Centerfield

I think I'd go with #2 -- Rumsfeld didn't believe in occupations. Combined, probably, with the delusion that one wouldn't be necessary in Iraq. Ignorance of another country and culture will do that to you, whether it's willful ignorance or not.

And I have to disagree with your comment that he (and his generals) did a pretty good job with the traditional part of the war. I think "adequate" is as far as I would go. Just for one, the contrast between the logistics execution of the first Gulf War vs. the Iraq invasion show how much better it could have been done: we sure didn't see combat troops completely outrunning their resupply, and unescorted or minimally escorted supply runs getting ambushed, during GW I.

I know it is a bit off your target Jon, but here are some thoughts from Stratfor on AQ in Iraq:

"Iraq: Al Qaeda's Desperate Moves
March 23, 2007 18 22 GMT

In a new video posted March 22 on the Internet, al Qaeda leader Abu Yahia al-Libi called for an end to the schisms between Iraqi Sunni Islamist insurgents and jihadists in Iraq, and for Iraq's Sunnis to reject any Saudi involvement in the conflict. The release is a clear effort by the jihadist network to mend fences with the Sunni insurgents. Significantly, it also demonstrates an al Qaeda attempt to raise al-Libi's public profile in preparation for him to assume a greater role among the network's next generation of leaders.

This release, by al Qaeda's As-Sahab media branch, marks the ninth time al-Libi has appeared in an al Qaeda video statement since February 2006. Only al Qaeda second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri has appeared in more new videos, with a total of 12 over the same time period. The charismatic al-Libi, who has strong jihadist credentials, would indeed be a good choice to take on a more prominent role in al Qaeda. As an accomplished preacher, he has eulogized fallen jihadist leaders and called on jihadists to attack such prominent targets as the White House. In addition, he is a veteran of the war in Afghanistan, and was one of four prominent al Qaeda fighters who escaped U.S. custody while imprisoned at Bagram Air Base in July 2005.

In his latest statement, al-Libi specifically called on militant groups Ansar al-Sunnah Army, the Islamic Army in Iraq and the Army of the Mujahideen to put aside their differences with the other Sunni insurgent groups in the country. This call for unity comes amid open conflict between Sunni tribes and al Qaeda in Iraq, as demonstrated by the March 23 attack against the Sunni deputy prime minister in Baghdad and the attacks against civilians involving chlorine gas in predominantly Sunni Anbar province.

Al Qaeda, which is facing a significant threat from Iraq's Sunni nationalist and Islamist militant groups, is trying to achieve three goals: First, to maintain its parallel power structure in the Sunni areas; second, to emerge as the vanguard of the Sunni resistance to the United States and the Shiite-dominated Iraqi government at a time when Sunni political leaders are cutting deals; and finally, to embarrass the Iraqi Islamist militant groups by arguing that they are not following true Islamic teachings.

The latest attack against a moderate Sunni -- likely carried out by the jihadists -- clearly suggests these transnational elements are attempting to discourage Sunni leaders from following a moderate path and cooperating with the Iraqi government, or from accepting help from Saudi Arabia. Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Salam Zikam Ali al-Zubaie was wounded in the suicide bombing attack, which occurred during Friday prayers at a hall near Baghdad's Foreign Ministry. A week earlier, suspected jihadist insurgents detonated three vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices packed with chlorine west of Baghdad in Anbar province, including one near a prayer hall used by a Sunni cleric who had spoken out against al Qaeda.

These attacks and al-Libi's appeal are signs of desperation on the part of the jihadists in Iraq. Al Qaeda realizes its influence in the country is waning and is appealing to Iraqi and foreign jihadists to concentrate their efforts on the common enemy, rather than on one another. That al-Libi made an appeal that normally would have come from al-Zawahiri or Osama bin Laden suggests he is being groomed to take on a more important role in al Qaeda." -------23 hours ago

I tend to side with Ricks view. I don't know anyone with such ground info and experiance who read Ricks, other than Bobby. He did say he endorsed Ricks highly when he told me to read FIASCO. Before he disappeared, he talked with Jon a bit about "surge" strategy. So far, he seems to have gotten it right. Yes? So again, I think it was a combination of 1 and 2. I give Bush credit for changing course a bit after the election and rejecting the negative suggestions in some of the ISG and Democrat(ic) recommendations. I also sensed some blind arrogance in Rummie and a whole lot of dreaming. It begs the question: how many experts does it take to influence policy? Certainly, Rummie knew that Saddam had created a huge network of thugs and criminals. These people were not likely to embrace liberation. What I don't understand is why Bush allowed Brehmer (sp?) to order actions that I thought were NOT in the game plan, like the disbanding and de-bathification of everyone. I am also not clear why we don't have more force in the disputed waterways. I also leave this link because I think Iran has always been part of the larger equation, or at least SHOULD have been.

I think one of the main concerns is that they didn't want to impose too much law and order for risk of appearing more like an occupying force. Think of the day we went into Baghdad, the day the statue came down. Imagine that the pictures that came out that day were of American troops handcuffing Iraqis, maybe even using physical force on certain looters who tried to resist. While in hindsight we should have been enforcing the law more, I can see the thoughts that were going through the heads of Rumsfield and others.

wj: Tossing a hated occupation force out (GW1) is easier than invading a country. But I'd also say that GW1 is simply brilliant, as well-done a as we've had. No, Iraq II wasn't at that level. But I do see it as pretty good. No war is perfect - even GW1 had its handful of losses!

Max:
You know, al-Qaeda's basic strategy has a serious flaw.

They assume blowing people up and superior religious passion can win long-term. Blowing people up cleverly does have some advantages: it does bring in attention, $$$, and cachet.

BUT, also, every time they blow somebody up, no matter how cleverly, they mobilize much more support against them. And that's what we see in Iraq: every time they blow somebody up, more people there hate them. That's how they went from owning Afghanistan to being on the run in more and more places.

Al'Sadr is much more dangerous because he focuses on controlling people, milking that control, and is willing to do more deals with non-fanatics. The results speak for themselves in the numbers of people and amount of ground controlled.

"Good generals study strategy; great generals study logistics."

No question, we had a great general running GW I. But the Iraq war? We certainly had very good tactics in the initial invasion. But strategy? Only at the lowest level. Certainly nothing resembling a grand strategy: what do we do with the country once we capture it.

It occurs to me that there is a certain parallel with the Rovian approach to politics. Pretty effective at winning an individual (election) battle. But, on current evidence, no effective long-term strategy.

I'd suggest reading State of Denial by Bob Woodward. It reveals an administration totally unconcerned with post-war planning. They viewed Iraq in very simple terms, much like Bush does with most every issue.

Sorry, but Woodward is just a step or two in front of Hirsch. Look, even Cobra ll tried to pin much of the blame on the administration and lighten the military responsibility. nfortunately, I think Woodward did have a bit of politics on the mind. I still think Ricks was closer to the truth.

["One of the first things Bremer did after arriving in Iraq was to show Garner the order he intended to issue to rid Iraq of Baathist leadership, "Senior Party menebers," it stated, "are hereby removed from their positions and banned from future employment in the public sector." In addition, anyone holding a position in the top three management layers of any ministry, government-run corporation, university, or hospital and who was a party member -even of a junior rank -would be deemed to be a senior Baathist and so would be fired. What's more, those suspected of crimes would be investigated and, if deamed a flight risk, would be detained or placed under house arrest.
Garner was appalled. This went far beyond what he had planned for months and, in fact, had briefed Rumsfeld and President Bush. The message Garner had given his subordinates, recalled his strategy chief, Col. Paul Hughes, was, "Let them sort out their own de-Baathification -either kill them or force them to leave."
If issued as written, the order Bremer was carrying would lead to disaster, Garner thought. He went to see the CIA station chief, whom Garner had seen work well with the military. "This is too hard," Garner told the CIA officer, who read it and agreed. The two allies went back to Bremer.
"Give us an hour or so to redo this," Garner asked.
"Absolutely not," Bremer responded. "I have my instructions, and I am going to issue this."
The CIA station chief urged Bremer to reconsider. These are the people who know where the levers of the infrastructure are, from electricity to water to transportation, he said. Take them out of the equation and you undercut the operation of the country, he warned.
No, said Bremer.
Okay, the veteran CIA man responded. Do this, he said, but understand one thing. "By nighfall, you'll have 30,000 to 50,000 Baathists underground. And in the next six months, you'll really regret this."]

FIASCO by Thomas Ricks pages 139 - 139

Who issued Bremer's "instructions"? Who issued the instruction to completely disband the Iraq army? While it is clear the military Brass did not resign over these moves, it seems clear that the instructions Bremer carried out, put the military in a position they did not plan for. These moves weren;t even the policy as discussed by the adminstration's Press Secretary. From cutting reserves troops to de-Baathification, from disbanding the Army to a lack of security personal to train police and build counterterrorist operations, even the approval of resources and orders to sieze and hold cities in Anbar from the start, our post-war policy went to the dogs. There is plenty of blame to go around, but I think Woodward tends to look in one direction.

Stratfor with another this Monday morning. Interesting read.

"…In considering the situation, our attention is drawn to a strange paradox that has been manifest in American foreign policy since World War II. On the one hand, the United States has consistently encountered strategic stalemate or defeat in particular politico-military operations. At those times, the outcomes have appeared to be disappointing if not catastrophic. Yet, over the same period of time, U.S. global power, on the whole, has surged. In spite of stalemate and defeat during the Cold War, the United States was more in 2000 than it had been in 1950…

…Put somewhat differently, there is the liberal view that the Soviet Union was not defeated by the United States in the Cold War, but that it collapsed itself, and the military conflicts of the Cold War were unnecessary. There is the conservative view that the United States won the Cold War in spite of a fundamental flaw in the American character -- an unwillingness to bear the burden of war -- and that this flaw ultimately will prove disastrous for the United States. Finally, there is the non-ideological, non-political view that the United States won the Cold War in spite of defeats and stalemates because these wars were never as important as either the liberals or conservatives made them out to be, however necessary they might have been seen to be at the time…

…If we apply these analyses to Iraq, three schools of thought emerge. The first says that the Iraq war is unnecessary and even harmful in the context of the U.S.-jihadist confrontation -- and that, regardless of outcome, it should not be fought. The second says that the war is essential -- and that, while defeat or stalemate in this conflict perhaps would not be catastrophic to the United States, there is a possibility that it would be catastrophic. And at any rate, this argument continues, the United States' ongoing inability to impose its will in conflicts of this class ultimately will destroy it. Finally, there is the view that Iraq is simply a small piece of a bigger war and that the outcome of this particular conflict will not be decisive, although the war might be necessary. The heated rhetoric surrounding the Iraq conflict stems from the traditional American inability to hold things in perspective…

…Even in cases where the enemy was engaged fully, the United States limited its commitment of resources. In Vietnam, for example, the defeat of North Vietnam and regime change were explicitly ruled out. The United States had as its explicit goal a stalemate, in which both South and North Vietnam survived as independent states. In Korea, the United States shifted to a stalemate strategy after the Chinese intervention. So too in Cuba after the Cuban missile crisis; and in Iran, the United States accepted defeat in an apparently critical arena without attempting a major intervention. In each instance, the mark of U.S. intervention was limited exposure -- even at the cost of stalemate or defeat…

…In other words, the United States consistently has entered into conflicts in which its level of commitment was extremely limited, in which either victory was not the strategic goal or the mission eventually was redefined to accept stalemate, and in which even defeat was deemed preferable to a level of effort that might avert it. Public discussion on all sides was apoplectic both during these conflicts and afterward, yet American global power was not materially affected in the long run...

…This appears to make no sense until we introduce a military concept into the analysis: the spoiling attack. The spoiling attack is an offensive operation; however, its goal is not to defeat the enemy but to disrupt enemy offensives -- to, in effect, prevent a defeat by the enemy. The success of the spoiling attack is not measured in term of enemy capitulation, but the degree to which it has forestalled successful enemy operations…

…The invasion four years ago has led to the Sunnis and Shia turning against each other in direct conflict. Therefore, it could be argued that just as the United States won the Cold War by exploiting the Sino-Soviet split and allying with Mao Zedong, so too the path to defeating the jihadists is not a main attack, but a spoiling attack that turns Sunnis and Shia against each other. This was certainly not the intent of the Bush administration in planning the 2003 invasion; it has become, nevertheless, an unintended and significant outcome…

…Moreover, it is far from clear whether U.S. policymakers through history have been aware of this dimension in their operations. In considering Korea, Cuba, Vietnam and Iran, it is never clear that the Truman, Kennedy, Johnson/Nixon or Carter/Reagan administrations purposely set out to implement a spoiling attack. The fog of political rhetoric and the bureaucratized nature of the U.S. foreign policy apparatus make it difficult to speak of U.S. "strategy" as such. Every deputy assistant secretary of something-or-other confuses his little piece of things with the whole, and the American culture demonizes and deifies without clarifying…

…However, there is a deep structure in U.S. foreign policy that becomes visible. The incongruities of stalemate and defeat on the one side and growing U.S. power on the other must be reconciled. The liberal and conservative arguments explain things only partially. But the idea that the United States rarely fights to win can be explained. It is not because of a lack of moral fiber, as conservatives would argue; nor a random and needless belligerence, as liberals would argue. Rather, it is the application of the principle of spoiling operations -- using limited resources not in order to defeat the enemy but to disrupt and confuse enemy operations…"

Perhaps this is a "centrist" take.

OK, of course, that dig was unfair - it's mostly Rumsfeld whom we have to hold to account. Mostly. Of course, Bush has to be held to account for not holding feet to flames on the subject.

I would add Congress into the mix of those responsible for failing to provide meaningful oversight, particularly the Republicans since they were in charge until recently.

One of the most frustrating aspects of following Congressional responses to Iraq is that no one is acknowledging that there is a difference between being there and and providing law and order and being there and not providing law and order; that there is a difference between being there and showing gratitude to the Iraqis who have helped us and being there and not showing gratitude to the Iraqis who have helped us. Instead, on the Democratic side we've gotten the attitude that provision of law and order or not, showing gratitude to the Iraqis who have helped us or not, we should not be there. End of story. Meanwhile, the Republican side has mostly held that the president decided to go there, he has the prerogative to do things as he sees fit and we have the obligation to support what he wants to do how he wants to do it.

What we need is for Congress to take a serious look at what does work and what does not work, rather than stroking its members' constituents' ideological erogenous zones by insisting that the whole enterprise (possibly just actions in Baghdad) is doomed to failure or resorting to sloganeering to support the effort. Congress should then insist that the president desist from what has not worked and do more of what has. General Petraeus has already taken the initiative on this front. We just need to make sure that his decisions to abandon past mistakes to not get overruled.

The answer is none of the above. There is an enemy on the ground that has been able to out think, out run, and change their tactics much quicker than us. This current scenario is based on situational tactics than a grand strategy. Actually, no matter what the strategy planned the enemy exist and can react. To think that the US could have a plan of action put on paper in an office building in Washington,DC where the answers to all the world's problems exist is dangerous and foolish.

This Dennis, shows you're wrong to a degree. AQ made serious blunders and now the split, which Bobby confirmed months ago, is wider.Our enemy isn’t so bright and needs help from abroad as well as help from corrupt officials in the Iraq government. We all remember the Democratic chant of “No to a puppet government”. Well, we don’t have puppets and they don’t always do the right thing. The second point is that the capital is calmer and Sadr was forced to flee. Third, we have also stepped up action on the borders. Look at what happens when we patrol the waterways. 15 Brits being held by Iran. Did you know more than a year ago, Iran had troops cross the border into Iraq, and attack?

Now I think you are being a bit extreme. Washington SHOULD have understood that Saddam ruled by a whole class of thugs and criminals that were hardly going to vanish in the night. And how many more became insurgents due to policies Iraq is reversing now? Add to that violent base, warlords, sectarian militias, religious extremists and agents crossing the border (including international arms merchants). Armchair generals mostly agree that force size, security resources and better policies (Bremer for one) could have taken a big bite out of the violence now happening. We can't fix everything for certain, but as Stratfor pointed out above, perhaps clever disruption and defending our Western ideology is the bottom line to protecting our self-interests.

Unfortunately, Washington D.C. had better look long and hard at the world's problems. We are the only real big stick keeping the dogs at bay. The Democrats are right in pointing to Iraqis for much of the present problem. The administration should have expected many of the problems we face today. My bottom line is that our policy in Iraq cannot pre-empt other more serious dangers. The bigger ones are right next door to Iraq.

More about our surge

The Present State of Iraq March 2007