Centerfield

OK, we've demonstrated that, given access to the source code, the voting machines are a lot less secure than they ought to be. Which means they could be compromised by someone with that kind of access. But for the much larger population which doesn't have such access, how easy is it? There is a lot to be said for trying the same kind of trial with expert hackers who don't have that kind of starting knowledge.

The other weakness of the test is that it doesn't seem (on the accounts I read here in California, where the story has been of obvious interest) to distinguish between the time it takes to set up a break-in and the time it takes to make a change to the results on-site. If I've got something on, for example, a flash drive, can I plug in and infect the system in seconds? Or do I need to spend some time working over the machine. Obviously the former would be much more of a threat.

Personally, I've spent too much time working on computers to be totally comfortable with a system which doesn't product a hard copy which can be reviewed if necessary. If I was designing a system, I'd have it product one that the voter could review at the time, and then deposit in the existing ballot boxes. Then, if there was a question, the results from the machine could be validated -- just like a re-count does today.