Centerfield

Jon,

There's definitely a place for tanks in guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency (what we're calling "fourth generation warfare"), but it's a much more limited and circumscribed role than what it plays in classic conventional maneuver warfare (what we've taken to calling "third generation warfare"). It's unfortunate that the tactics and strategies that tend to produce dynamic victories in "3GW"-- large-scale decisive maneuver generally based on the application of superior firepower and operational shock-- aren't particularly successful in "4GW," where you need a more sophisticated civil-military-political strategy emphasizing intelligence-driven small unit action that supports information operations and targets the enemy's strategy (and not just his combatants). But there it is.

And, in fairness to the IDF (as well as my peers in the US Army, whom I'm constantly criticizing on this point), there really is a need to be able to fight both kinds of threats. For the Israelis, failure to defeat the Intifida and the Arab insurgency isn't a matter of national survival-- it just means the conflict is prolonged for eternity. But being incapable of defeating invading Arab armies in the open battlefields of the 1967 or 1973 wars would mean the very existence of Israel would be called into doubt. Thus, one can see why their military community has largely weighed being powerful in the latter over the former kind of war. The best of the best really do know how to fight both (and here I'm talking about guys like LTG David Petraeus and COL H.R. McMaster), but as an institution, armies generally have to choose to train, equip, and prepare to fight one at the expense of the other. At least until we can figure out how to teach our junior leaders how to think instead of what to think.

That said, my nominees for the Top Five books on counterinsurgency would be (in no particular order):

John Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam

Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency

David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice

Max Boot, Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power

Brian Linn, The US Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902

Honorable mention goes to Thomas Hammes, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century, which is actually a really good general overview for someone just starting to learn about the field.

All are taught (to varying degrees) at the Army's Command and General Staff College now that fighting a counterinsurgency has received slightly more attention than it did in the last three decades. And the Army is now fielding a counterinsurgency manual, which I'm in the process of reading, that has been largely influenced by LTC Nagl.

Each of the branches of the military has a different focus. None of them are focused, trained, equipped, or manned for peace keeping, nation-building, or counter insurgency. Seems to me that in the modern world we need a fifth branch of the military. Give them the charter for these types of missions. Heavy in military police, civil engineers, linguists, and medical personnel. Mainly reserves that practice these jobs as a civilian career and could be called up when needed. This would maintain the traditional branches of the military focused on the “third generation warfare", which is still vital.

Just my opinion, I've been wrong before and I'll be wrong again.

Bernie,

There's actually been some discussion about that, but the typical bureaucratic politics keeps getting in the way, at least thus far.

Colin Powell had pushed for the establishment of an "Active Response Corps" in the State Department that would have consisted of civilians with the technical specialties that you describe above (presumably, it would have needed the military to provide security for impermissive environment). The problem is that the Foreign Service has a rather insulated bureaucracy and doesn't want to change to "do nation-building."

Others have suggested a pseudo-civilian organization like the Afghan Reconstruction Group-- private sector volunteers who could, again, be paired with military units in order to provide the technical expertise necessary to implement nation-building operations. Here the problem is that it takes time to recruit these civilians into service, and time is generally a luxury during the invasion-to-stabilization phase.

There are recommendations for standing reserve civil affairs groups that would exist under the Army's control (with military and civilian reservists), who would possess the technical skills necessary to support nation-building and stabilization operations, and here the Provincial Reconstruction Teams may prove to be a suitable model on how to employ them.

Regardless, it's pretty obvious to everyone on the inside that we need to come up with solutions to the stabilization challenge, we just don't know exactly what to do and bureaucrats tend to resist changes to their organizational culture (witness the Army and Transformation). That said, just as the Goldwater-Nichols Act reformed the services into a more Joint organization, it's past time for a new "Goldwater-Nichols" that forces an interagency approach onto the federal government culture.

But, as one eminent historian recently put it, this will happen only over the body bags of a lot of career Foreign Service officers, because they do not want to have to do this.

Thanks, Bobby!

Oh, and I forgot my idea on who won:

War: IDF
Politics: Hiz