Centerfield

Yeah, right.

Why execute him today?

I smell something fishy.......

So there's two possible interpretations here. One is that Muqtada al-Sadr has gained power through the rise of his militia and their propensity to use force; in this scenario, they intimidated poor, defenseless Da'wa, forced them to bend to al-Sadr's will, and are thereby wielding undue influence over the central government. If this is the case, then actively destroying JAM will break the Sadrist grip on Da'wa and enable Maliki to move forward with a unity government, unfettered by the spoiler Muqtada. Everything works out in this interpretation because we've conveniently decided to believe that Sadr alone is responsible for this situation and if you remove him from the equation, we revert to a Lockean state of nature.

But then there's the second interpretation: that Da'wa was caught flat-footed relative to SCIRI, whose superior militias were better-equipped, better-trained, and better-organized, and thereby enabled them to infiltrate the ISF, control the Shi'a dominated southern provinces, and direct the levers of the political landscape (note that Hakim's SCIRI-- not Jaafari/Maliki's Da'wa or Muqtada's OMS-- control every democratically-elected Provincial Council in southern Iraq. And every southern provincial Governor- with the exception of my counterpart in Karbala- is from SCIRI, as well). Here, too, Muqtada rose to power because of his militia and their willingness to use political violence. But instead of intimidating and influencing Da'wa, in this scenario Da'wa actively sought out a partnership with Muqtada because they feared the alternative- SCIRI cornering the market and driving them off the political map- and knew that only an alliance with Muqtada had the muscle to protect them against the SCIRI monolith.

In this scenario, if you eliminate al-Sadr's militia without addressing the power and influence of the Badr Corps (SCIRI's militia), you will have effectively handed control of the southern zone to SCIRI, forcing Da'wa to fold or seek support from somewhere else (and because SCIRI is more closely aligned with Iran, Da'wa would likely have to look to the Sunnis). In other words, it's not in Da'wa's interests to lose, so they're going to delay the game in order to prevent a SCIRI monopoly from emerging.

The wild card is the Iraqi Security Force- the Iraqi Army and the Iraqi Police who ostensibly owe their allegiance not to one of these political factions, but to the legitimate central government. Some of these units are well-trained and equipped, but heavily infiltrated by SCIRI, Da'wa, or al-Sadr; some of these units are poorly trained and equipped, but relatively independent from the militias. And some of these units are well-trained and equipped, and operate- as they're supposed to- independently of the political militias and serve the legitimate government. The trick is to minimize the first two types and maximize the third, and if and when there's enough of the third to be abel to fill the al-Sadr "vacuum," then it's time to move against him. But doing so beforehand puts Da'wa in a position that they will not accept. Mark my words: that they will not accept.

Finally, the point that no one's talking about is that Muqtada al-Sadr's has some legitimacy that we don't want to admit. He represents a large, well-organized political organization that is much, much larger than his illegitimate militia-- he has tremendous charisma and is quite popular with the urban poor and dispossessed (SCIRI and Da'wa are both seen to be more representative of the establishment, and in SCIRI's case, it is actually by philosophical design). The reaction to the recent US-Iraqi raid in Najaf that killed al-Sadr's chief lieutenant is all too telling here; the people of Najaf took to the streets to protest and, even now, there's considerable backlash among non-Sadrist Shi'a for how that went down (and it has heavily affected my own relations with my Iraqi counterparts, not that I'm necessarily opposed to what was done, mind you- nothing comes without complications and costs, and we have to accept that to work out here).

So, in short, I standby my comments from last week: first, you build independent and capable Iraqi Security Forces who can secure their people against internal and external threats; then you take down Sadr and (eventually) the other militias. If you do it out of sequence, you're not going to solve anything.

Man, is that a dangerous game. At what point is Sadr so infiltrated into the highest levels of security that he could act to prevent his elimination? The street must know WHO hanged Saddam, who taunted him on the wrong day to execute him. And the more violent the Sunnis become (see US deaths), the more Sadr is encouraged to retaliate. Right now AQ is using these events to incite the public against moderate Arab governments. I don't see how non-Sadrist Shi'a can see AQ and Bathists being furious and violent as heading in the right direction.

Having said that, I understand your sequence thing. I just wonder how many really loyal Iraqi soldiers you can actually train and arm with the increasing power of Sadr and other militias. Ricks doesn't seem so optimistic. I assume Sadr knows just what you are up to. Iran knows too and Sunni governments seem to have already given a green light to arm and fund more Sunni violence.

Instead of exploiting the Sunni/Shia divide, we still seem to manage being the scapegoat for each as each side gets stronger, or more belligerent.

Of course, we could be making a deal with the Sunnis. At the present time, I see why Da'wa won't budge, unless we really send home troops. And many Militias would love that. And what militia executed Saddam? Where were the MOST LOYAL police that lead him to the gallows? Perception carries a lot of weight in Iraq. I think Biden has split from Lieberman.

Happy New Year Bobby and keep your head down. I am sure we all feel that way here. At this point, I don’t think there are many one can trust in Iraq, except those Americans and Brits who guard your back We’ll be needing your service elsewhere………………

Peace NYC

... then actively destroying JAM will break the Sadrist grip on Da'wa and enable Maliki to move forward with a unity government, unfettered by the spoiler Muqtada. ... we've conveniently decided to believe that Sadr alone is responsible for this situation ...

You misunderstood me. Nowhere did I place ALL the blame on Sadr. I said that there were multiple groups in that same bag. Obviously, (1) if we killed Sadr, (1) his lieutenants would take over and be just as bad, and (2) other, similar groups would take over the same ecological niche if JAM suddenly vanished, and (3) it's not just JAM being evil, but lots of other opportunistic groups.

Would my suggestion of having Coalition troops oppose these particularly troublesome militias be easy to execute? No. Is opposing gangs easy for the FBI? No (and the Mafia even has had some political/cultural legitimacy and powerful lobbying teams at certain times). But they do it, and, fortunately, are far enough ahead of the gangs that they threaten few Americans unless they try to buy drugs.

I'll shut up if you can explain to me a likely scenario in which (1) the Baghdad-area ISFs in particular aren't filled to the gills with bad actors (evidence would seem to suggest the contrary), and (2) politicians will come to power who both are willing and able to deal with the problem without being shot first.

Like Max said, Happy New Year! And thanks for helping hang in for us.

Could we "take out" militias without a surge if that WAS the plan (and still keep a lid on elsewhere)? Get ready for the New Year. Most representitives want to bolt Iraq NOW.

And look at us retards. We were discussing how we might prevail.

Jon,

Obviously, (1) if we killed Sadr, (1) his lieutenants would take over and be just as bad, and (2) other, similar groups would take over the same ecological niche if JAM suddenly vanished, and (3) it's not just JAM being evil, but lots of other opportunistic groups.

You're not making sense here. If you think that's the case, then why endorse kinetic action against Muqtada al-Sadr and the Mehdi? If he's just going to be replaced by a "just as bad" lieutenant or if "other, similar groups" are just going to take over JAM's "ecological niche," then why bother taking action against him? Why sacrifice Coalition lives and diplomacy trying to take down a leader or organization that will simply be replaced by something "just as bad"? You're making no sense here.

Would my suggestion of having Coalition troops oppose these particularly troublesome militias be easy to execute? No. Is opposing gangs easy for the FBI? No (and the Mafia even has had some political/cultural legitimacy and powerful lobbying teams at certain times). But they do it, and, fortunately, are far enough ahead of the gangs that they threaten few Americans unless they try to buy drugs.

I missed the part where we defeated gangs and the Mafia purely or even primarily by taking kinetic action against them. Oh, to be sure, there were and are occasional raids against these organizations, but that's not what has marginalized them and kept them form gaining the kind of entrenched power that the militias have in Iraq. The discerning issue is NOT the FBI's sparse and few kinetic raids against the gangs, it's far more the fact that there are other dimensions of the full-spectrum paradigm-- political, economic, social/cultural, inf*rmational-- that have contributed to the neutralization of organized crime in the US. A similar solution is needed for the militias in Iraq-- not just (or even primarily) the Coalition raids you endorse. In fact, those raids are probably the least decisive part of the equation, but they seem to get the most attention.

I'll shut up if you can explain to me a likely scenario in which (1) the Baghdad-area ISFs in particular aren't filled to the gills with bad actors (evidence would seem to suggest the contrary), and (2) politicians will come to power who both are willing and able to deal with the problem without being shot first.

I'd be wary of anyone trying to tell you they know the composition of the ISF in Baghdad-- which ISF units in particular are they talking about? The Iraqi Police? The Iraqi Army? Which Battalions, Brigades, and Divisions of the IA are they talking about? It's very easy for someone to say "the ISF is infiltrated by the militias," but the accuracy of that statement varies from province to province and district to district-- it varies by Division, Brigade, and Battalion. Obviously, I can't talk in detail about how infiltrated one unit is compared to the next-- such inf*rmation is obviously classified. I will say, however, that we have a lot of Americans working very hard to alleviate the problem.

As for the politicians, again, I'm wondering which factions of the Council of Representatives aren't already aligned with one armed militia or another? You're thinking they have a Western-style society, where the political groups are separate and independent from the militias, and the militias are using their power to intimidate the elected representatives into supporting or turning a blind-eye to their criminal behavior. That's not the case. In Iraq, the militias are the armed wings of those political groups; they follow the orders of their political leader-- who, by the way, also controls the actions of the elected representatives, government bureaucrats, and everyone else affiliated with the party. The militias are integrated into the political process, and this is crucial to understanding how to neutralize them.

Now if you're saying we need to get to a place where independent political candidates are running for office that are not aligned with the the organized political parties (and hence, by default, the militias), then that's one thing. But it's going to take a long-term concerted effort to marginalize the militias where we can get to such a system- it's not going to happen in the next few months or years, that's for sure. And it's not going to happen just because the Coalition starts rolling up al-Sadr and other militia leaders. It's a long-term process, and indiscriminate Coalition raids could actually jeopardize, not support the objective, if it's not carefully implemented.

I missed the part where we defeated gangs and the Mafia purely or
even primarily by taking kinetic action against them. ...

Yes, of course you're right.

Why do I think (especially Baghdad-area) Iraqi Army and Police are getting less reliable? I do understand that both forces are getting bigger, and that the the Army appears to be mostly OK in a small and rising number of provinces. BUT the overall picture of unreliability is growing. Two years ago, ISF betrayals were rare and startling. One year ago, they were still uncommon enough to be newsworthy. Now, blogposts from Baghdad expect them as a daily part of life. Posts often mention that Iraqi equipment, police and soldiers are often seen engaging in violence and ethnic cleansing.

That seems to me like a worsening picture. I realize that might not be so easy for you to see close to the trenches - I have trouble believing in exponential progress continuous in my field, computer networks until somebody hands me access to a 10x-faster faster part.

Tell me. In Baghdad, who do you think is a more powerful man: the Prime Minister of Iraq, or Muqtada al'Sadr? Who has the most powerful and effective force in Baghdad?

You're not making sense here. If you think that's the case, then why endorse kinetic action against Muqtada al-Sadr and the Mehdi? If he's just going to be replaced by a "just as bad" lieutenant or if "other, similar groups" are just going to take over JAM's "ecological niche," then why bother taking action against him? Why sacrifice Coalition lives and diplomacy trying to take down a leader or organization that will simply be replaced by something "just as bad"? . . .

Why? To save democracy in Iraq. If he really is as powerful as I think he is, well, I rather imagine his long-term plan is to ethnically and politically cleanse Baghdad and take over the Iraqi govt as a new, (theocratic?) dictator.

Of course I'm not JUST endorsing kinetic action - but rather, suggesting thinking out a plan, and then executing that thought-out plan against them. When some new major threat comes up, don't you deal with him in turn? I think y'all are smart, and are up to figuring out how to do this stuff.

Jon,

Two years ago, ISF betrayals were rare and startling. One year ago, they were still uncommon enough to be newsworthy. Now, blogposts from Baghdad expect them as a daily part of life. Posts often mention that Iraqi equipment, police and soldiers are often seen engaging in violence and ethnic cleansing.

You're just plain mistaken. Two years ago, there were far MORE ISF betrayals than we see today. The defection rate among ISF units, which varies from province to province and unit to unit, is now about half what it was two years ago, and a class of relatively independent battalion and brigade commanders have risen through the ranks as Americans have identified and forced out senior commanders (from two years ago) who were heavily affiliated with the political militias.

As for the equipment, and it pains me to acknowledge this, but much of the weapons and equipment that went missing from the ISF inventories, disappeared two years ago, before the Multi-National Security Transition Command - Iraq had developed adequate accountability and inventory systems for the weapons and equipment. In other words, the weapons went missing and were given or sold to the militias or insurgents primarily because US Army advisors didn't put a control measure in place to account for those weapons after the hand-over. It was an absurd mistake (and a mistake we didn't make during my time as a military embed in Afghanistan). Today that's no longer the case, and weapons are no longer being turned over to the militias. That doesn't mean there aren't some militias still using the stolen equipment-- we'll never get those back because, in some cases, American advisors didn't even record the serial numbers-- nor that there aren't some ISF members who moonlight for the militias-- clearly there are. Just that your statement is not true.

That seems to me like a worsening picture. I realize that might not be so easy for you to see close to the trenches - I have trouble believing in exponential progress continuous in my field, computer networks until somebody hands me access to a 10x-faster faster part.

I should note here that I'm not "too close to the Baghdad trenches"-- I'm the State Department's Provincial Program Manager for the Karbala Provincial Reconstruction Team, which is about eighty miles south of Baghdad. My mission ties me to the Karbala provincial government, its officials, and leading political and civil society organizations in the province, and it's not a military position at all (though, I obviously interact with the Coalition on a daily basis and there are military members- including Corps of Engineers and Civil Affairs- on my team). And, in fairness, because of my background, I can move rather easily between the civilian military worlds out here.

But with the exception of my US higher headquarters (which is Ambassadors Saloom and Khalilzad), I don't interact with Baghdad, am not integrated into their military fight, and have my own battles to worry about that consume my time. I do, however, have several friends who are assigned to Military Transition Teams (MiTTs) and Police Transition Teams (PTTs, or "Pits") in Baghdad, and I email with them on a semi-frequent basis, so I'm not out of the loop. I don't pretend to be an expert on Baghdad, but neither am I (or perhaps because I'm not) "too close to the trench" as you suggest.

Tell me. In Baghdad, who do you think is a more powerful man: the Prime Minister of Iraq, or Muqtada al'Sadr? Who has the most powerful and effective force in Baghdad?

Well, the answer is probably neither- it's probably Hakim and SCIRI, respectively, whom I've repeatedly mentioned in previous comments. That said, it's a little more complicated than a simple linear statement like "who is more powerful than whom." Think of it like a college football season, where Michigan can beat Notre Dame, but Notre Dame can beat UCLA, but UCLA can beat USC, and USC can beat Michigan-- who is the "better" team? We have to devise other metrics to divine that answer because, clearly, each one can (and did) best one of the others, while losing to an other, in head-to-head play. Sadr's JAM has more military or paramilitary force than Maliki's Da'wa, to be sure, but Sadr would lose much of his power if he lost his ad hoc political alliance with Maliki. The Coalition and SCIRI's Badr Corps- both of whom are more powerful than him- would eat him for lunch, and he knows it, and that's why he's desperately trying to tie himself closer to the government over the last few weeks-- not because he's trying to control the government (he knows he can't do that), but because he's trying to preserve his power.

Of course I'm not JUST endorsing kinetic action - but rather, suggesting thinking out a plan, and then executing that thought-out plan against them.

Okay, I'm going to call you on that one. Show me where in this post or related comments or even other posts that you've recommended action in the other three quarters of a classic counterinsurgency strategy: political, economic, and inf*rmation operations. Maybe I missed it, but the impression you've left is that we need to "take out" al-Sadr and that the Coalition is the only actor who can do this. If you're now saying that you meant we need to take him out using a more sophisticated four-quarter COIN strategy-- one that includes political and economic alternatives, and a strategic communications annex that exploits those successes-- then I misunderstood. But you have to understand that such a strategy has (and will) take some time before it achieves the effects we want, and you won't even know if/when it's already being implemented (at least on the economic and inf*rmation operations lines)-- you can't then turn around and complain that we're doing nothing about al-Sadr just because you can't see what we're doing.

Now there's no denying that the Coalition is taking decisive kinetic action against al-Sadr's organization, and there could be several reasons for that, none of which I'm going to go into right now. As the raid against Sahib al-Ameri-- which is in Najaf, south of me-- demonstrated, it's clearly about more than just the security situation in Baghdad. And that's all I'm going to say about that.

Bobby, I think I want to give the Iraq arguments a week off to cool.

Unfortunately, because I made the mistake of posting my original militia post during the blogbreak, I didn't do a good job. I was unnecessarily paranoid, maybe DID oversimplify, as you suggest, and was too mentally tired to get in all the important supports to my arguments. Now I see us arguing back and forth on things we actually agree on, even.

Sorry - I DID know better, and did the wrong thing.

I am glad to hear about the measures being taken to reduce ISF problems and against al'Sadr.