Centerfield

1. Kerry already has changed it from this year to July 2007.

Where have you been? Iraq is already in civil war.

Save your venom for the Republicans that are using/used Iraq for political gain.

but because we must stay until we are confident

Iraq can function without our immediate, day-to-day care. If troops were to leave en-masse at the end of the year, regardless of whether infrastructure or internal support systems were functioning, the nation of Iraq would stand a very good chance of either imploding, devolving into sectarian civil war, or both. This implosion not only creates a situation even more hostile than it currently is, but results in a massive waste of funds.

Here are the logical consequences if you actually believe this stuff.

1) We are potentially committed to staying in Iraq forever. As long as the government is not free-standing, we must stay.

2) A significant number of foreign affairs people consider our continuing presence in Iraq to be hurting, not helping, the chances of long-term stability and consensus, because any faction seen to be working with us is labeled collaborationist. If they are right, every day we stay means one more Iraqi government official killed or kidnapped for working with us, which means another US reprisal, which means another dozen widows and orphans. Staying is thus by definition the initial term in an infinite series.

3) The need to complete an action is a function of the the cost expended on that action. Therefore, every soldier killed and dollar spent means we must be even more committed to staying. This is, again, an infinite series.

This kind of logic was used in Vietnam by the US, in Ireland by the English, in Lebanon by the Israelis, in Afghanistan by the Russians. It's not an argument from, it's an appeal to fear and pride. One of these days, we are going to have to go home and see if the Iraqi government stands or falls on its own. This can happen this afternoon or in 2028, and the result will be what it will be. It's just a matter of how many lives and dollars you want to spend, first.

Levin and Reed have roughly the same proposal without a mandatory run-away date in it as an alternative. It's being labelled as "cut and jog." Most of the current state Democratic party platforms I have seen lately contain some variation of "cut and run," and call for immediate withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Iraq. Since the national Democratic party won't have another platform convention until 2008, we'll have to take the votes of the Democrats in the House and Senate as the official position of the national party. The Senate should be voting this afternoon or evening on both the Levin/Reed "cut and jog" amendment and the Kerry/Feingold "cut and run" amendment.

As I've blogged elsewhere, when you add it all up it still comes out to "Run away!" Democrats in the Senate and House will tell us whether or not that's the official Democratic position in the very near future.

BTW, I think it would be interesting and instructive if the official platforms of the parties were "cut and run" vs "30-year mortgage." In the end, I think those are indeed the only honest positions (see also, social security: "repeal the tax cuts" vs. "stock up on cat food"), they will be significant for America for the next generation, and they deserve and up-or-down vote in the general election.

To compare Iraq and Vietnam is a bit misleading.

In Vietnam, we were fighting a military foe that had the support of the people and was backed by a powerful neighbor, trying to prop up a government that lacked popular support.

Iraqi voters have shown support for the government, and the opposition is not an organized political movement, nor is it supported by a strong outside force. It's a limited number of militia -- armed thugs who support individual leaders -- and outside Al-Qaeda fighters.

This is a group that attacks civilian targets more than military, and does not enjoy widespread support.

That is not to say that the American military is welcome in Iraq, and that the populace isn't eager to see us depart. But there's a huge difference, militarily and politically, between Iraq and Vietnam.

The simple fact is, we will have a military force in Iraq and Afghanistan for many years to come. The size of the force, however, should see significant reductions by summer 2007, as more Iraqi troops become trained and ready to take the place of U.S. forces.

I never wanted to vote for Bush in 04, but Kerry couldn't convince me that he would stay committed to finishing the job in Iraq. Now I don't have much doubt that if President Kerry were in office today, he wouldn't order an immediate withdrawal, but that just proves that he is the finger in the wind politician that I sized him up to be.

Since at least the beginning of the year, he has been looking for opportunities to grandstand in ways that will position him as the leading "liberal" candidate for the Democratic nomination in 2008. First, he called for an Alito filibuster (from Europe). Now this.

On the bright side, the odds are that centrists will have 2 good choices in 2008, unlike the 2 lousy choices we had in 2004.

Earth to Kerry:

Thanks for playing, John. We have some lovely parting gifts. No, sorry, you only get one swing. Yup, that's the general rule. Yes we know that's really not fair, but it's the way it seems to work. Other people are waiting to play John...you had your chance. You lost. People don't seem to like you that much.

This is a group that attacks civilian targets more than military, and does not enjoy widespread support.

What do you base this on? An insurgency survives in the face of weapon and personnel inferiority with civilian support for informants, cover, lookouts, recruitment to cover losses, safe houses, etc... Also: insurgencies always grow in the face of an occupation, because even if we are being careful about civilian casualties, every time one of their 18-year-olds hopped up on equal parts of the Koran and testasterone gets himself spread like peanut butter against the drywall by one of our 18-year-olds hopped up on equal parts of the Bible and testasterone, all 68 of his brothers, uncles, and cousins sign up for insurgency basic training the next morning. Birth rate is the ultimate asymmetrical warfare, and the occupier loses, unless he's willing to raize the city, kill the males, sell the women, convert the children, and sow salt in the earth.

If anything, Iraq is much worse than Vietnam in terms of "hearts and minds," because at least the South Vietnamese asked us in. In Iraq -- well, nobody likes a gate crasher. But the analogy with Vietnam was that of throwing good money and lives after bad.

Sometimes it is most prudent to simply stop the bleeding -- especially when the wound was self-inflicted.

Greg,

You're missing some key concepts here. There's multiple levels of "support" that insurgents get from the local population, everything from turning a blind eye to the former's activities to passively providing aid and comfort to actively assisting their cause (we actually have nine different classifications in counterinsurgency studies, so I'm simplifying here). But I put "support" in quotation marks for a reason-- it isn't always freely given, and is often a function of survival: when government forces cannot protect the population from the insurgent violence, the population will concede to insurgent demands in order to live.

Now it's true that the insurgents currently get a wide (although varying) degree(s) of support from the local population, but that doesn't mean the insurgents are necessarily popular with the local population-- it just means their terrorist tactics have succeeded in intimidating the locals into doing what they want. Thus, the momentum starts to turn when the host nation forces (in this case, the Iraqi Security Forces) become more capable of providing security for their fellow countrymen, and the insurgents find themselves isolated from the population. When that occurs, the insurgency will find itself confined to shrinking areas of operation, sanctuaries that (quite frankly) may never be eliminated, but can be reduced.

But for this strategy to work, it requires trained, relevant, and ready Iraqi security forces-- something that the Administration and the Administration's critics will both agree is currently lacking. That means we have a choice: we can continue with our dual mission to conduct counterinsurgency operations while vigorously training the ISF and handing responsibilities over to their respective units as they become ready; or we can withdraw US forces, and watch as the untrained ISF get defeated by their adversaries, the democratically-elected central government collapses, and the country falls into a state of widespread civil war (we're currently seeing only a limited one right now-- believe me, it could be much worse). Failed states are, of course, breeding grounds for terrorist sanctuaries, training centers, and bases of operation to attack the decadent West, if you need a reminder that our security is indeed linked to security in Iraq.

And that's what makes the "cut and run" tag so apt: if you know the host nation security forces aren't ready to perform their function (and all of the Democratic Senators believe that), but you still advocate a withdrawal of US forces that will thereby lead to the collapse of the central government-- how is it NOT cutting and running? I understand that it's because not a single one of them understands counterinsurgency (with the exception of Biden, who isn't really one of them and, in any case, understands it better than anyone in the Administration), but that doesn't make it any less true.

I've been a critic-- on this forum and on my own blog-- of the tactics, operations, and strategy in the War in Iraq. I never understood why they needed 150,000 troops for a country of 25 million in Iraq, when we only needed 20,000 troops for a country of 25 million in Afghanistan; I think those larger troop numbers worked against their cause, as the Coalition sought a more military solution to the insurgency (which is, inherently, political-- and I concede that most critics, who demanded more troops, never understood this).

I do believe that the war has been unnecessarily prolonged by the Army's reliance upon the wrong kinds of tactics (generally, large-scale kinetic operations focused on maneuver and superior firepower instead of a combined political-civil-military strategy executing small unit operations from intelligence derived by a supportive population), although even in a best case scenario, we'd still be there for a few more years.

And I do think we need more of the non-doctrinal asymmetric methods-- embedded advisory teams in the ISF, Provincial Reconstruction Teams throughout the countryside, and a proactive information operations campaign that establishes a climate of perceptions for the Iraqi people that is favorable to opposing the insurgency, among others-- that have proven so valuable (and in fact, I have a panel at Fort Leavenworth's conference in August that will be arguing precisely that point to the Command and General Staff College).

But the key to success in this theater (as in most counterinsurgency campaigns) is training the Iraqi security forces to be capable of securing the population, demonstrating that the central government cannot be overthrown by military force and terrorist tactics alone, and thereby encouraging the insurgents to seek a political solution to their problem. If you leave before the ISF is ready, you are cutting and running. If you set an arbitrary mandatory timetable to train the ISF-- a timetable that doesn't allow sufficient time for the ISF to be trained-- then you are cutting and running. That's a fact. We may not like that victory is going to require an extended presence (albeit, I would hope, in a reduced footprint and with changed tactics and operations that LTG Chiarelli is already implementing). But those are the choices we face.

Bobby,
In regards to Afghanistan, do you think we have created stability instead of an increasing threat of warfare and terrorism? I wonder if our numbers in Afghanistan can handle an assassination of Musharaf and the subsequent search for Pakistani nukes let alone deal with the growing insurgency of Taliban forces. Have we used a modified Afghanistan approach effectively in Somalia? The irony there is amazing. What approach works best against this?

As far as Iraq, I still do not see us invading, securing infrastructure, and protecting a green zone and government, besides being prepared for possible invasion surprises with 20,000 troops. That idea didn't even make it into Cobra ll. I have read some of your thoughts regarding the Weinberger and Powell Doctrines, but given the civilian determined foreign policy goals of creating democratic regimes and frightening rogue ones from evolving their intelligence/terrorism networks, commanding the field and protecting vital assets seems a prerequisite. Certainly, Iran was moved with our size in the beginning. If it is just decapitation and proxy-playing (which can easily lead to slaughters), why even stay in Iraq now? Shall we see what a force of 20,000 can do? Of course, we need to secure these longer-term foreign policy objectives, but I still do not see how 20,000 troops do it, or withdrawing altogether. There are reasons why the Sunnis have been isolated from a national army as well as why this Iraqi force doesn't get advanced weapons. They end up in insurgent's hands. How much of a myth is the "Iraqi Army as a solution"?

Lastly, I apologetically move my digression to Iran. If Iraq was (and is) so important (and modifying Iran's behavior was one reason we invaded), how is Iran now not much more important to contain? Seriously, I am at a loss to understand why Iran's actions are not more threatening to Liberal Democracy than Saddam's. The Left screamed this in 2002 and are silent now, but so are Republicans.

Has our Iraq adventure really stretched a 1.4 million strong DOD? What muscle is there to exert on Iran, NK and others let alone stand strong against Russia and China? Isn't letting Iran pass points of irreversible consequence out weigh the civil mess our withdrawal from Iraq would create? Shall we watch while Iran embeds and can choke the Straits of Hormuz with all sorts of nice weapons? Doesn’t this risk many lives down the road?

Blix has just said five years to Negroponte's 10 years to the Iran bomb. Negroponte said ten years -for what reason? Might you be so kind as to explain our behavior towards Iran (what kind of potential threat v Iraq)? I would like to know your view as to how blow back might be effecting our Iran policy now and whether many who advocate staying the course in a trillion dollar Iraq occupation have apparently become blind to Iran's strategy of de facto rights.

A few Democrats actually concur with the White House on Iraq. If Rove wins a three peat on the same strategy, Democrats should disband. I have heard no Democrat reiterate Kerry's vow to keep Iran from getting nukes. I hear nothing about military arms from Russia to Belarus and Chavez. I hear little from anyone regarding NK. Does anyone think our 100 billion dollar missile defense can shoot down a typofdong 2? Well, we're here still debating cut and jog.

I can't wait until the Dodgers play the Mets....

Max,

Well, again, I think the strategy to secure Iraq with "20,000" troops (DISCLAIMER: that number is completely arbitrary based off our discussion re: Afghanistan, and not necessarily what the Downing Plan may or may not have actually recommended) would have had to rely heavily upon indigenous forces to provide the vast majority of the foot soldiers. You would have had the Peshmerga in the north, the marsh Shi'a in the South, and some successor to the old Sunni-dominated Ba'athist Army responsible for the Sunni Triangle; each would have had US military forces embedded within their force structure to coordinate their operations and direct air strikes and employ other combat multipliers (such as the Prophet) as necessary. Coalition maneuver brigades would have likely been used to secure Baghdad (and perhaps a couple of other cities), and to constitute an operational reserve (for quick reaction type missions) and to conduct deliberate operations in support of the indigenous security forces. Provincial Reconstruction Teams would have been deployed to each province to link in with the Iraqi Governorates and local-level political structures, and to provide unity of effort for development and capacity-building operations. Finally, a second command-- the Multi-National Security Transition Command-- would have begun the process of building and training a new multi-ethnic, multi-religious Iraqi National Army that wouldn't (initially) be used for combat operations, but that would train intensively and be indoctrinated with professional military ethic.

So what you would have-- initially-- was a scenario where the Kurds controlled the north, the Shi'a controlled the south, and the Sunni controlled the Triangle-- and let's be honest, the men that controlled the regional security forces would be the same ones that controlled the political offices, so we're really talking about warlords here. Meanwhile, security for Baghdad would have come from the Coalition, and this is where the provisional and later elected Iraqi governments would have resided. Initially, their rule wouldn't have extended much beyond Baghdad, but as the Iraqi National Army emerged-- demonstrating its tactical superiority over the warlord militias through deliberate operations-- Baghdad's power would slowly marginalize the warlords and extend further into the country.

There's definitely shortcomings with this strategy-- for starters, it relies upon the Sunni Army to be able to control the Triangle and that may or may not have been possible (we shall see in the coming months what control the Sunni leaders really have over the insurgency in their midst-- like Arafat with the Intifada, it may be something that "leadership" actually has no control over); the possibility for sectarian strife (even with US advisors embedded into the regional structures, and PRTs doling out reconstruction and development projects to "bribe" the local leaders to play nice) would have been significant. There are also PR/media implications (if you think Abu Ghraib was bad-- and it was-- believe me, it was nothing compared to what would have emerged in this de-centralized process... think Dostam suffocating 100 Taliban prisoners in a box car). But it's definitely a concept that needs to be explored and examined because-- unfortunately for my people-- the War on Terror isn't going away, and we need to learn all our lessons now and refine the process for the future instead of waiting until after the fact and saying, "Oh, I guess we could have been a little more creative back there."

As for Iran, again, I don't have any insight into what the White House is doing, but my feeling is that they tried Iraq and realized it didn't work out in influencing the region quite as well as they had hoped-- to be sure, Qaddafi folded in his cards; Riyadh is taking action against (and getting in regular firefights with) their jihadist adversaries, instead of turning a blind eye to their recruiting, financing, and supporting of terror networks (as they did throughout the Clinton and first two years of the Bush Administrations); and we've even had some (albeit different) successes with Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, and Pakistan (although India's nuclear saber-rattling did a lot more to bring Pakistan into our camp). But there's still Syrian intransigence, and the lesson the Iranian mullahs seem to have taken is that having nuclear weapons is their only viable security guarantee. But because of the perceptions of what's going on in Iraq (i.e., that we're "losing" the War, or in the least "taking too long to win"-- regardless of the truth, there is perception and in politics that is often what dominates), my sense is that they're hoping not to have to play the military card against Iran, and desperately hoping that some kind of velvet revolution can overthrow the mullahs and install a more moderate, responsible government. And while that may very well happen, it could also mean a period of time that an Iranian dictatorial regime possesses nuclear weapons, is allowing enriched uranium to pass into the hands of non-state terrorist actors, and-- for that matter-- it's no guarantee the mullahs wouldn't use said nukes against Israel or Iraq or Europe, if their overthrow was imminent and they had nothing else to lose.

I don't have the answers, brother, and I don't know how these things are going to play out. I wish I did. Unfortunately, it's a complex world, it's getting more complex, and it's hard to say what's going to happen next-- it's even harder to say what should happen next.

Bobby,

A reply only if and when you have a chance….

(Having reviewed you intelligent reply):

Geez....and Pericles is of no help?

You lay out a concept for the Warlord scenario, but your reservations appear to be insurmountable including the rejection by the military of arming these dangerous militias in 2000 under the Zunni concept. You are dead right about Abu Graib looking tame compared to the violence unleashed in the Warlord scenario. Therefore, I do not think this solution would work in Iraq, by the very reasoning you apply to it. 20,000 wouldn't stop the Turks from moving to prevent Kurdish succession. My understanding is that not all is well in Afghanistan. I find it hard to believe this a DOD fault, but then I'm bias towards those who have to actually plan and fight. The converse (mucho troops) has less fallout it seems for Iraq and we chose the middle ground. Imagine finding Sunni Warlord help in the beginning. The Shiite militias might have easily fought themselves and breaking up Iraq would be a serious risk in the ~20,000 plan. I know the number is a general thing.

I do know your comrades and my defenders have a long road ahead. We have never directly fought a country with nukes. My worry is that your Iran analysis and speculation presents great risks if you are called again to stop Iran. Is risking Iranian possession of nukes worth the possible loss of life should shadowy groups get them? And there is that “unknown” slice we don’t even know about. Iran has studied NYC well. How is this not much greater than the threat Saddam presented in 2003? Can those who defend our Iraq policy (not in its entirety) just bale on Iran? Where is the principle or foresight in this? I hope your new blog will deal with the stubborn facts regarding this comparison of threats.

I expect too much. Isn't it absurd to take action later from a military point of view? Shall we wait for cruise missiles and wmd? Do military experts really think there is little difference pre-empting sooner v waiting a few years after Iran has nuclear material, defenses and a choke hold on the Gulf? Do we as Americans have a right to get answers and the right questions given the money and life laid out for both Iraq (at the loss of Iran?) and missile defense (as NK prepares a test)? Do you see a coherent strategy? Is there significant progress? I see little accountability for blow back, an irresponsible lack of discussed options and costs, or even a clear picture of the world we are moving into. We finally triumphed over Communism and 20th century madness. We experienced years of growth and influence while the two parties attacked each other rather than the issues. Now are we slipping into second best? 1.4 million strong, our DOD seems silent. There is a fire beginning in Africa and Asia. Our administration is shrouded in secrecy. I understand your application of the Warlord strategy. I do not see any clear vision by civilians in office to present a clear plan beyond things like global strike and conventional tridents. Is our military stronger than ever, evolving and capable enough to deal with the approaching storms? Do they have a strategic plan reflected in any political leadership? Who would you recommend as an expert voice of hegemonic sanity?

Sorry to ask so many questions. I don’t expect answers. For those who do not see the point in asking these question, I suggest they reflect the real dangers of cut and run. There are even bigger issues blow back is making us run from and Kerry's resolution is the dim flip side of this issue. He uttered that he would not let Iran acquire the bomb. Where is he now on that issue? Nowhere. Even conservatives don't seem to mind Mullahs with nukes. For once, I hope Bush will ignore the polls and at least define what is at stake in NK, Iran, Syria, and Iran. If he does not he has given up on the war on terror. Iraq was never just about Saddam.

There is no Reagan or JFK on the horizon. If you were President (what year will you declare?), what would you do about Iran, NK and the increasing tension in South America? I know that is too much to request, but briefly ( if you have a chance one evening), do you advocate force (when?) in regard to Iran? How dangerous would this be when you suggest the point of action? What should we do about NK, embargo and build a missile defense around NK? And in South America, how much pressure would you exert to prevent China and Russia from fueling fires in our backdoor?

On the lighter side, the Mets are looking sharp these days too. It will be a good series.

Thanks.....

Max

Bobby,
Your suggestions and questions about usage of the old Iraqi Army bring
up a couple of related questions I've had for a while.

Do you have any ideas on why the original Coalition Administration (it's amazingly hard to find the name now) was replaced with the CPA and Paul Bremer?

I seem to remember that they were trying to use the Iraqi Army for security and were having a hard road. Do you know anything about that?

Jon Kay,

I thought the reason Paul Bremer was brought in was because the original Coalition Admin DISBANDED the Iraqi Army and Bremers job was to replace it.

Risk: Pullout in quick order and there's a real possibility of Iraq becoming a failed state. That would increase the probabilty of a series of events that would not be in our best national interests.

Reward: It's concievable a orderly phased withdrawal in the near future would decrease the insurgencies viability or simply force the Iraqi man on the street to stand up. It's not that high up on my probability list though.

You pays your money and you takes your chances.

Max,

Those are great questions, and like I said, I don't have all the answers. I'll have to think about those questions and get back to you.

Jon and Dan,

The predecessor to Paul Bremer's Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was LTG (Ret.) Jay Garner's Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA). There's dozens of reasons that have been peddled as to why the CPA replaced ORHA or, more specifically, why Bremer replaced Garner-- some are credible and some are downright silly, and like always, it's hard to really know what was going on.

But the disbanding of the Ba'athist Army was made by Bremer (not Garner), as part of his larger de-Ba'athification campaign to radically alter Iraqi society. Interestingly enough, in his memoirs, My Year in Iraq (which my lieutenants cynically referred to as It's Not My Fault), Bremer argues that the Ba'athist Army had already melted away across the board, that relying upon it to contribute anything would have required calling its members back to service, and its re-arming and re-equipping-- something he argues that Talabani and Barzani would never have accepted. But it does come out absolutely clear that the recent discovery of the Al-Hillah killing fields played a large role in his decision to disband the Army-- he was disgusted by what he had seen and believed that only a revolutionary New Iraqi Army could have merited the investment.

Again, there would have been costs to keeping the old Army intact, and anyone who claims otherwise is clearly a partisan. I'm not necessarily saying that Bremer made the right or wrong decision (I wish I knew, but I really don't). I do believe, however, that this decision was possible in Iraq, while its counterpart (disbanding the Afghan Militia Forces) in Afghanistan was not stemmed from two important reasons: first, in Afghanistan, we rapidly handed political control of the country to an indigenous provisional government (established by the Afghans themselves in what became known as the Bonn Agreement); in Iraq, despite Garner's announcement of his intention to turn over control to an interim Iraqi Government on 15 May 2003, the US-led Coalition remained as political authorities for more than a year after the collapse of Saddam's regime. Secondly, in Afghanistan, we had less than 20,000 troops on the ground and no appreciable means of forcing a militia disarmament, even if we weren't concerned with the security vacuum that would create (which, as one who was there, I can say we were); in Iraq, meanwhile, with eight times that force level, there was a tendency to believe that kinetic military operations could lead to conclusive solutions, and the Coalition likely believed they didn't need the Ba'athist Army. Regardless of the normative judgement of the decision to disband, those factors likely made it possible in one case and impossible in the other.

Good stuff Bobby, thanks for the info.

just read this report on Fox... maybe Bobby can make heads or tails of the NGIC report

http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,200499,00.html

To me, this makes it even more imperative that we stay.

Max,

I agree with all your points, although I think you're a bit too hard on Sen. Kerry, at least concerning his motives. I think he, like a lot of Dems unfortunately, really believe that premature withdrawal of troops will help. The fact is, his position is wrong, for obvious reasons.

I was one of those pro-war Kerry voters. At the time, considering Bush's record, it seemed like the right choice. The choice is moot now, obviously.

Oh, and Kerry ran a miserable campaign. There's no other way of putting it.

"Cut and Jog" is now the official position of the Senate Democrats.

Max,

I agree with few of your points, although I think you're a bit too optimistic on the Bush administration, at least concerning his motives. I think he, like a lot of Repubs unfortunately, really believe that the continued presents of troops will help one way or another. The fact is, his position is wrong, for obvious reasons.

Oh, and Kerry ran a miserable campaign. There's no other way of putting it.

Man that is so easy....

The campaign was a function of the man Rick. He had no choice, that was the campaign he had to run, and it showed us who he is...parser, vacillator, apple polisher.

Kerry did absolutely zilch to inspire confidence that he would be anything more than a politician. Which is to say, a liar, a cheat, a backscratcher and a partisan. With Bush, whether he is right or wrong, you KNOW he truly believes what he is doing is in the best interest of the American people.

But is there any guarantee the latter is better? What's our guarantee that a sincere dummy is better than a smart conniver?

Much as I dislike Kerry, I don't believe he thinks he'd act in a way counter to the best interests of the American people. I just don't think he was enough in tune with us to actually be able to discern what that meant.

With Bush, whether he is right or wrong, you KNOW he truly believes what he is doing is in the best interest of the American people.

Well I know many others wouldn't, but I'd grant that. Here's the thing though...if someone is not especially capable, they're bound to do WAY MORE damage if they act without doubt as a true believer in their knowledge of what's best for us.

I'd like to think that someone who was unsure about this would try to be a good listener.

bk, your points are well taken. But I contend that many of the people who are willing to vote for the best person regardless of party, looked at Kerry and couldnt believe this guy won his Senate seat much less his nomination - even in Mass he is regarded as some kind of an idiot. I dont think he is smart at all, I think he is a sheep, a follower who blindly goes the way of the party (or his wife) thinks, and all of the traits I mentioned before and all I could see was catastrophe with him as President. Im not a big Bush fan, there are alot of things he does and has done which I have been dead set against. Illegal Immigration Amnesty, anti-abortion, anti-gay marriage all these things plus a few dozen more would make me vote for someone other than Bush in most cases. But this is WAR - I would have chosen Bush over nearly every Democrat which was in the Primaries.

Now, 6 years ago, I chose Bush over Al Gore as well. As someone who grew up in the 80s listening to rock-n-roll - Al Gore meant one thing to me: censorship. Combine that with his whole "created the internet" thing and the fact that he did nothing while Clinton spent 8 years doing nothing but banging interns, and well, no way could I have cast my vote in his direction.

But is there any guarantee the latter is better? What's our guarantee that a sincere dummy is better than a smart conniver?

Is this the common perception? Most if not all seem to believe that Bush is an honest man. I'll grant his TV persona doesn't inspire confidence, but is he really a dummy? My take is he might not be able to join MENSA, but he is as intelligent as most. As to being a good listener, your perception might vary depending on who he has chosen to listen to. If I were to criticize him for a personality fault it would be his impetuosness rather than his intelligence or willingness to listen.

With Bush, whether he is right or wrong, you KNOW he truly believes what he is doing is in the best interest of the American people.

Too bad nobody told him that most Americans aren't wealthy, well connected white men.

Max:

At this stage, it is good to have a real dialog including a full array of potential options. The proposal by Kerry and Feingold helps to facilitate real debate, regardless of what you think about Kerry's ambition. By the way, Scott Rasmussen's poll had Kerry beating Bush 48-41 in a hypothetical election.

The problem with Iraq is the lack of government institutional authority. It's got no "street cred." As long as the U.S. is the caretaker of the Iraqi government, this mess will continue and likely get worse.

Another issue not receiving enough attention, in my view, is the way the money is being spent. We are now spending something like $9-Billion per month to fight the insurgency, without apparent measurable success. Where is that money going? Who's getting it?

As my old 8th grade history teacher told us back in 1968, "it takes two kinds of men to make a war, old men looking for profits and young men looking for adventure." (There's at least a germ of truth to that statement.)

Somebody's making huge bucks off of this occupation. Is the money so haphazardly thrown around the country that some may actually be getting into the wrong hands and financing the insurgency?

As Kerry said some time ago, by saying we'll stay as long as it takes, those profiting from the operation can take as long as they want.

Bobby,
I imagine many things are in flux at the moment. We all await your speculation concerning questions asked. I do find this interesting former Clinton Defense Secretary says take out NK launch pad, now . Well, not all Democrats are quiet, though this article makes Bush’s response either measured or based on a lack of missile defense. I think the Aegis is the only thing working presently.

This all gets back to my very first post here. I erroneously thought there was a centrist criteria of sorts regarding the new Doctrine of Preventative and Pre-emptive force. The obvious asymmetry of force used in 9/11 requires a new doctrine. By what criteria are we spending a trillion in Iraq with US casualties and large Iraqi civilian losses? When we compare the multitude of reasons with the behavior of NK and Iran, Iraq runs third. Even Casey blasted Iran today over its involvement in Iraq. Each of the countries stated is a different tactical situation, but NK has certain negative strategic limitations, Iran does not. And Iraq left to madness tomorrow would not be a wmd producer for some time.

I still think you said it right when you asked, “what rogue behavior warrants US force?” and “what sacrifice are we prepared to make as a nation as our soldiers (and citizens living in “ground zeros” like LA and NYC) face the blunt of counterforce?”. Forgive my paraphrasing. There must be some criteria and strategy to deal effectively while we are still the leading voice that addresses the emerging tripolar ideological contest growing around the world. Personally, I regard comments from warrior/philosophers (no matter how humble) to be important.

I also find it relevant while some think Zarqawi’s posthumous theories suggest we not confront Iran, the CIA now reveals it believes Bin Laden wanted Bush to win the 2004 election. By the logic of some here, that would mean we should have voted for Kerry! I suggest the Lady holding the scales take here take off her blindfold and take a good look at what she is weighing. Justice may be blind, but uncoupled reasoning, like a freight train goes nowhere fast.

I and others await your take on these matters, even if they come as a series of educated speculations.

As for the others here, I voted for Kerry even in disgust. Remember he denied he would cut and run. even today with our allies supporting US demands to NK, Kerry says nothing in support of the administration (Biden often does -had to get that in there). I knew a Republican Congress would bind him and I felt he would educate himself once he took office and advance our security. La Monde called him the "enlightened warrior". I prefer hearing from Bobby.

After the election, I watched and having heard and read Kerry numerous times, I wonder what his learning curve really is. I also came to believe that Bush deserves to experience the consequence of his decisions, or at least Republican leadership. It would have been unfair to heap Republican problems on a Democratic President facing a belligerent Republican Congress. Kerry would have to rely on his communication skills to reach the people. Imagine that.

Frankly, I see only Hillary attempting to be centrist. I am stunned that the Democrats might actually lose to the same Rove gambit for the third time. Disaffected Democrats could go to Unity08, or an unexpected personality might emerge. Remember, the Madrid bombing was an opportunity for the Democrats to show some solidarity with Bush in the War on Terror. Instead, they waited for the final month to sound tough (no real plans). Isn’t this happening again?

If the Democratic leadership caters to the cut and jog (with implications for Sudan, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Somalia, Afghanistan…..) and wins, America will face four more years of decline. I’m wondering if James Fallow was right.

To those who say some Americans are making a fortune in Iraq, I ask who made a fortune in Viet Nam or Korea? And who will make money to pre-empt Iran or NK? War is expensive (MIC always makes money) and some say Rumsfeld tried to do it on the cheap and ended up billing for a trillion. Profiting finacially on Iraq is hardly why we are there, unless you can prove it or simply give in to Letist demonization. Yeah, Saddam want to switch to tradingoil in Euros so we removed him. You believe that? If you read Cobra ll, the administration and the military weren't keen on staying in Iraq outside of strategic bases and protecting the oil. Despite the Left's spin, Iraq is about mistakes in tactics and not about greed and domination. America has a long history of foreign investment often involving blood and weapons and stratgic basing. Without the vision of a Naval officer at the end of the 19th century advacating naval bases throughout the far east, Japan might have won the Pacific War. Unless you recommend we simply dropped even more nukes on them....

I thought centrists use the same yardstick for everything. Yes, it seems Saddam did not destroy all his wmd from '91. We need our leadership to establish a coherent criteria and strategy for hegemonic action and honestly apply it equally to all even if the tactics may differ. We need to judge performance and behavior with the criteria of such a standard. That applies to Bush, The Congress, Iraq, China, Iran etc….

Now Senator Kerry, where is that allied help for Iraq, and how will you stop Iran from getting the bomb? Some say Kerry didn’t have many options. Well, Bush has less with Iran, but let’s hope the Bush inner circle considers our future more than popularity polls or playing to the less than Internationalist base. Many here want him to ignore polls when it comes to Iraq, and yet he should consider his base on immigration, Iran, gay marriage, creationism, stem cell research etc….?

Doesn't strike me that anyone here needs that stuff. Try antiwar.com......

Dennis, I was being glib/brief. Bush isn't a "dummy," but he's also quite far from being a deep thinker, a thoughful considerer.

As you point out, one of his faults is "impetuousness." I'd say that this part of his temperament is well-connected to his unstudious nature. Some people pride themselves on being, say, "decisive men of action." Whether this is a virtue or a fault depends upon the situation to which it's being applied.

This is a good way to look at human nature, IMO. A given person's greatest fault and their greatest weakness are often the opposite sides of the same character trait..it's both a failing and a strength.

Bobby,

You covered one of the reasons for disbanding the old Iraqi army: they were useless for carrying out any objectives of the occupation. That point is well taken, given the level of professionalism and prevalence of Ba'athists in its ranks, we would not have been able to count on it to provide security competently in a manner consistent with democracy.

However, you missed the other problem associated with disbanding the army: setting loose tens of thousands of men with no marketable skills other than fighting. The result is that many were likely recruited into the insurgency. This could have been prevented if the army had been preserved in name with individual soldiers subjected to a vetting process to determine whether they could remain.

However, you missed the other problem associated with disbanding the army: setting loose tens of thousands of men with no marketable skills other than fighting.

I think you're missing something there, Scott. Namely that the Iraqi Army pretty much disbanded itself when the Coalition armies came in. We didn't capture any "tens of thousands" to set loose--they mostly just melted away.

We didn't capture any "tens of thousands" to set loose--they mostly just melted away.

But if we didn't officially disband the army, and instead had told them all where they had to report to in order to collect next month's paycheck, wouldn't a fair number of them have shown up?

Good question. Got a crystal ball?

But if we didn't officially disband the army, and instead had told them all where they had to report to in order to collect next month's paycheck, wouldn't a fair number of them have shown up?

Well, Jay Garner thought so, and so did some of the other members of his team. But Paul Bremer claims that the Kurdish leaders made it clear to him that they never would have signed on to such a plan, and so he ordered its total and complete disbandment.

That doesn't necessarily mean it had to be that way-- one has to suppose that Bremer could have reached some sort of compromise with the Kurds, such as an agreement to restore the old Army, but not until its officers had been vetted, as well as a guarantee that the old Army (being Sunni dominated, as it was) would only have been used to impose security in the Sunni Triangle, and could not operate not in Kurdistan or the Shi'ite provinces. That is, it could have been the local interim security force for the Sunni areas (as the Peshmerga and Shi'ite militias are for their respective regions) while the New Iraqi Army was trained, equipped, and brought on line. I can think of other compromises that might have been achieveable, as well.

But let me again state that I don't know whether the decision to disband the old Army was the right or wrong thing to do. I do disagree with Bremer's ex post facto argument that it was the only thing to do, and that he had no real choice in the matter-- we always have choices, and to claim otherwise demonstrates a complete lack of creativity-- but I wouldn't dare claim for a moment that keeping the old Army absolutely wouldn't have come with its own costs, and that it definitely could not have created worse problems of its own. I don't know that and wouldn't pretend otherwise.

Tully,
The original planning did not require us to disband the army and instead suggested something like bk's thought. American TV witnessed miles of disbanded soldiers along the roadside. Some fell back into Kurdish and Shiite militias and many went home to the Sunni triangle. Certainly, 40,000 for a new army could have been assemble with initial recruiting, retaining some former officers. Planning for post war control was far from ready when we invaded. That obviously reflected the importance the administration and even Franks put on rebuilding. Numerous military experts involved in planning rolling start warned of inadequate contingencies for police and security forces. It's not so much your crystal ball remark as it applies to Cobra ll, but the danger of similar incomplete strategies involving greater threats. That being said, I return into to Kerry and beyond cut and jog in Iraq.

Afghanistan (which supplies 90% of the worlds heroin and opium) is in a precarious state as NATO joins a pact with the US

Iran, meanwhile, shows up at a human rights UN meeting and is booed. Iran declares a suspension in enrichment is not in the cards and inform their public of a rationing of gasoline as Iran reduces oil imports.

North Korea should be happy looking at an active Japanese military expanding a new generation of missile defense with the US. Soon they will test their Sushifor 2 missile (just kidding) The North Koreans face a united front including the UN Security Counsel (in words only). Still, NK prefers the Iranian gambit

In each one of these situations involving North Korea, Iran and Afghanistan, the Democrats are silent about tactics, objectives and overall strategy. What relationship should the US seek with India and Pakistan? How can Afghanistan succeed? By what criteria do we compare sticking out a trillion dollar Iraqi day care to continued unmodified Iranian behavior? Where do we draw the line with Russia and China?

The fact remains: Kerry's numerous Iraq positions as well as those by others critics (including anti-action Republicans) never answer these connected questions of foreign policy and the war to pre-empt the nexus of terrorism, failed states and wmd. Its all about "getting our men and women back" without a stark look at the reality that causes their deployment in the first place. The danger between our current political extremes was and is always either the tragic consequences of inaction v the wrath of potential blow back from our less than "world class" formulation of tactics and adaptive strategies in using force. As long as Democrats and potential Republican candidates avoid a detailed list of strategic commitments (and their criteria for the use of force), their promises about our future security are suspect.

Max--that doesn't change a "what if" into a "would have been". Speculation.

HEY! Cleanup on aisle five!

Yeah, yeah, I'm coming... I've had better things to do today than clean up other people's posts... And I spent 30 minutes earlier today cleaning up a bunch of week-old posts...

Well, looks like not only have they found WMDs but they now found documents linking Saddam to Al Queda as well.

Hate to say it, but it looks like everything that Bush has said about why we invaded has been proven true. I actually feel bad for all the Democrats who have called him a liar.... nah, not really.

Well, looks like not only have they found WMDs but they now found documents linking Saddam to Al Queda as well.

WMDs like what?

We can' afford to wait for final proof, which may come in the form of a mushroom cloud....

Does mustard gas make mushroom clouds too?

bk: they foud over 500 different weapons over the course of the occupation, everything from Sarin gas, to nerve gas to anthrax all in bomb or explosive format. Much of it was left over from the original 91 campaign, but it shows that Saddam had it and was hiding it and it also shows that the inspections were a joke before this war.

Fox News reported both of these instances (the WMD report which was release to Congress) and the Taliban/terror ties report, which was also released to Congress.

Terror ties articles:
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,200908,00.html
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,199053,00.html
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,199757,00.html

WMD atricle:
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,200499,00.html

Lots of good stuff, here. Bobby, thank you for your well-thought-out and highly articulate comments.

My primary concern is that we do not measure the wisdom of either staying or going based upon the cost already incurred. It should be a matter of of the probability of success. If the policy in place is correct, it should be kept. But if it is failing, it should be altered. If you send three men into a burning building and they all die, you can't justify sending a fourth man in by saying "otherwise, the deaths of the other three men wil be in vain."

My opinion is that the current policy cannot, by definition, succeed. Therefore, we either find a different way to achieve our ends (which appear to change weekly), or we leave. If that is "cutting and running," then the resistance to doing so is "refusing to face reality."

I think, regardless of what the administration or the senate think, that the whole "Amnesty if you join the fold" thing is a good idea. Several goups have already contacted the Iraqi government about this. We can say "oh its bad they killed Americans" but the bottom line is that MORE will die if we dont reign them in.

Iraq has a functioning government. For all the positioning and babble of American politicians, the Iraqi government has the right to do what they think is best for them. I don't have to like it.

I still think they could have shut down most of the insurgency by creating a national oil trust, and splitting the money out evenly to each and every Iraqi. Money talks. It's not too late.

Tully,
Many who planned the war hardly needed a crystal ball to anticipate post-war conditions. By what standard was “adequate” thinking used to prepare a strategy, the majority of war planners considered necessary to secure the peace? There have been several reports regarding this” undersight.”

“To hedge against the risk that newly liberated Iraq could spin out of control and that WMD would go missing, Peterson and his fellow planners stressed the need to seal the borders, identify infrastructure that needed to be protected, and gather Iraqi troops and resources to quickly reestablish control of the country. But Peterson understood all too well that McKiernan had only limited number of forces and was struggling to persuade Washington to send reinforcements, military police, and support he believed were needed. Not even Peterson thought there were a lot of extra troops to take on the mission he foresaw for phase IV. Zinni had based his old 1003 plan on the assumption that it took more troops to secure the peace than to upend Saddam’s regime, and the rejection of that assumption led to a dilemma. ‘No officer in the headquarters was prepared to argue for actions that would siphon resources from the war fighting effort, when the fighting had not yet begun.,’ Peterson wrote. ‘The war was not yet started, let alone finished, when these issues were being raised. Only a fool would propose hurting the war fighting efforts to address post-war conditions that might or might not occur’.
Peterson’s paper spoke volumes about the incessant pressure to fight the war with as few troops as possible, the military’s unease about the outcome and its unwillingness to take a firm hand on troop requirements for a phase of the conflict that was replete with uncertainty. The military’s reluctance to address this, Peterson concluded, was one of the biggest mistakes of the war."(13)

from "Cobra II" by Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor page 146 Pantheon 2006

Footnote (13) Lieutenant Colonel Steven W. Peterson, “Central but Inadequate: The Application of Theory in Operation Iraqi Freedom,” National War College, available here

Maybe this link will work for the above citation here

I will leave it here....www.ndu.edu/library/n4/no45602I.pdf and hope others more versed can work the link to the National War College.

Go and look up the definition of "armchair quarterback," Max.

Tully,
That is simply unfair. Unless Cobra ll is full of crap, it overwhelmingly documents the lack of administration and DOD attention to the importance of phase IV and post-war security. Hybrid and Cobra ll (the actual battle plan) relied on Iraqi troops. Is Trainor just making up the handling of police deployment, securing the surprising number of weapon stockpiles (created to protect Saddam from Shiites and Kurds) or military invasion plans that counted on Iraqi troops? This isn't arguing "whether to" or "armchair quarterbacking.” If the Steelers didn't change their tactics for the playoffs, they would have fallen to the Colts. Blown plays, penalties, costly timeouts are certainly fair game on Monday. If Cowler had played it conservatively as many thought he would, and he got ripped (like many predicted), how its criticizing him, arm chairing? His coverage constantly shifted, they were rarely fooled and the defense applied pressure without undercutting the secondary. The offense rolled taking to the air and then the ground. Had Cowler run the ball into numerous punts, the critics would have had a field day.

How many planners need be dismissed before their warnings are later considered "timely identifications of faulty planning" rather than the whines of armchair quarterbacks? And when those whines come from the planners? I remember what military experts thought of submarine warfare prior to the outbreak of WW2. Little planning and resource allocation was given to post-war planning. Going into the invasion the DOD was relying on resources that would either be disbanded or never arrive (police). If armchair quarterbacking is pointing this out during and after the fact then the 9/11 Commission is arm chairing as well as most other efforts of accountability and improvement of performance.

I read a Foreign Affairs article years ago advocating an Iraq Constitution that gave indigenous homeowners a piece of the oil revenue for at least ten years. A great idea that would have helped create intuitions and a public vested interest. This too, is, and was a mistake not to implement. Since I advocated both greater post-war planning from the start AND an Iraqi oil trust, I do not regard these comments as arm chairing.

Interesting words from 40 years ago. Ancient arm chairing? remarks from a Viet Nam era realist

Tully, That is simply unfair. Unless Cobra ll is full of crap

It is. From the first sentence of your citation, demonstrably so. And also by definition is a textbook case of armchair quarterbacking.

...Peterson and his fellow planners stressed the need to seal the borders...

Iraqi borders: 3650 km of open ground, requiring tens or hundreds of thousands of widely-dispersed troops. Why, if only we'd invaded with a eight or ten million troops, we could've done everything perfectly in the eyes of a pair of NYT correspondents!

An army of armchair quarterbacks is no more relevant than one. Hindsight remains 20/20--and completely unprovable. It also typically ignores the drawbacks of the alternative "miracle solutions" proposed by the AQ (that's Armchair Quarterback).

DEFINITION: 2 (attrib.) theoretical rather than active (arm chair critic)

Now please tell us how Peterson, McKiernan, and a long list of people actively engaged in the planning and execution of Cobra ll are theoretical antagonists.

Abu Graib was the consequence of poor phase IV planning identified before the fact by active planners and combat ready officers. The NCIS, which has to investigate some of the the consequences of these "mistakes", does not seem to share your distain for General Trainor.

As for borders, no problem. We have a 700 hundred mile fence we are going to build. With DOD’s money an Iraq fence (perhaps built by imported illegals) could build an Iraq fence.

Peterson wasn't talking about a complete closure of the entire border. He was advocating extensive recon and monitoring along with sufficient rapid response teams including the resources to interdict covert supply lines. The idea was not to let insurgency build in the beginning. An Iraqi force placed at points on the border away from sectarian fighting would have been a possible strategy. We aren't talking about a million troops. We are talking about crappy post-war plans and public blow back, which threaten our foreign policy strategies including Iran. I have friends who served in the administration sector in Iraq, one classmate of Bush from the Yale years. He says the effort to administer (as he witnessed first hand) was pathetic and Assassin’s Gate is a good look at our performance. Your distain for journalism is showing….

Yeah, blasting Cowler for not letting his QB throw would have been arm chairing. Not having his team ready for deafening noise on snaps, or blown coverage because of poor defensive reaction to Manning audibles would all be off limits on Monday. Not in Vegas.

I love the administration response in Cobra ll to warnings about the lack of police. Rumsfeld could do stand up. Please tell me what quotations are incorrect.
You know that the documented objections and warnings came in real time despite the public blackout.

Hey, Dick Cheney recommended Cobra ll as a must read.