Centerfield

Boudica.

200K+ against 10K. Guess who won?

Tully, there is a difference between lightly disciplined, but working as a team (which is what Jon is proposing), and working essentially as individuals (i.e. a mob, which is what the Romans faced).

Against a mob, a small but disciplined group has a huge advantage. Against a team where the individuals are free to propose innovations within the basic plan, the rigidly disciplined group is actually at a handicap. Especially if the officers (OK, actually senior NCOs) get picked off, because the troops have no practice making decisions when the situation changes.

When I was in the Army, I started out really hating the spit-and-polish stuff. I didn't like spending hours polishing boots, or worrying that my uniform was properly pressed or my ribbons and insignia perfectly positioned. I also tended to push the boundaries on hair length.

But over time I grew to tolerate and even like some of it. It was relaxing, almost meditative. And it does serve several purposes:

1. Discipline. It helps build structured habits in the lives of people who don't always have them.

2. Cohesiveness. A lot of the drudge work in the military is shared -- you do it with your bunkmate or squad or platoon. It helps build an "us against the world" mentality that binds members of the unit closer together. And that's far more important (and harder to achieve) than in an office. There's a difference between cohesiveness in a civilian setting and cohesiveness when bullets are flying.

3. Morale. Forcing soldiers to look good makes them start taking pride in their appearance, and thus pride in their membership in the military. It also tends to spread to pride in their unit, their MOS and their accomplishments.

4. Advertising. Everyone in uniform reflects on public perceptions of the military. Polite, professional, sharply dressed soldiers convey a much better image than rude, rumpled, unshaven soldiers.

5. Busy work. There's a lot of downtime in the barracks. Keeping people busy shining shoes is a way to keep them from getting into trouble.

The key thing to remember is that things like this tend to be peacetime, back-on-base activities. Out in the field, nobody cares how you look or smell -- only that you do your job.

Thermopylae.

I've just read suggestions in Churchill that spit and polish is needed to maintain cohesiveness, but you know, Google, Dell Computer, and other private sector employers maintain their esprit de corps without them.

And we know all about the numerous times those dedicated code monkeys have laid their lives on the line, fighting hand-to-hand at overwhelming odds to defend the profit contribution margin of the laptop accessories division! GMAFB. Corporate commerce isn't war. Failure to meet monthly sales quotas rarely involves funerals.

Apparently some think military unit cohesiveness and esprit de corps and the absolutely required reflexive obedience to orders are built through committee meetings. Uh uh. Some also seem to believe that military discipline is necessarily "rigid" to the point of hide-binding, eradicating individual initiative completely, creating mindless robot soldiers incapable of acting. Also uh uh. When the fecal matter impacts the rotary impeller mechanism, no committee decision will save you. Only training and discipline and group cohesiveness will. Leadership is a good thing, yes, but the idea that leadership is fostered through a lack of exercised discipline is wishful thinking.

Take the United States Marine Corps as a case in point. There are few if any more thoroughly spit-and-polish organizations in the entire world with such high levels of discipline--and such high success levels. Know what their unofficial motto is? "Improvise, Adapt, and Overcome."

Highly disciplined and trained military units are enormously more effective in combat than "lightly" disciplined units. When the two meet in anything resembling equal numbers, it's no contest. "Lightly disciplined" is synonymous with "lightly dedicated" and "lightly obedient" and, worst of all, "lightly trained." Leader charisma can only do so much.

Innovation and adaptability are not in the least incompatible with discipline. Yes, there are drawbacks to discipline, but as the British say, "horses for courses." Consistently effective military action requires high levels of discipline. Lack of same leads to failure when facing disciplined units. The penalty for failure in military action is not the unemployment line.

Sean makes good points. "Barracks" discipline has a very sound basis in military psychology. In armies where non-combat discipline is not enforced, unit combat quality goes to hell, and the learning curve for such units in battle is paid for in blood.

In some areas I agree that discipline built on the strict rank structure is useful for some war fighting, However as the military becomes increasingly high tech that kind of discipline becomes less important.
If you are talking about infantry assaulting a building or an enemy position immediate obedience to orders is probably required. If you are talking about operating a nuclear reactor on a submarine that same immediate obedience could be catastrophic.
War fighting changing, the battles involve fewer infantry assaults and more tomahawk missile or predator UAV strikes. The enlisted personnel are more likely to be involved in high tech jobs like programming the tomahawks, repairing the UAV, or calibrating satellite communication gear. These high tech jobs need people who can think, and make decisions without consulting the chain of command.
Infantry will always be important but today a battle may also be decided based on who has better accuracy, faster repair rate, and fewest technical errors. A stealth bomber loses its advantage if the landing gear doesn’t retract due to improper maintenance. Humans make mistakes, in today’s military it is better to have someone who is able to tell their superiors that they are wrong and what the correct answer is. In high tech jobs the spit and polish discipline of yesteryear is counterproductive.

Straw manning. Discipline and the rank structure and obedience to command does NOT turn people into robot zombies and their commanders into idiots, nor does it make every single decision one requiring a direct order and micromanagement running up the entire chain of command.

The reasons for "barracks discipline" stand, though the practice in application has always varied to fit the unit type and mission. Different forces have different approaches. The discipline of Air Force support units doesn't look much like that of mechanized infantry or Marine Corps assault teams or Navy gunships. Yet the same principles apply across all of them.

For comparions of how differing approaches to disciplne have worked in our own military, one could compare the Carter-era armed forces with those of today. It's not a pretty comparison. Superior forces come from superior training and unit cohesiveness, which in turn comes from highly disciplined units.

I'm not talking about robot zombies or idiots, I'm talking about extremely smart people who every once in a while make a mistake. Sometimes in a stressful situation an officer will get turned around and order something isolated on the port side instead of starboard. Instead of correcting a problem this could cause a loss of propulsion leaving the boat dead in the water. I need to have a very junior sailor not obey that order, correct the officer, then follow the correct order to fix whatever was broke.
The problem is that the officers are trained not to ask questions, they give orders. They are allowed to get around that by saying things like "report how to isolate that section of pipe” instead of "how do we isolate this". The junior sailor gets trained in boot camp and in initial schooling to quickly follow orders that don't seem to make sense. Marching in formation has very little practical use. These habits create a situation where an incorrect order could be followed and take the ship out of the fight.
The navy trains very hard to prevent this but the discipline, rank structure, and obedience to command create an opportunity for uncorrected errors.

Alot of interesting answers here. I learned alot. Thanks!

It's not quite the same thing, but I will point out a couple of cases where superior drilling failed: Pylos and Sphacteria, won by Athens over Sparta, in the Peloponnesian War.

The drilling didn't fail in those cases, the attack and defense plans did. Not every battle can be won. War's not a programmed computer game--stuff happens. "For want of a nail..."

I'd note that the first battle you cite (Pylos) was mostly a sea battle, followed by the Spartans trying to land against an entrenched Athenian force, which wasn't exactly the Spartan's best point of militarism. Or anyone's--standard "required force superiority" numbers for the times for even attempting to break such a position on land were three to one or better, not even money, and the Spartans were attempting it from the sea. And the numbers were somewhat equal. There was no failure of discipline and cohesiveness on either side, the Athenians just plain had the upper hand of position and preparation and used it well.

And Sphacteria? Gimme a break, Jon! There were less than 500 Spartans trapped on a small island, they had food enough to keep from being starved into surrender but little else other than their weapons, and Demosthenes took them with a force of ten thousand. The Athenians weren't undisciplined neophyte slouches either--we're definitely not talking Boudica's screaming hordes. They may not have been up to the Spartan standards but they were competent and experienced, and at those odds Demosthenes didn't need to bring the kryptonite.

But things are a lot less likely to go wrong in a cohesive, well-disciplined, well-trained unit.

Bernie, you seem intent on creating strawmen. As Tully has clearly pointed out, "discipline" does not mean "slavish adherence to every single order no matter what."

You also overlook the serious potential pitfalls in the looser approach to order-following you try to describe. Take your nuclear submarine example. Now there's a place where it's actually extremely important to follow orders. Say you're an engineer, dealing with a reactor problem. The standard course of action might be to open a particular valve, say. But unbeknownst to you, a separate problem has arisen at the other end of the pipe connected to that valve, and opening it would have catastrophic effect. The officer giving you orders knows about the other problem, but you don't. If you do what YOU think is right, based on the limited knowledge you have, you might kill some of the crew, or seriously damage the boat.

Moreover, many times there is not a single absolutely "right" answer. But hesitation in crisis situations is almost always disastrous. The crucial thing is for a decision to be made immediately, not debated in committee by those who THINK they know better.

Another good reason for the barracks discipline is that it serves as a proxy for demonstrating what level of care and attention you will pay to more crucial details. A person who keeps an unkempt room is also probably not that careful to keep their firearms well-cleaned, or to maintain the 50-caliber machine gun assigned to them, and on which YOUR life may depend.

Bernie, well-trained officers are also trained a bit better than to just give orders. For an example, Google the story/question for which the right answer is: "Sargeant, get that flagpole up."

Pat, I worked in a submarine engine room for nearly 2 decades. The situation I described happened about once a week, while we are running drills simulating severe accidents. The people who work in the engine room are very well trained; they know how every system is built, and how it is lined up. The officer on watch in the engine room is very junior; they spend their first year there before they go forward to drive.
The officers learn the basics of the plant while they also learn navigation, weapons systems, and tactics. The enlisted men learn the intricate details of the systems. When anything out of the ordinary happens for real they generally follow the recommendations of the enlisted watch standers. They are extremely smart but they are supposed to learn how to sink targets, not every detail of the engine room. The problem comes when I get a new enlisted man onboard who doesn’t think its his place to correct an officer.
My point is that as the rest of the military becomes more technical, these situations will be more common. The enlisted person is typically smart and very well trained, and often more knowledgeable about the technical specifics than the officers. The officers are supposed to have the battle field picture, not the details.
Your second point however is dead on. I’ve always heard it referred to as “attention to detail”, learning that every minor detail is important. The idea behind inspections noting even insignificant flaws is that it teaches people to how to focus on a project and ensure it is perfect. Once they have that method of thinking mastered you can give them jobs like repairing critical pieces of equipment.
Wj, I’m looking but I can’t find anything. Could you give me another hint?

I'll detail the story. It's an old ROTC/OCS standard trick question on leadership and command and micromanagement for officer candidates.

"If you had a 100-foot 500-lb flagpole on the ground, and a full platoon of men and one sergeant, what series of commands would you give to get the flagpole raised?"

The correct answer is, you say to the sergeant, "Sergeant, raise that flagpole." Then you STFU and let the men do their job.

Oh, speaking of the group issues reminded me that Fedex has, in effect, a boot camp. That's one reason, I guess, why you don't hear about people "going Fedex". I met a graduate of said camp on a Fedex tour once. He did seem more into Fedex group than your average programmer.

(Pylos) was mostly a sea battle, followed by the Spartans trying to land against an entrenched Athenian force, which wasn't exactly the Spartan's best point of militarism

It was the other way around. The Spartan fleet got there before the Athenian one. Demosthenes had five ships' worth of soldiers. The Spartan fleet had 43. Demosthenes fought them off for a day and a half before the Athenian's 50 ships of reinforcements appeared. Yes, Soarta had the advantage. We don't know how many men each side had, but we do know the Spartans had 8x as many vessels. So, yeah, it was a bridgehead situation, but the Spartans had vast superiority and really should've been able to do it if they were so 'leet.

And Sphacteria? Gimme a break, Jon! There were less than 500 Spartans trapped on a small island, they had food enough to keep from being starved into surrender but little else other than their weapons, and Demosthenes took them with a force of ten thousand.

I'm failing to see the ten thousand in Thucydides. I do see that they're embarked in just a few ships. Thucydides only mentions over 2400. Though you're right that it's still quite a margin - 400 Spartans, likely. Again a bridgehead, with odds no worse than Pylos, I think. Except this time the landing happened, poorly opposed, because the Spartan troopers let themselves be surprised.

Now, the Athenians probably had some kind of spit and polish - the point I was making -, just less than the Spartans.

The Spartan fleet got there before the Athenian one.

Er, no, not really, though the major sea battle did take place after and not before the garrison landing. My bad, and I got the initial numbers wrong as well. More like 1800 Spartan land troops plus their armed ship's crews versus 450 Athenian land troops and some unarmed ship's crews in the first assault. (Thucydides emphasizes the lack of arms available for Demosthenes' sailors, but is unclear on counting them.) There was no initial sea battle before the first assault--Demosthenes had beached his ships as soon as the Spartan fleet appeared. The Spartans had to try to take the fort from the sea, while landing troops to reach the land approaches (said land approaches sucked as assault paths, BTW--it was a very well-positioned fort). And they weren't just the fleet--they'd sent land forces overland as well, although they apparently didn't arrive before the main scrum and didn't play a part in it.

Anyway, the Athenian fleet was there first, left troops to fortify the garrison, then moved on, leaving Demosthenes with five ships, maybe 400+ soldiers, and a good fortified position. THEN the Spartans sent ships to take Pylos back, fielding about four or five times as many land troops as Demosthenes had plus their ship's crews (150 per ship--lightly armed rowers) crashing (and losing) many of their ships on the rocks to get their troops landed. They were assaulting a well-fortified position from the sea via an exposed landing, and they failed in the direct assault. No surprise there. They DID get their forces landed and got established for a siege--one they would inevitably win if they had enough time. Their next error was sending away ships for timber to build the siege engines, further weakening their fleet.

But the Athenian fleet arrived by surprise on the second day, taking the weakened Spartan fleet from behind with superior numbers in the sea battle on the morning of the third day. The Spartan fleet fled.

(You can discount the Spartan rowers in the initial assualt, if you like. In an assault against a fortified position like Pylos they'd be muscle and cannon fodder, unable to bring the numbers and muscle to bear on any position. But they were there, and had they had time for the siege to work would have counted considerably. As would the Spartan land forces, had they arrived in time.)

Most of the Spartans (and most of their remaining ships) fled, leaving the Athenians in control of the harbor and the shore fort, but some 400-500 Spartans were trapped on the island of Sphacteria in the harbor, left behind with no rescue in sight. By the time the Athenians took Sphacteria (after some diplomatic double-dealing that would make the Soviets blush) they had reinforced and were fielding maybe 3000 land soldiers plus the crews of their fleet, another 7000 or so lightly armed extras*. Against a few hundred Spartans on a small island with only a few good positions. The Athenians swarmed the island from all directions in massive force after weeks of perparations, and those thousands of lightly-armed rowers supplementing the heavily-armed land troops did indeed count. The Spartans were pushed back to their makeshift fort, but surrendered when they were surrounded--they simply didn't have the numbers to stop the invasion or even hold their make-shift fortified position for long. No power of position would stop the numbers they faced--by then they were almost halved in number by casualties, and they were facing thousands with a couple of hundred and NO supply lines.

But the idea that either side was "lightly disciplined" or that the battles represent some kind of victory for a lack of military discipline is eminently laughable. Both sides were indeed experienced and disciplined military forces--the war had been going on for several years at that point.

The biggest error by either side was the Spartan's failure to blockade both mouths of the harbor after their initial assualt, but after their abortive direct assault they may well have lacked the ships and men to do so. The Athenian fleet had them by numbers in both ships and troops when it arrived, Demosthenes still held the high ground on land, and once the Athenian fleet got into the harbor against the much-reduced Spartan fleet the outcome of the sea battle was a given.

I'm failing to see the ten thousand in Thucydides. I do see that they're embarked in just a few ships. Thucydides only mentions over 2400.

RE: numbers on Sphacteria: Read closer in Thucydides. The forces used against the few hundred Spartans on Sphacteria consisted of "800 heavy infantry" in the initial landing, followed up with "ALL the crews of rather more than seventy ships, except the lowest rank of oars, with the arms they carried, and eight hundred archers, and as many targeteers, the Messenian reinforcements, and all the other troops on duty round Pylos, except the garrison on the fort" in the second landing (Thucydides, 4:31) Add 'em up as best you can--but I get about 2400 regulars PLUS the Messenians PLUS the land troops installed in Pylos after the harbor victory PLUS seven thousand lightly armed ship's crew*. That's a LOT of troops to face off with 400-500, even if they were the best Sparta ever produced.

Ten thousand may even be a slightly conservative number--Thucydides does not enumerate the numbers of the Messenians, or of the land forces already in Pylos. I get 2400 Athenian regulars plus 7000 lightly armed "shock troops" plus the unenumerated-but-numerous forces.

(*--I am being VERY conservative, and taking the lower bound of "rather more than seventy" and the number of rowers in a classic fifth-century Athenian trireme. A trireme carried three banks of oars, roughly 25 per bank per side, one man to an oar. That would be 150 rowers per ship [actually 174 in classic form]. If they took all but the "lowest rank," that's a minimum of 100 per ship times 70 ships is 7000 armed ship's crew for the "light" forces and shock troops, with 50 times 70 is 3500 crew staying on board the ships. BTW, a "targeteer" is a light infantry soldier who protects the archers until it's time to charge. A classic trireme actually carried by level 62 in the top rank, 58 in the middle rank, and 54 in the bottom rank. Using those figures and seventy ships as the base, that would be 8400 crew landed as light troops.)

Tully, thanks for the response on that flagpole problem. (The version I learned included a flat plain, with no trees or rocks in sight. Nor any tools on hand, either. Just to make the would-be junior officer wrack his brain more at the hopelessness of it all . . . before discovering the "solution.")

The lesson, which any decent training program for officers must inculcate, it that senior NCOs actually run a military unit. And if the junior officers will just let them, life will be easier all round. Not to mention significantly longer.

(on Pylos)
They DID get their forces landed and got established for a siege--one they would inevitably win if they had enough time.

Some, landed out of sight. Not sure if it's clear from the account that there were enough to make it clear. It took them a long time to get there because they had to land out of sight.

Rather more to the original point of troops with more spit and polish not winning in direct battle, it's still true that Demosthenes beat off much larger numbers of Spartans in a series of direct landing attempts.

(on Sphacteria)
followed up with "ALL the crews of rather more than seventy ships

OK, I'd been looking for the numbers of ships involved but wasn't spotting it. Now I'd say you're right - it was even less even than Pylos.

BUT - it's still true that one reason the Athenians had an easier time was that they caught the 'leet Spartans in bed. At Pylos, the Athenians successfully and hotly opposed every frontal landing attempt made while they were at a disadvantage. The Spartans completely failed to even make the landing hard in battle, and at that point they had to lose fairly quickly.

They still both look to me like cases where spit and polish didn't work so well.

I'm surprised the question was asked, and further surprised the thread has reached towards 20 comments.

IMO, discipline in the military is a pretty obvious virtue. In general, warriors need to respond quickly, cohesively, and without questions for a command structure to be successful.

Quibbles can be made, as folks above have shown. But no serious points can be made without strawnmanning the concept of a soldier to be precisely equal to a dumb obedient automaton. That's insulting.

At Pylos, the Athenians successfully and hotly opposed every frontal landing attempt made while they were at a disadvantage.

The Athenians were at a disadvantage in numbers, but they had a HUGE advantage in position--they already occupied a strong hilltop fortification, above the landing. They held the high ground, the available landing was ugly (the Spartans had to beach their ships on rocks, disabling them) and the assault path between the landing and the fort was ugly--and under fire from the fort. Demosthenes' beached ships blocked the only easy landing, leaving the one landing available for a direct assault a lousy place to try it from. Then he made sure that it looked like his weakest point anyway, so the Spartans would try it. Which they did. (Suckered!)

Go look up the locations of Pylos, Sparta, and Athens on a map, Jon. (Pylos was in Messenia, which is next door to Sparta. Sparta controlled Messenia at the time--the Messenians who aided Athens came from the Messenian colony at Naupactus, where the Athenians had given them space and used them to help control that harbor. Spartan troops could come overland. Athenian troops could not.) After the original assault failed, the Spartans figured they could set up for the siege and wait for their overland reinforcements from Laconia and Messenia. Why waste more troops on assaulting the fort? They could walk right in and take it in a week or two just by cutting off the water and supplies with a siege.

Caught sleeping, they were. They didn't know that big Athenian fleet was coming from Zakynthos. Had they known, they would never have sent any ships away for timbers. And they would have made sure to blockade the harbor entrances. They thought they had a lot more time than they did. They were wrong.

Spit and polish had nothing to do with it--you just wanna sneer at the Spartans. Neither side was, in your own words, "a minimally disciplined army." Which makes the battle inapplicable to your original point. It was just plain war, between two experienced forces that had been slugging it out for several years by then.

And not to put too fine a point on it, Jon, but who won the Peloponnesian War again? Remind me. ;-)

Spit and polish had nothing to do with it--you just wanna sneer at the Spartans.

I do?

Look, these are just TWO examples out of tons of fights out there. All this says is that discipline doesn't win every single battle. That's surely not news.

Notice, I think leadership is a more important issue than discipline. I think the most important reason Athens won these two battles is that Demosthenes and Cleon (especially Demosthenes, maybe) were smarter than Thrasymelidas or Epitadas, the Spartan leaders.

...who won the Peloponnesian War again?

Athens' fellow democracy, Syracuse, because they had leadership that could stand up to Athens'. Unlike Sparta. Democracies are largely better at choosing leaders ,INCLUDING military leaders, and more enthusiastic about following them. Notice, the Spartan alliance alone was unable to win without that error of Athens' empire going against another big democracy. All the Athenian arrogance was for naught until that.

Notice that it was the same for us in Vietnam. For all his undemocratic ways and assorted nastiness, still the simple fact of his election meant Ho Chi Minh had a much more enthusiastic following than the South Vietnamese dictators we backed. I think it would've just been Korea again without that election.

All this says is that discipline doesn't win every single battle.

But Jon, who thinks that? It would be silly to think that discipline wins every battle. Isn't it FAR more reasonable to state the pro-discipline hypothesis by saying that discipline sure seems to increases your chances in the majority of warfare situations, other things being equal? It's pretty analagous to the common sense notion that "chance favors the prepared mind."

That seems like a no brainer to me. I remember as a much younger man reading an interview with, if memory serves, Bill Bradley, who later became a senator. Could have been some other hoops player though, it was long ago. Anyway Bradley or whoever was well known for his religious practice and devotion to craft. And what he said when asked about it always stuck with me. He said that he used to imagine a situation where he came up against his doppelganger, his twin in the world, someone just as tall, just as gifted, just as able. he knew that in such a situation, he wanted to win, and that in this case, it would be disciplined preparation that made the difference, because everything else would be equal.

It's not about guarantees, it's about maximizing your chances.

Athens' fellow democracy, Syracuse, because they had leadership that could stand up to Athens'. Unlike Sparta.

Nice try! Lysander would be surprised to hear that, Jon. Do you think the war ended at the end of Thucydides' history, which he chopped off to leave Athens looking victorious in his narrative after their humbling by Syracuse and its allies and saviors* as a result of their complete overreaching, even though the war itself went on for several more years past Thucydides' history? Just can't bring yourself to admit that the Spartans managed to prevail, can you, Jon?

Exhibit B in the Spartan-bashing:

SPARTA won, Jon. Battle of Aegospotami. Athenian fleet destroyed by Lysander. Wiped out. Lysander marched on and besieged Athens, and ATHENS SURRENDERED TO SPARTA. End of the Peloponnesian war. (Xenophon, 2.2.19-20)

(Not that Athens did itself any good killing most of its generals after Arginusae. That must be that superior democratic leader-choosing you were speaking of. As was the decision to launch the Sicilian Expedition in the first place. Almost the textbook definition of hubris, that.)

And after being conquered by Sparta, Athens was not destroyed, not razed to the ground, not obliterated as the Corinthians and Thebans demanded, its people neither slaughtered or enslaved, why again, Jon? Oh, yeah! Because Sparta wouldn't allow it. Magnanimous in victory.

*--Syracuse beat Athens in the Sicilian Expedition. But I hear Syracuse also had a little help breaking the Athenian siege, and in the ultimate expulsion of the Athenians. Some guy named Gylippus, wasn't it? Where did they dig him up from, anyway? (Hint: Six letters, starts with an "S"....) And who led the Syracusan ground forces in the expulsion, capturing Demsothenes? And who was it Nicias surrendered to again? Oh yeah, that would be Gylippus again, that famous democratic Syracusan general, so superior because he came from democratic Syracuse...wait, he wasn't from Syracuse, was he? Where did he come from? I forget. ;-)

Tully:
Yes, I'm aware that the alliance took Athens, burned their fleet, and made them agree to harsh terms that succeeded in preventing their return as a great power. But every word of what I wrote about the democratic Syracuse being the strategic difference-maker is true. Do we give primary credit to France or Adm. de Grasse and his fleet in the Revolutionary War? No, and I doubt Syracuse saw it any differently.

Brian:
Isn't it FAR more reasonable to state the pro-discipline hypothesis by saying that discipline sure seems to increases your chances in the majority of warfare situations, other things being equal?

Yes, indeed. And, I guess, at this point in the thread, the hypothesis is neither proven nor disproven. We'd need something like thirty battles where the major difference was discipline and nothing else.

Maybe I should go start an undiscplined but drilled mercenary company, to gather evidence ;-).

Uh huh. And the French won WW2 for us.

The Syracusans were getting their butts kicked before they imported a Spartan general to command their forces, and he kicked it open and chased out the Athenians in short order. BTW, Lysander burned the Athenian fleet weeks before the assault on Athens. Without the help of Syracuse. Athens hurt itself with its own over-reaching. As I said, hubris.

And when both Phillip of Macedon and his son Alexander came through the Pelopponese, they left exactly one city-state alone. The bad-asses of Sparta. I still think the Spartan's reply to Phillip's threats of invasion an eradication was as good as it gets in defining their attitude.

We'd need something like thirty battles where the major difference was discipline and nothing else.

You'll be lucky to find one. Hard enough just to find battles between equal forces, much less equal in all other regards. But if you do, mark me down for bets on the disciplined units.

Maybe I should go start an undiscplined but drilled mercenary company, to gather evidence ;-).

"Drilled but undisciplined" is almost a contradiction in terms. But I'd be interested to see the results. From a distance. :-D

and he kicked it open and chased out the Athenians in short order.

...yeah, because alliance forces + Syracuse outnumbered the Athenians. Though, the most important butt-kicking, at sea, was a decided novelty for the Spartan side. I think the Syracusan left flank must've made a real difference. They were good at sea, like Athens, and for the same reasons.

> Lysander burned the Athenian fleet weeks before the assault on Athens.

Well, I admit that I was thinking that that had happened because too much of the fleet had died at Euboea, on the Syracusan front. But, no. Thanks for the steer to Xenophon. Still, Syracuse did cause some changes. The Athenian fleet's handling against Lysander does seem rather as though Team B was in charge.

It reminds me of how stupidly toll roads and some other things are handled in Austin now that Team A is away and running the country. In particular, we see that the very effective Demosthenes commanded fleets as well as armies, and that fleet commanders Menander and Euthydemus were also lost near Syracuse. And it wasn't just the strategoi, but probably almost everybody promising.

There's a real trend here: fleets on Athens' side were mostly winning battles even at bad odds until they went against the combination of Syracusan fleets and enough allied ships to give Syracuse' side a chance. After that, all of a sudden, they were being stupider than even the Spartan fleets.

And, what if Athens had conquered Sicily on plan? Would the Spartan Allience even've gone back to war? My theory is that that would've been noticeably easier without the big democracy there. Certainly, Team A would've been back to oppose Lysander.

Even if they'd just won on the sea, as they probably would've against a non-democracy, they'd've retreated with almost everything to Athens, including their naval Team A. The oligarchies would've had to rebuild their navies and armies. The balance would've shifted toward Athens.

Thucydides, in ch23, says the Syracusans DID see it just like I suggest:

"the Syracusans no longer thought only of saving themselves, but also how to hinder the escape of the enemy; thinking, and thinking rightly, that they were now much the stronger, and that to conquer the Athenians and their allies by land and sea would win them great glory in Hellas. The rest of the Hellenes would thus immediately be either freed or released from apprehension, as the remaining forces of Athens would be henceforth unable to sustain the war that would be waged against her; while they,the Syracusans, would be regarded as the authors of this deliverance, and would be held in high admiration, not only with all men now living but also with posterity. Nor were these the only considerations that gave dignity to the struggle. They would thus conquer not only the Athenians but also their numerous allies, and conquer not alone, but with their companions in arms, commanding side by side with the Corinthians and Lacedaemonians, having offered their city to stand in the van of danger, and having been in a great measure the pioneers of naval success."

Henry needed his "professional" archers, when officers refused to obey his command to kill French prisoners at Agincourt Octoer 25 1415.

Years later, calvary stood behind unwilling infantry at Waterloo. Battle has a coercion of its own, apart from personal persuasions that the cause is just. Defeat is still unacceptable and modern warfare seems to techno/Catch-22 its ubiquitous coercion on today's professional soldiers as Keegan predicted. It's becoming more remote-controlled and impersonal with fewer Western societies supporting continued military readiness.

Robo armies will have maximum dicipline, but will their neural nets allow for initiative, risk taking, creativity and resourcefulness shown by humans? We don't always win a game with logic.

Drilled and "creatively adapative" perhaps.....

right link for above

The prior link showed an example of drilled and creative....LOL

What, Jon, Thucydides the Athenian didn't want to give Sparta any credit? The same guy who closed out his history of the Peloponnesian War several years early to leave out the fact that Athens lost? What a shock--he seemed like such an honest guy!

All Thucydides is saying is that AFTER Gylippus the Spartan delivered Syracuse from near-ruin, Syracuse wanted to take advantage of the situation for their own glory and influence. Duh. But they didn't. They had other problems on their hands, namely Carthage, which kept them busy well through the end of the Peleponnesian War and the fall of Athens. Any impairment of Athen's military strength from the Sicilian Expedition was completely self-inflicted.

And, what if Athens had conquered Sicily on plan?

Then they might have been fighting Carthage in very short order--Carthage badly wanted to reclaim ALL of Sicily, not just Syracuse. Which would not have helped Athens in the least in holding off the Spartans. Unless they managed an alliance with the Carthaginians, in which case the history of both Greece and Rome would have been very different. I think an alliance was very unlikely--unless Athens handed over Sicily to Carthage in payment.

But it didn't happen, did it? If, if if...

Sparta won. Athens lost. Syracuse did not send troops to Lysander, or join in the sea battle that destroyed the Athenian fleet. They were busy with Carthage. Sparta won the war, soundly defeating Athens. Simple enough.

Boy, Xenophon is pretty depressing right now. I'm still in the inevitable postwar disorder.

Where does T. deny Sparta credit? He just says (and seems inclined to agree himself) that Syracuse felt they deserved primary credit. He gives lots of credit to the Spartans as well. I agree with him - the Spartans were vital players in the alliance, but it was Syracuse that ripped the heart out of the Athenian navy, the Team A I talk about.

Thucydides' feeling that way rather suggests that a man a little familiar with who was who in the Athenian Navy, felt that there was a critical loss of some kind at Euboea.

Before Syracuse, what fraction of sea fights come out losses for Athens, let alone in stupid duffer ways like in their two battles against Lysander? There were several fights, and the answer is, not many.

Then they might have been fighting Carthage in very short order--Carthage badly wanted to reclaim ALL of Sicily, not just Syracuse.

That might be true. Conquering the world is annoyingly hard, isn't it? See, now, if Alcibiades had had a chance to play modern strategy games as a kid, maybe he would've understood about "one at a time."