Centerfield

Sadr's shown himself to be fairly adept at knowing when to back off to keep himself alive. I'd say Sadr's concerned that the Iraqi power structure, such as it is, has had enough of him and his violent followers, is beginning to unify into a coalition with teeth, and is cleary getting ready to actually address some "root causes" in settling down Baghdad.

We know how that gets done in that culture. Hint: it's not done with welfare programs and bonding retreats.

Don't get your hopes up. I'd say that, when it comes to the kind of force involved here, Sadr might just hold the best cards. It will NOT be easy for the government to assert itself, even if it chooses to.

Sadr's doing this to play for time - IMHO he's probably hoping he can quash this long enough to kill and intimidate more MPs.

Unless, of course, the Coalition gets off its ass and considers doing something.

Can you explain to me why we're just sitting passive in this? I mean, even the surge plans appear to involve sitting PASSIVE patrolling neighborhoods instead of going after militias to begin with. Whatever happened to the preemptive ideas we used against Saddam and his army?

Can you explain to me why we're just sitting passive in this?

This logic may be a little twisted, but:
The more we interfere with the elected government the longer the process is going to be. I the Iraq leadership manages to oust Sadr it will go a long way towards their gaining confidence with the populace. The same goes with the insurgency. If we do the heavy lifting instead of the Iraqis it does nothing for the Iraq government's legitemacy. It makes them weaker if anything. If Maliki can oust Sadr on his own it kills more than on bird for both them and us. For them and us it removes a big thorn. And as a big bonus for us it stops a lot of Iran's ability to meddle. I think they have a lot of eggs in that one particular basket.
There is the greater Mideast to think of also. If the hard changes come from within Iraq itself I can hear the man in the street saying "We can do this too." If all the changes and work is done by us--I don't think we are going to get that many invites in the near future.

I remain optismistic about what we have started. It is going to take a long time though. It would be nice to get by this critical juncture. Now is not the time for impulsive action IMO.

Ditto what Jay said.

And Dodd and Kerry in Syria is a laugh. Did these two see the US Embassy tapes of the attack in Syria? Tell me the Syrians didn't set this up to look moderate. LOL. How about Kerry going to Iran and visiting the University students that burned A's picture? How about a visit to the Taliban in Afghanistan?

The fact Syria and Iran play both sides of the sectarian divide while Iraqis die is an international scandal. Well, so is Darfur, Somalia etc.

And AQ telling Hamas to defeat Abbas? How about AQ take out Sadr? More troops without strategy is pointless. Let's see if McCain weighs in. And isn't it time for Moore to make good his threat and go after the Democrats?

> The more we interfere with the elected government the longer the
> process is going to be.

Yeah, except that doesn't seem to be working. From my last post:

The Prime Minister of Iraq appears to have made deals with the worst militia, al-Sadr's, probably to avoid being shot. That has to include promises not to take action against them. Therefore, additional measures are needed to stop the escalating violence. And the same dynamic is likely to apply to his successors, just as few of his predecessors did much about the militia. ...

UPDATE: I notice that Iraqi politicians are trying to form a new government that doesn't depend on militias. So maybe there's some hope. But notice: dealing with the militias is easy for us, with a huge army, and no security threat to our politicians, but hard and risky (fatal?) for them. Any militia-free government will have to live in terror. Shouldn't we help them more with this problem that's easy for us and so hard for them?

It seems that the forecast is that we are going to try to engineer the PM's ouster in favor of someone else who can lead a coalition united in sentiment against the militias and sectarian violence. That's why Al-Sadr is floating a cease-fire trial balloon. If a new PM gets in, Al-Sadr could get marginalized.

That's not going to be easy for us to do without being branded as evil puppeteers, but ultimately, the people of Iraq may well accept it if in fact the majority public sentiment is against the sectarian violence and the people can be persuaded to believe that the constitutional government has long-term sustainability.

If OTOH the majority of the people are convinced that the collapse or irrelevance of this government is only a matter of time, and that the US is getting prepared to step back and let the chips fall where they will, then we might just be kidding ourselves.

That's a pretty reason IMO, for a short-term boost to troops...to boost security in Baghdad to settle the populace and to strike some hopefully decisive blows against the bigggest and most well-organized insurgent factions. Will it work? Only one way to find out for sure.

> That's a pretty reason IMO, for a short-term boost to troops...
> the populace and to strike some hopefully decisive blows against the
> bigggest and most well-organized insurgent factions. Will it work?
> Only one way to find out for sure.

Yep. But, as I understand it (and my vast military expertise comes entirely from reading and playing wargames), I think we should be able to work much more cost-effectively by going on the offensive now against militias.

After all, it's my impression that it takes hundreds of thousands of men to patrol street corners (just patrolling Baghdad and one other city is thought to be a stretch), but I believe we could go on the offensive against militias at current troop levels.

I doubt the Iraqi army with all its Shiite troops can/or will take out Sadr. Bobby is the one to comment on that. I think Jay is right about our having enough strength now to take out militias unless they retreat into civilian religious centers. Then we can support "Iraqis with embeds" going house to house (those loyal enough to the government). We have to be careful however, appearing to be picking sides. That is why AQ in Iraq should be target numero uno.
AQ offers a truce LOL.

I am interested in the best deployment of our resources relative to Iran and Syria. Something tells me that at some point in the next two years we will have to be ready for a military confrontation. What might be involved in such a conflict? I am sure our Navy is on top of this, but another carrier group in the Gulf bottleneck seems risky.

As we all know, events will constantly up the ante and shift the focus for political leadership here. I see some polls out and do not think they reflect much. Test the draft? There is a long way to 2008. Something tells me we should enjoy this New Year and reflect on all there is to lose that we now enjoy should we down play the seriousness of the proliferation and extremist trends unfolding in Africa, the Middle East and the Far East.

future military deployment?

Take a look at the newslinks to the right of the article linked right above. Tanks are rolling in Ethiopia.

This relevant in terms of where we should be considering our military will be needed to contain the growing Islamist expansion.

Roll down the article and read AQ using the ISG report to validate their viewpoint.

one last interesting link discussing Islamist ideology Iran is now trading oil in EUROS not DOLLARS. I remember Moore suggesting we were going to bomb Iran before we let this happen.

Guess he was wrong about this one too.

I doubt the Iraqi army with all its Shiite troops can/or will take out Sadr. Bobby is the one to comment on that.

Here's the thing: the Iraqi security forces-- especially those in the Middle and Lower Euphrates governates-- are overwhelmingly Shi'ite. But-- and the media doesn't do a good enough job explaining this-- not all Shi'a are the same, they don't all share the same interests, and they're not nearly as unified (especially below the national level) as you might think.

Along with numerous smaller and more local level groups, you have (1) SCIRI and the Badr Organization, (2) Da'wa [which has splintered into at least two factions- Da'wa and Da'wa (Iraq)], (3) Office of the Martyr al-Sadyr (OMS) and Mehdi, and (4) Al-Fadhila. Yes, the ISF- especially in the Shi'ite regions- are predeominantly Shi'ite, but SCIRI has done a much better job infiltrating the ranks of the Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police than any of the other factions. Would they be willing to "take out" al-Sadr? Well, there are already some indications that they've been trying to neutralize his militia power so that their own militias (Badr Corps) can control the ground-- just as Muqtada has carried out similar violence against SCIRI. Much of the violence that gets reported as "sectarian violence" is in fact intra-sectarian (Shi'ite on Shi'ite or Sunni on Sunni), as each side tries to muscle out the other for better position if and when the Americans withdraw.

Now Da'wa and OMS are in a relationship, but it's a relationship of convenience and necessity driven more by SCIRI strength than by any common interests. Da'wa really lacks the militia power that the others have, so it was only natural that they would turn to Muqtada for muscle. Generally-speaking, though, yes, the Shi'ite factions close ranks against the Kurds and Sunnis at the national level, but below the surface-- when you look at where there's no Sunnis for them to fight against-- they're already fighting each other in low-level acts of targeted violence.

I think Jay is right about our having enough strength now to take out militias unless they retreat into civilian religious centers. Then we can support "Iraqis with embeds" going house to house (those loyal enough to the government).

And that's part of the problem. As bad as the militias are, many exist because they're able to provide a level of security against the insurgents that the Iraqi security forces just aren't able to provide. If we changed our focus and neutralized al-Sadr, it has to first be preceded with independent, capable, non-partisan ISF that will be able to secure the population. Otherwise, if we just eliminate the militias, the result would be a tremendous security vacuum, and that would be exploited by armed insurgents who could then terrorize the population. And the good news is that by all accounts, the ISF in North Babil and Baghdad are reaching a high level of performance (Diyala is a different story), so this may be why you're hearing stories of a desire to finally take on Muqtada (I can't confirm or deny what's in the cards)-- the conditions are set for this kind of an operation. I will say that doing it before the ISF was ready to takeover probably wouldn't have done much-- think of the difference between the Marine clean sweep of Fallujah (which didn't have capable ISF to replace them) and COL McMaster's isolation operation in Tal Afar (which did have competent ISF, and helps explain why Tal Afar remains pretty stable one year later, with just a single US Army company involved).

All that said, it's not as easy to take down a militia as you all might think. They don't walk around in uniforms or mass their forces so that we can identify them, and they can blend into the population-- a population which often supports them-- rather easily. Like counterinsurgency, it requires very sophisticated action and who gets assigned the mission is critical to whether or not it will be successfully implemented.

And that's part of the problem. As bad as the militias are, many exist because they're able to provide a level of security against the insurgents that the Iraqi security forces just aren't able to provide. . . . If we changed our focus and neutralized al-Sadr, it has to first be preceded with independent, capable, non-partisan ISF that will be able to secure the population. Otherwise, if we just eliminate the militias, the result would be a tremendous security vacuum, and that would be exploited by armed insurgents who could then terrorize the population.

Yeah, that was the plan. But, has it really have worked out that way?

The facts on the ground are that militia-defended regions are so close to being a security vacuum as to make no difference (e.g., unless you're one of exactly the right set of groups, AND have paid your protection money, AND don't threaten any gang^h^h^h^h militia members, AND militias in your neighborhood aren't feeling bored bored and trigger-happy)

Also, at this point, aren't the militias a far worse danger to Iraqis than the insurgents, because they're big and growing, while the insurgents are small in numbers and shrinking?

...by all accounts, the ISF in North Babil and Baghdad are reaching a high level of performance..

Maybe. Does it matter?

By putting all our faith in the ISF future, we've allowed Iraq to get to a state where its politicians are physically insecure. The ISF, even if perfect, needs to get orders to go militias to do any good (any not just the militias on al-Sadr's little list). Where are those orders going to come from? Brave, dead MPs?

In any case, I believe you said something yourself about ISF compromisedness, which seems more of a fair statement to me. Plenty of ISF equipment, soldiers, and even units are seen fighting FOR militias and helping with ethnic cleansing.

All that said, it's not as easy to take down a militia as you all might think.

I understand that. I'm certainly not expecting every militiaman's head on a stick five minutes after the Coalition starts in.

But let's face it: there's an awful lot less that you can get away with if you can't assemble easily in numbers, can't store much arms and ammo in any one place, or show your head much out of doors.

In particular, I think we could drop fatality levels dramatically, almost eliminate ethnic cleansing, and allow Iraqi politicians to operate without having to have the militias along for a ride. Unlike PM Maliki, President Bush doesn't live in fear of drug gangs, even though they're pretty strong, and we can never get rid of them.

Jon,

I think you have a misunderstanding of the way the militas work here in Iraq. Yes, the militias are thugs and yes they impose their brand of security and control the population through armed force. But they are also the armed faction of established and organized political groups-- they're not independent from the political process, they are an extension of that political process. Thus, Badr Corps is the military wing of SCIRI, and Mehdi is the armed wing of OMS, etc. etc. They're not independent organizations.

These politicians whom you think need to be secured from the militias-- in most cases-- they are already aligned with one militia or another. Does Da'wa have to worry about getting killed by a Badr Corps militia attack? Absolutely-- and that's why they have their own (albeit weak) militia to protect them and it's why Da'wa reached an agreement with OMS to align with Mehdi and balance against Badr's superior armed force. There's no good parallel to this in the US or Western Europe, so Americans have a hard time understanding this, but this is my fifth straight year in a foreign country, so I can say that this is really more the norm than the exception.

All of which is to say that the government isn't refusing to shut down the Shi'ite militias because they're afraid of being retaliated against-- that's not it at all. They're not shutting them down because the vasy majority of UIA politicians (the ruling coalition) are themselves affiliated with an armed militia, albeit usually indirectly. This dynamic is a little different in Kurdistan, and a lot different in the more Sunni provinces (Anbar, Salah ad Din, Diyala), but then we're not talking about those provinces. Or at least I'm not.

The facts on the ground are that militia-defended regions are so close to being a security vacuum as to make no difference

This depends completely on which province you're talking about. There are a handful of provinces that have weak ISF and are more or less controlled by the militias, but still have relatively high levels of security for the general population. Najaf would be one of those, although clearly Sistani's presence has much to do with the stability. But no those are not necessarily the facts on the ground, unless you heavily qualify what ground you're talking about.

In any case, I believe you said something yourself about ISF compromisedness, which seems more of a fair statement to me. Plenty of ISF equipment, soldiers, and even units are seen fighting FOR militias and helping with ethnic cleansing.

Again, this depends heavily on where you're talking about. To be sure, some ISF units are heavily infiltrated by militia members-- for example, the 5th IA Division forces in Diyala, which poses serious problems for a province that is mized Shi'ite and Sunni (and even some Kurdish enclaves). But others are not-- for example the 8th IA Division forces in Babil, which operates very independently of the militias and has been containing the Mehdi in Al-Hillah rather well for quite some time now. Still others are infiltrated by the militias, but are actively and aggressively taking measures to drive the infiltrators out of the ISF-- Abu Walid, a former Shi'ite Ba'athist commando was brought in to be our Iraqi Police chief here in Karbala for precisely that reason, and you can imagine just how destabilizing that was to the status quo. So, again, as always, you can't make an accurate general statement without heavily qualifying it, because the facts on the ground change from province to province.

Excellent post Bobby.

Unity and the militias are very complicated issues as today’s news suggests.

Of course, some of your first-hand observations leads us back to the soundness of our plan to begin with. Many who rightly anticipated sectarian AND insurgent violence predicted that without an effective ISF or our unleashing unacceptable carnage, we could only fight to a draw. I believe the earlier Bush moves we forced upon the Iraqis obstructed both our containing the violence and fielding a loyal ISF.

Suggestions appear to time-sensitive. For instance, oil rights might have worked had we started off in Iraq with a campaign to “give the Iraqi people their oil”, and reiterated our commitment to vacate Iraq ASAP. Police and counterinsurgency forces were also a fatal neglect of Phase IV. I understand why now Iraqi leadership is cool to the idea.

I see you didn't exactly say WHEN you think an ISF would be ready to carry out a hypothetical directive to eliminate Sadr.. Not that this MUST happen. At this point in time options have changed and it must certainly be a complex mission now to prod the necessary dynamics along to curtail Sadr and other threatening militias, let alone identify and target assets. I certainly do not think we should take force against the militias off the table.

I am sorry if in the past I sounded like our military can just swoop down on a bat rope and nail the bad guys. I do not take the expenditure of life and material lightly. This must be a slow and complex operation in Iraq, given the deep social conflict and daily violence.

Frankly, I wonder about the extent our Iraqi bind lowers our posture towards other threats. Iraq puts us in the geographic center of extreme Islamists and despots with a lot of force, but it produces billions in material attrition, regrettable loss of life and a diversion of attention from Afghanistan to Africa. Any unnecessary loss of our soldiers and innocent civilians focuses my anger at mistaken tactics. I assume after three years we have corrected many of them and are learning. Already numerous experts have pointed out that our history in Iraq does not conform to the new counterinsurgency handbook.

The media is certainly lacking in its exploration of the complexity of Shia and Sunni communities in both Iraq and Lebanon. Hizb’Allah is opposed by other Shia factions. Numerous Sunni factions oppose AQ. In Gaza Fatah and Hamas are locked in combat. I wonder if the degree of militancy and violence is related to the degree a particular group is allied with jihadist-minded clerics and radical leadership.

From the moment Iraq plunged into lawlessness, the role and need of local protection increased. It is disheartening to see that “tactics without strategies”, as Ricks called our Iraq policy, has limited our options and added to the international blowback against most US policy. It is inspiring that we haven’t given up.

I see that General Ab*zaid is retiring. I can only wonder what Gates will come up with. For the moment I can only speculate that Intel going into the ISF will most likely end up in the hands of our adversaries. How do you actually secure the security forces? It seems the ISF itself must become a patchwork, compartmentalized and embedded with the most loyal operatives.

I see you have posted a reply to Jay.........

> These politicians whom you think need to be secured from the militias--
> in most cases-- they are already aligned with one militia or another.

Yeah, I know. I guess I'm not expressing myself too well. Lemme try again.

There's alot of evidence that Iraqi violence and ethnic cleansing, overall, are spiraling upward - the increased deaths in front of our troops and media and substantial and increasing refugee flows into Jordan and other neighbors. Simultaneously, blogs talk about more and more militia attacks, especially around Baghdad. Therefore, it seems reasonable to hold increased militia activity responsible for it. The ISG report came to similar conclusions.

Democracy can't function in a scenario where thugs run the streets. Either the thugs will invalidate the polls or, as we see in Iraq, make the politicians make deals

The early stages of a healthy democracy pretty much universally include security increasing and violence DECREASING. Ethnic cleansing grows rarer and rarer. This is all the opposite of what we see in Iraq. Therefore, Iraq is NOT a healthy democracy.

Was it the will of the people being shown here? No. Polls and blogs both appeared to agree that most Iraqis were more interested in peace than violent ethnic cleansing or religious clashes.

So the next questions to ask is, what's happening in Iraq that didn't happen in less troubled democracies? Well, we expect to see violence decrease because the will of the people for greater security brings crackdowns against violent groups. Why not in Iraq?

My conclusion from that point is pretty obvious: the point I made about needing a balance of guns to rule effectively in Iraq. Now, here's one point I didn't address so effectively before. As you pointed out, every party or group that preceded Saddam's fall already had something militia-like. But, except the Ba'ath Party, the biggest ones were actually more interested in being around for deterrence than fighting.

The violent Shia ones started very small in 2003, indeed, hardly able to hurt more than an unlucky handful. If Iraq were a healthy democracy, we'd probably see a representative of a peaceful militia as PM. He'd've been cracking down on the violent ones.

But, since 2003, nobody has cracked down on the violent Shia militia. They went out and started shooting at people. Still nobody stopped them. People slowly joined them, since they were clearly having fun and gaining power. Now they're big enough to be effectively more powerful than the old peaceful militias. Politicians have to ally with at least one evil militia to operate.

So, really, what I'm saying is not so much that politicians have to ally with with militias so much as they have to ally with evil thugs. So, what I really meant is that Iraqi politicians can't give orders to stop the violent militias. THAT'S why think it's unlikely the cycle of increasing violence can be stopped without us finally getting around to cracking down on the violent militias ourselves.

I hope I'm wrong!

I'd be hard-pressed to recognize any of the militias, even before 2003, as having been "peaceful" militias. Da'wa, the oldest and least militarized of the Shi'ite political movements, was (and I believe, still might be) classified as a "terrorist organization" by the State Department.

It's true that they didn't take aggressive measures against the Ba'athists, but that was out of self-preservation-- they were well aware that Saddam wielded far more military power, and wasn't afraid to use any tactics (including chemical weapons) to subdue an uprising... In fact, the Shi'ites painfully re-learned that lesson after (they believe) we betrayed them in the aftermath of Desert Storm.

But this didn't mean that these militias were "peaceful"- within the areas they controlled, within the streets and alleys of Shi'ite neighborhoods, the militias weren't peacefully co-existing with one another. In fact, what we would have seen were numerous incidents of targeted violence as SCIRI prepared itself to be in control of post-Saddam southern Iraq, while Da'wa retaliated in kind. [Interestingly, SCIRI has always seen its area of operations in a much more limited sense of the Shi'ite areas, which is one of the reasons that they support federalism today]. These militias were certainly not "peaceful" in any sense of the definition as I know it.

You may be confusing "militia" with "tribe," in so much as that the tribal sheikhs also wield some armed power. Socially, culturally, and even legally, a sheikh is expected to secure and protect the members of his tribe, mediate and arbitrate between disputes, and potentially can call upon the adult males to take up arms in order to provide that security and/or take vengeance against others who have violated the tribe, whether a member of the same tribe or some other tribe. Generally speaking, these would have been much more peaceful, but we don't usually refer to them as "militias" in the strict sense of the word, since it becomes confusing and lends itself to support bad decision-making- the tribal structure is a separate and inviolable part of Iraqi society, and that isn't going away.

The only problem here, though, is that in the central and central-south areas, the tribal structures are very weak. Saddam saw them as a threat to his regime, as paranoid dictators so often do with anything that is a competitor to their absolute control over the population. Thus, relying upon the tribal structure to bring peace in these areas is going to be inherently challenging. Note that this is not the case with, for example, Dhi Qar, Maysan, or Muthanna, where the no-fly zone enabled the tribes to be somewhat bolder and more independent, and today they still exist in relatively stronger form. Basrah is yet another separate case where the so-called "oil mafia," which is neither a militia nor a tribe but quite simply a criminal gang, has emerged as a significant power in the province.

Now I do think we're going to get around to neutralizing the militias, or at least the militias who are a threat to the legitimacy of the central authority-- meaning Muqtada al-Sadr's Mehdi; I'd be surprised if we made any moves against Talibani's or Barzani's militias in Kurdistan, or even SCIRI's Badr Organization (which has deftly created the illusion of demilitarization). And Muqtada has probably had (and seen) this coming for quite some time now, which is why he's recently tried closing ranks with the other Shi'a groups, because they represent his protection from the Coalition.

But that said, as we learned in Afghanistan, there's a proper time and sequencing for the neutralization of warlords- there first has to be ready, reliable, and loyal ISF to assume control of the area after the Coalition withdraws- otherwise, criminals and insurgents enter the area to prey on the locals, and the locals turn to and create new militias to protect them against that threat, thereby empowering- ta da!- new militias to become threats. It also cannot be solved purely kinetically- some kind of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) program has to be established to provide a carrot for militia members to leave their service and become productive civilian members of society, and DDR requires funding (the Japanese government may be willing to support this, since they funded the effort in Afghanistan).

But this is a tricky business. De-throning Muqtada is going to be a very complicated process, and it can't happen without buy-in from the Shi'ites in the government-- and that means both SCIRI (who are already more or less for it) and Da'wa (who are against it). Right now, that support is building but it's going to take some time. And the truth of the matter is that (as much as Americans hate to admit this) Muqtada al-Sadr does have some legitimacy in the Shi'ite areas of Iraq- he's extremely charismatic, his hawza has millions of followers, and the urban poor believe that he represents their interests moreso than any other political leader. It isn't just a simple matter of knocking down doors and disarming his organization.

I must defer the ground situation and tactics to Bobby. I understand the frustration Jay discusses although I think pre-emptive action against militias, oil thugs and belligerent tribal leaders had it's opportunity long ago and many options are time sensitive and conditional on either sufficient American "holding" forces or capable ISFs.

I am also told that Arab or other Sunni forces from outside Iraq are not acceptable "stabilizing forces" to deploy for added oil infrastructure or border security.

Right now Turkey is threatening to hit the PPK in Kurdish Iraq. The Iranian Resistance militia we disbanded long ago (without getting much in return) is not likely to be restarted with a strong Shi'ite Iraqi government.

With such limited options and a real danger of intelligence and weapons leaking from an "empowered" ISF, perhaps our beefing up "select" tribal forces and militias and/or "assisting (militarily)" in any significant conventional fight between them and adversarial groups, is all we can do right now.

If reality is closer to what Bobby describes (I think it is), then COUNTERINTELLIGENCE and US/IRAQI SF/INTEL that are loyal AND effective ARE the most powerful tools we can build in the Middle East and Iraq.

I would think that an "ALLIED" counterintelligence structure involving the Saudis, Jordanians, Lebanese and Egyptians needs to be joined with the Iraqi counterpart. Not only do the Shi'ites in Iraq need to deal with extremism of both religious flavors in Iraq, but our "ALLIES" including Afghanistan and Pakistan need to address the rise of Shi'ite radicals supported at the moment by Syria and Iran. We need a loyal group of Intelligence resources to flush out on the ground what dangers are being planned, so if we have to strike we know who, what and where..

A failure to "know" more about our adversaries will lead to a failure to prevent terror in Gaza, Lebanon, Sudan, Algeria, Nigeria, Somalia, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Iran, Syria, Iraq, Indonesia, Chad, UAE, Afghanistan, Turkey, Israel, and eventually, Europe and America.

I assume AQ, Jihadist groups, Hizb'Allah and Iranian Guard are all open targets to hit in Iraq. Why not create, as part of the counterintelligence structure, a beefed up force based in Iraq, to hit select adversaries like the ones I listed above? I mean a significant strike force (30,000) that would make all militias a bit worried about working too closely with such declared targets.

I guess Bobby might say these groups are too dispersed and never concentrate their assets. Still, we should have active snipers and rapid forces that can nail them like the General in Afghanistan. No bat rope required. With all those billions America spends, one would think we could buy some pretty good Intel, or pay for insider agents. We need to know all that is possible to know, forgetting for a moment, the slice we will never know. Wasn’t that the first lesson of 9/11?

Iran resolution

"Leave Crusaders, or have your heads cut off"

Max,

I am also told that Arab or other Sunni forces from outside Iraq are not acceptable "stabilizing forces" to deploy for added oil infrastructure or border security.

I actually never bought into the argument against this one. I always thought that we should have accepted the Riyadh plan-- basically, a Muslim military corps manned by some countries (including Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Pakistan) and funded by others (chiefly the neighboring Gulf States). Even understanding that it might have faced some sensitivities against fielding it in the Shi'ite regions, it still could have been employed in the mostly Sunni areas. But the Administration turned this one down, and so it goes. And in fairness, we'll never know how serious Riyadh really was about implementing proposal.

With all those billions America spends, one would think we could buy some pretty good Intel, or pay for insider agents. We need to know all that is possible to know, forgetting for a moment, the slice we will never know. Wasn’t that the first lesson of 9/11?

Indeed, but money is only part of the equation. The best intelligence comes from having operatives, agents, or troops on the ground who are interfacing with the local population, establishing good relationships, and able to gain inf*rmation that- when fused with other intelligence at higher levels- paints the picture that enables us to take decisive action against terrorist organizations. Money is important in that it provides those operatives, agents, and troop commanders with an instrument with which to do favors for the local population, thereby enabling a higher level of trust and the emergence of quid pro quo "infrastructure-for-intelligence" kinds of deals. But it's only part of the equation. Right now the harder part is getting competent and reliable Americans at those lower levels who are willing to go out every day and interface with the local population- in fact, it's been a significant obstacle, but that's a different story.

Jon "Post-Santa" Kay

Merry Christmas!

I've enjoyed this little chat alot, learned alot, and hope you have too. I also hope you enjoy your Christmases, and have an easier time going to sleep than I am....

Yes, Post-Santa, I've enjoyed the conversation. I have learned that options seem to have a season. I’m thinking of the Byrds. When and how is as important as why.

Bobby, thanks for the time laying out your position. Again, I too, was in favor of some help from our Arab friends from the start, but this may have been another time-sensitive option. A friend, who worked in Baghdad, said Shiite opposition to such a Sunni deployment was very strong. Imagine Sunnis guarding Iraqi oil. The Turks might have had a role, or some Sunnis from outside the region as you suggested. If only we had bullied the Iraqis in the beginning with sounder tactics that brought more stability.

I meant of course, the billions we spent should certainly have included paying operatives and agents on the ground. This was a priority from the start This is the most direct way of uncovering our adversary's plans. I believe this is part of the military handbook. Nigeria ought to be a bit worried about its own counterinsurgent effort. I wonder how penetrated our other friend’s intelligence services are. Well, at least we hired the Israelis to interrogate prisoners. LOL

I will check out your link. I think posts on these specific strategic options can clarify things in ways media has been total negligent. There is a disconnect in media -like the afternoon the networks reported Kerry and Dodd in Syria while ABC showed the security monitor tape at the US embassy in Syria when the keystone terrorists attacked and were mowed down by security forces. Who thinks this was not a Syrian production?

May everyone have a nice Christmas Day. May our people be safe around the world. May rational and peaceful means to avert conflict succeed before the necessity of the last resort. Maybe this year, we will get it together and be more effective in our leadership and strategies. Alot is uncertain. Half the battle is a plan that COULD work. The other half is doing it right. Without the right discourse, this will not happen.

The enemy will be working harder this coming year, whether we are in denial or not.

This morning the Russian Ambassador claimed that the new Iranian resolution does not stop his country from selling Iran anything. We need, as an international community, to stop pretending and denying. If the French really think the above resolution changes much, we need a new alliance with countries that take terrorism and proliferation as serious matters. You know, radioactive fallout goes around the world no matter who uses a nuke. There is still time to put out the "brush fires" and "build a bridge" to a safer future.

Was that cliche enough? Peace.....

Lessons from 2006

I thought this might be an interesting closer for the year. Knowing my predilection for spurious linkages, I doubt it.

Hey, whats up with the word inf*rmation? Another spam keyword?