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December 06, 2006

Iraq Study Group Report thread

Here is the full report. I have not had time to read the whole report yet, but I note this from the Executive Summary:

Our most important recommendations call for new and enhanced diplomatic and political efforts in Iraq and the region, and a change in the primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq that will enable the United States to begin to move its combat forces out of Iraq responsibly.

Posted by Todd Pearson at December 6, 2006 11:49 AM
Comments

It is 4th and inches with 30 seconds to go on the other team's 45 and they punted, which we expected, right?

Did it really take six years for us to decide that we needed a bolder diplomatic effort with Syria, Iran, and Iraq? Geesh...

Posted by: Mathew at December 6, 2006 03:29 PM

Some of the conclusions are debatable. Iran and Syria want to destabilize Iraq. These two are trying to destabilize Lebanon. Some of the recommendations are wishful thinking. Bolder diplomatic effort with Iran and Syria? We offered Iran a reactor. We disbanded the primary insurgent group that attacked Iran from Iraq. We have avoided chasing insurgents back into Syria and have held off additional sanctions on Syria despite the numerous terrorist conventions in Damascus and Syrian hit squads. As we speak, Syria and Iran resupply Hizb"Allah. Gates has already retreated a bit from the Baker Report.

Movement on the Israeli/Palestinian issue? There is a civil war in Gaza. Iran has called for Israel's destruction. Hamas won't recognize Israel. The Baker Study simply does not have any magic bullets. Without a stake in Iraqi institutions such as Constitutional provisions to provide oil revenue for Iraqis, the government will continue to be hit. Without better safeguards on Iraqi oil, black markets will fund terror.

January 1 throws the ball in the Democrat's court. They would prefer to do nothing and continue to blame Republicans. Fortunately, they can’t do that. Russia, China, Iran, Syria, North Korea, Belarus, AQ and Hizb”Allah, Chavez, Sudan, Somalia, Nigeria, and Afghanistan. What will Democrats deal with first?

Posted by: Maxtrue at December 6, 2006 04:50 PM

Syria's nuke program

Posted by: Maxtrue at December 6, 2006 05:46 PM

another element missed in the Baker Study.

Posted by: Maxtrue at December 6, 2006 05:51 PM

No takers Todd or am I scaring them away?....okay here goes......

(Some thoughts provided in ( )s below. I was trying to be a bit humorous.

Most recommendations seem to rest on vast sums of money. Given intelligence reform, I doubt the reorganization of so much will help us over the next two years in Iraq. The Study suggests long-term US participation in Iraq, very little in terms of the strategic importance of requiring a stable Iraq and even less of the intractability of certain problems such as the sectarian divide in the Iraq army. It also suggests almost a denial of the intensions of Iran and Syria to destabilize the region, the accelerated momentum for civil war throughout the region fomented by sectarian extremists, and no recommendations to counteract the effects of defeat in Iraq or the gains taken by leaving prematurely. More than once, it speaks about our US forces needing to be ready for global contingencies, but where is that? Darfur, North Korea, the China Sea? And if there are so many hotspots requiring our military readiness, how does the Baker Study address that necessary stress of a very busy military deploying into much of the same situations? If our biggest problem issues from the Middle East, how are we going to exit gracefully? This Study may in fact make Israel more likely to act against declared enemies. My biggest objection is its lack of strategic context and the basis of why we went to Iraq in the first place. Again, why is Iraq important, what are the possible negatives of continuing to make mistakes? Ricks ends his FIASCO with a warning about leaving a brush fire in Iraq burning. This report is somewhat depressing and mute. It does not recommend partition or Constitutional oil rights. It isn’t graceful at all and despite its assertive tones, looks weak. Carter has called Iraq the greatest American blunder. Really?)

RECOMMENDATION 40: The United States should not
make an open-ended commitment to keep large numbers of
American troops deployed in Iraq. (under what strategic circumstances would this change?)

RECOMMENDATION 41: The United States must make it
clear to the Iraqi government that the United States could
carry out its plans, including planned redeployments, even if
Iraq does not implement its planned changes. America’s
other security needs and the future of our military cannot be
made hostage to the actions or inactions of the Iraqi government. (what are the possible future needs and what does “could” mean?)

RECOMMENDATION 42: We should seek to complete the
training and equipping mission by the first quarter of 2008,
as stated by General George Casey on October 24, 2006. (if half of them are not blown up)

RECOMMENDATION 43: Military priorities in Iraq must
change, with the highest priority given to the training, equipping, advising, and support mission and to counterterrorism
operations. (65% of troop’s water travels by convoy. What were we doing for the last three years if we were not doing the above?)

RECOMMENDATION 44: The most highly qualified U.S. officers and military personnel should be assigned to the
imbedded teams, and American teams should be present with
Iraqi units down to the company level. The U.S. military
should establish suitable career-enhancing incentives for
these officers and personnel. (Old idea. What force does the embed teams have? What incentives?)

RECOMMENDATION 45: The United States should support more and better equipment for the Iraqi Army by encouraging the Iraqi government to accelerate its Foreign
Military Sales requests and, as American combat brigades
move out of Iraq, by leaving behind some American equipment for Iraqi forces. (should we place more weapons in the hands of questionable soldiers when present arms are sufficient for military operations were Iraqi troops prepared to actually fight? What about our troops getting better equipment and force protection?)

Restoring the U.S. Military

We recognize that there are other results of the war in Iraq that
have great consequence for our nation. One consequence has
been the stress and uncertainty imposed on our military—the
most professional and proficient military in history. The United
States will need its military to protect U.S. security regardless
of what happens in Iraq. We therefore considered how to limit
the adverse consequences of the strain imposed on our military
by the Iraq war.

U.S. military forces, especially our ground forces, have
been stretched nearly to the breaking point by the repeated deployments in Iraq, with attendant casualties (almost 3,000 dead
and more than 21,000 wounded), greater difficulty in recruiting, and accelerated wear on equipment.
Additionally, the defense budget as a whole is in danger of
disarray, as supplemental funding winds down and reset costs
become clear. It will be a major challenge to meet ongoing requirements for other current and future security threats that
need to be accommodated together with spending for operations and maintenance, reset, personnel, and benefits for active
duty and retired personnel. Restoring the capability of our military forces should be a high priority for the United States at
this time. (Funny how this parrots Iran’s take and opposes a more Tullian view of our armed forces.)

RECOMMENDATION 48: As equipment returns to the
United States, Congress should appropriate sufficient funds
to restore the equipment to full functionality over the next
five years. (This is interesting. Are they suggesting many billions of damaged weapon systems and equipment has been taken out of our readiness for five years? A nation at war usually increases production. What percentage will be replaced by better systems?)


RECOMMENDATION 57: Just as U.S. military training
teams are imbedded within Iraqi Army units, the current
practice of imbedding U.S. police trainers should be expanded
and the numbers of civilian training officers increased so that
teams can cover all levels of the Iraqi Police Service, including local police stations. These trainers should be obtained
from among experienced civilian police executives and supervisors from around the world. These officers would replace
the military police personnel currently assigned to training
teams. (ahh!!! This is the part about the lack of preparation mentioned in Cobra II. No plan for immediate policing and follow-through on phase IV.)


(The next items reveal the extent the US plans to stay in Iraq for a long time.)


The Federal Bureau of Investigation has provided personnel to
train the Criminal Investigation Division in the Ministry of the
Interior, which handles major crimes. The FBI has also fielded
a large team within Iraq for counterterrorism activities.

Building on this experience, the training programs should
be expanded and should include the development of forensic
investigation training and facilities that could apply scientific
and technical investigative methods to counterterrorism as well
as to ordinary criminal activity.

RECOMMENDATION 58: The FBI should expand its investigative and forensic training and facilities within Iraq, to include coverage of terrorism as well as criminal activity.

One of the major deficiencies of the Iraqi Police Service is its
lack of equipment, particularly in the area of communications
and motor transport.


RECOMMENDATION 61: Programs led by the U.S. Department of Justice to establish courts; to train judges, prosecutors,
and investigators; and to create institutions and practices to
fight corruption must be strongly supported and funded. New
and refurbished courthouses with improved physical security,
secure housing for judges and judicial staff, witness protection
facilities, and a new Iraqi Marshals Service are essential parts
of a secure and functioning system of justice.


(I can’t believe this has to be recommended.)


5. The Oil Sector
Since the success of the oil sector is critical to the success of the
Iraqi economy, the United States must do what it can to help
Iraq maximize its capability.

Iraq, a country with promising oil potential, could restore
oil production from existing fields to 3.0 to 3.5 million barrels a
day over a three- to five-year period, depending on evolving
conditions in key reservoirs. Even if Iraq were at peace tomorrow, oil production would decline unless current problems in
the oil sector were addressed. (Gee….I hadn’t thought of that.)

Short Term

The Iraqi government must improve its intelligence capability,
initially to work with the United States, and ultimately to take
full responsibility for this intelligence function.

To facilitate enhanced Iraqi intelligence capabilities, the
CIA should increase its personnel in Iraq to train Iraqi intelligence personnel. The CIA should also develop, with Iraqi officials, a counterterrorism intelligence center for the all-source fusion of inf*rmation on the various sources of terrorism within
Iraq. This center would analyze data concerning the individuals, organizations, networks, and support groups involved in
terrorism within Iraq. It would also facilitate intelligence-led
police and military actions against them.


(Wasn’t the next one part of the essential mission? -to increase our intelligence operations while damaging the terrorist/intelligence activities of those WMD=capable adversaries such as Saddam?)


RECOMMENDATION 79: The CIA should provide additional personnel in Iraq to develop and train an effective intelligence service and to build a counterterrorism intelligence center that will facilitate intelligence-led counterterrorism
efforts.

(These recommendations do suggest the level of the apparent mistakes. Had Republicans exerted greater influence on the President, I do not think some of these recommendations would have had to be made now. I do not think Gates and Bush will adopt much of this, but it serves notice to Iraq that an apparent centrist group of former American officials now formally challenges American resolve. It says we’re not leaving, but we are leaving and it seems a bit confused about the consequences of either. Not that this will have much bearing on the sectarian hostilities in Iraq.)

Posted by: Maxtrue at December 6, 2006 08:34 PM

Maxtrue:

The reality is that there is a lot to digest and, from what I have seen, most people in the blogosphere (not including you) are reacting today to the commentary rather than the guts of the report itself. Nonetheless, I appreciate your efforts to advance the discussion here. I expect there to be an ongoing/multi-thread debate here.

Posted by: Todd Pearson at December 6, 2006 11:42 PM

I have not had a chance to look at the report. Probably won't until late next week. So I am holding off until I can read the details.

Posted by: Jim M at December 7, 2006 08:31 AM

I'm not inclined to bother to read the report. Our options at this point all seem to me to be crappy ones. Even presuming we could pull the fat from the fire, it's already been burnt up real crispy. I sense an inexorable shift in momentum, and there's an atmosphere of political piling on. It seem to me to it's being gleefully covered by the media. The font sizes grow for ever-glibber grim headlines. It's starting to feel to me like an emotional tidal wave of public opinion, and I don't think it can be stopped or its course changed.

At this point, the ones who are going to be eagerly reading this report are Iraqis and folks across the middle east. Presumedly there are some remaining hopeful Iraqis that we have on our side in trying to hold together the nascent constitutional government. If these folks are smart, they are preparing themselves for the high likelihood that we aren't going to follow through on various promises that have been made. That's not right, but IMO the handwriting is on the wall.

Right now, as we blog from the safety of our desks, various folks with real-world pressing things at stake imminently(like their lives, and the physical and economic safety of their family) are busy furiously shifting their eggs to safer and more realistic baskets, and tucking the remains of big hopes away in a corner box for some other time. The poor bastards.

Posted by: bk at December 7, 2006 09:15 AM

Sadr and the other militias will celebrate in the streets when they read this report.

The first part, about problems, went well into talking about the damage done by militias. It was the only part I liked.

The second part, what to do, struck me as disturbingly fatalistic. This isn't Vietnam. We have very powerful forces, and haven't yet lost the possibility that a well-thought-out plan can win.

> Sustained increases in U.S. troop levels would not solve the
> fundamental cause of violence in Iraq, which is the absence of
> national reconciliation.

Only half right. The fundamental cause of violence in Iraq is that nobody's stopping violence. The militias aren't being confronted. This isn't Vietnam - moderates don't hate our side and don't want violence. That's being ignored.

In fact, if I were writing this report, I'd have just one recommendation:

JON'S RECOMMENDATION: Stop making deals with the militias and fight them! We must fight Sadr and other militias on our own initiative, and on our own plan. The Iraqi government can never do that of its own accord, since it depends on militias to not be shot.

We have enough troops there to do this right now. We don't have to get every militiaman - just forcing Sadr and his force structure off the streets and into hiding would be a big advance.

Are we currently going after Sadr, despite the tale of misery he causes? No! Why not?


> RECOMMENDATION 1: ... launch the comprehensive New Diplomatic
> Offensive to deal with the problems of Iraq and of the region. ...

Because we haven't been trying to deal with problems of Iraq and the region so far atall.

> RECOMMENDATION 13: There must be a renewed and sustained commitment
> by the United States to a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace on all
> fronts: Lebanon and Syria, and President Bush's June 2002 commitment
> to a two-state solution for Israel and Palestine.

Oh, yes, we'll be able to resolve a 2,000-year-old trouble spot at our convenience to help us in Iraq in the next year or two. Talk about dilution of effort! What a typical committee effort!

> However, past experience indicates that the violence would simply
> rekindle as soon as U.S. forces are moved to another area.

That's only true so long as we continue to just kind of respond to certain militias we haven't done deals with yet.

> The Iraqi government should accelerate the urgently
> needed national reconciliation program to which it has already
> committed. And it should accelerate assuming responsibility
> for Iraqi security by increasing the number and quality of Iraqi
> Army brigades. As the Iraqi Army increases in size and capabil-
> ity, the Iraqi government should be able to take real responsi-

How is any of this going to stop militias from continuing to control the streets, so long as the government continues to depend on militias to not be shot itself?

> RECOMMENDATION 43: Military priorities in Iraq mus
> change, with the highest priority given to the training, equip
> ping, advising, and support mission and to counterterrorism

I'm pretty tempted to accuse Baker of being a covert militia-lover from this list of priorities. With this list, the militia's grip on power can never fade.

In fact, absolutely none of the recommendations I've read so far seem likely to address militias effectively. You'd think we didn't have a huge army there, just from reading the report.

Posted by: Jon Kay at December 7, 2006 01:18 PM

Sobering, hardly means a total lack of inspiration. There is a mood here that Brian senses, but I believe events will further motivate “new thinking”. Perhaps Jon and many others are struck by the complete unreality of the recommendations. A kind of rudderless salad bowl.

Why were we there? Why is Iraq important? Has Iran already intimidated the region into appeasement? Do we need Iranian help to “solve” Iraq? Will Israel be forced to ignite WW3? Will Palestinians agreed to accept an "Israel" and end their civil war? Will Syria and Iran bring down Lebanon? Will Sunnis unleash more Jihadists in Iraq? It is hard to accept recommendations without a broader calculus. In a strategically coherent plan, Iraq becomes a question of priorities and costs.

Media is playing this as another event in the political battle over Iraq. The battle over Iraq in reality is more about the nature and responsibilities of pre-emption and the validity of the clash of civilization dialectic manifest through asymmetrical terrorism. The nexus of this novel historical phase coupled with high tech and WMD thrusts foreign policy in a completely new direction. It will take new means, new alliances, new discourse and new consequences of mistaken tactics. Thus it is hard to accept out of context defeatism in a critical moment like now, nor think for a moment that our adversaries are not prematurely celebrating while others on the front lines contemplate extraordinary measures of self-defense. Yes, more pre-emption or appeasement without criteria.

Let us start briefly at the beginning. The Times reported weeks ago about nuclear weapon designs posting up at that Iraqi Document Survey group I linked here many months ago. No Representative worth their paycheck thought Saddam wasn't WMD capable. We know the many caravans into Syria prior to our invasion.

We removed Saddam and gave the Iraqi people a chance to choose between partition or unity while we bungled our way into a lawless, undermanned occupation beset by violence rather than a UN-mandated support force and adequate implementation of several of Baker’s recommendations..Mind you, I am not sure how well this could be done by just ourselves and the Brits. Speculating has a limit. We certainly didn't think long term like many of their contradictory comments suggest. The recommendations are often either self-evident (Holy Crap) or wishful thinking (yeah right). Other recommendations reflect a grim defeatism, as though Iraq were not many times more important than Viet Nam, Grenada, Somalia, Bosnia, Serbia or Panama.

We acted and removed a WMD-capable fascist Sunni from doing exactly what his personal recordings say he would have done. Prior to our invasion, parts of his nuclear group drove to Syria. Saddam’s intensions were clear as were the contracts with Russian, Chinese and French companies.

The odds were always in favor of civil war (see most experts before the war) and our plan B was what for this contingency? There is real doubt there was ever a coherent phase IV (See FIASCO). But I won't pile on.

We have a significant fighting force in Iraq. I always thought Iraq was a basing idea on our way to Damascus and Tehran. The smart thing to do would have been to admit the planning problems from the start and move aggressively to field a military force that could hammer militias, police that obeyed the law, counterterrorism operations and infrastructure security that worked. This is arm chairing, but I have always been stunned by our mistaken record given the amounts of money spent coupled with Iraqi oil wealth.

The recommendations, as I said before, seem defeatist, wishful, or so obvious it is hard to believe such advise was not part of Cobra II from the start, given the Bush-declared IMPORTANCE of our moving quickly (far faster than against Iran ) to REMOVE SADDAM and then manage Iraq's oil industry while containing sectarian violence.

It was the right (but rushed) next move with Saddam, given our military's reluctance to partition Iraq in arming Militias from the start and squeezing the Saddam middle. That would be more of a proxy war. I believe Sadr is an example of why Zinni's plan would have failed. To adopt the reverse and try and create a new Iraq army from scratch without even a coherent plan and resource to do this was bungling at best. This is why Rumsfeld is gone. Disband the army, kick out all Saddam Party card holders from government and fail to protect oil infrastructure were talked about as mistakes for years (even before the fact). And what would our Arab friends do as we crushed the Sunnis, left and just let Iran and Syria fill the vacuum? But onward.

We are here. Rove will live to play one more day, I am afraid that if we retreat from Iraq, the Sunnis and the Israelis will regard our alliance as insufficient to provide security. Israel will consider pre-emption and Arabs will support extremists to fight in Iraq. Once again the world seems too paralyzed to confront genocide, terrorism, anti Semitism, proliferation and anti-liberal extremism. Events will continue to morph into increasingly threatening and complex stalemates.

The Iraq Study, from my initial looks seems disconnected from a dialogue about national security as it relates to Iraq. While it makes sense to reconfigure as civil war erupts, one cannot inspire Americans to sacrifice and endure when there is little conversation about the goals and mission behind today’s use of military force. It sets high bars and in a moment suggests dangerous options. The recommendations sets forth little underlying criteria for deciding when we SHOULD leave, nor shows our disposition and deployment in Iraq degrades our readiness (presumably with Iran next door and continued deployment in the Gulf.). While I do not echo the NY Post’s front page, I have grown weary of the cycle of defeatism and failures. They have little to do with the real task at hand. Remember, The Study does not recommend more troops, partition, Constitutional oil rights, defeating militias, interdicting weapons from Syria and Iran. Very strange, yet predictable I suppose. I hope Gates proves to be more independent of this “group think”. The way forward? To where? And I'm not sure the DoD is quite comfortable with these recommendations as the best way forward.

More here

Posted by: Maxtrue at December 7, 2006 06:55 PM

premature rejoicing?

Beyond the human cost, what should America consider as the best options to secure a world free of terrorists/extremists with WMD or WMC?

Does this rational self-interest mean inevitable conflict with regimes seeking WMD that support the Islamic terror network? Should we do this by pre-empting their means of production and material transfers? What is that point where we COULD use force? When is diplomacy exhausted? Never?.

And how should we behave in order to prevent Iran or Syria (see North Korea) from acquiring nuclear weapons and their delivery systems including but not limited to cruise missiles, air and surface launched missiles, drones, sub launched missiles, aircraft, shells, SF teams, and delivery through several terrorist groups?

Do we doubt the real Iranian aim in enriching fuel is to create a credible nuclear threat to deter any serious Western retaliation for acts of terrorism and aggression that Iran undertakes against the United States and its allies. Then there is the matter of supplying proxies with delivery systems.

Wasn’t our removing a WMD-capable brutal despot who was considering more and supplying some assistance to terrorists, consistent with a general criteria for pre-emption? Iraq is no longer a WMD threat.

Picture Bob Newhart as Iraq Study Spokesperson reading these recommendations out loud before a session of Congress.


Posted by: Maxtrue at December 7, 2006 10:35 PM

I liked the "Secret Plan to End the War" better. I want "Peace with Honor" in Iraq.

Posted by: C3 at December 8, 2006 05:29 PM

How about "stability with resolve"?

Times quotes military on Study

Posted by: Maxtrue at December 8, 2006 07:47 PM

Yes, Peace with Honor.....more than two million dead in the slaughter that followed. Now there was a graceful exist.

Yes, we need more Republican realists and Democratic "historians" like Carter to lead us to a peaceful land based on facts, ground realities and objective threat assessments..

Baker? Didn’t he enable Saddam in the first place. Didn’t Carter spawn Osama? What about realists "ending the war on terror" like Reagan "ended the Cold War"? Jeanne K died today. Seems that warrior would not have capitulated. If memory serves me correctly, Reagan moved mobile missiles into Europe while the anti-war wing burned him in effigy.

If this is a centrist, bi-partisan Study, then we're in big trouble. Given the Study's average membership age, yesterday's moderates and realists are not today's centrists. Negotiate with Iran? Didn’t Baker give them dud missiles once to get back hostages?

I do not believe the center wants a replay of peace with honor. Unfortunately many wouldn’t mind "no peace with dishonor". Yes, there will no peace and there will be little honor if we walk, run. skip and jump.

I don’t know who I am angrier at: the idiots who got us here, or the ones who think we can just walk away.

plan B

Posted by: Maxtrue at December 8, 2006 10:11 PM
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