Centerfield

Interesting point.

I have been skeptical of Rumsfeld's "leaner meaner" concept. But as you state, it has been working (at least better than I expected and at least for now). But my long-term concern is two-fold:

1. Have we stretched ourselves too thin? If another conflict were to break out, would be able to effectively deal with it, without calling up more Reserves of National Guard?

2. Speaking of Reserves and NG units, I know of a few units that have done more then one tour in Iraq or Afghanistan. What will this do for long-term enlistment and retention?

The one thing that I have found amazing in all of this is, the ones that politicize this war criticize the casualty numbers as if there can be no acceptable military action, unless there are none. There is no perfect war, losses will occur even in the best of campaigns.

Clearly, the number of acceptable losses depend on your evaluation of whether the goals of the war are valid. In WW II, a war for survival, the number of casualties was irrelevant (although the government did its best to minimize casualties and to keep the public from realizing how bloody the war actually was).

I read an article in International Security that suggests the American public's tolerance for casualties is related to both the evaluation of the war aims and the perceived likelihood of success. Essentially, people were more likely to accept a relatively high level of casualties if they thought the US was going to prevail, even if they didn't necessarily agree with the war aims. However, those that did agree with the war aims were willing to accept a higher level of casualties.

Plus, the first Gulf War made people think that wars could be fought essentially casualty-free, especially against a weak opponent like Iraq. I think you have to wonder, if the administration knew the level of casualties we would incur, whether it would have still invaded Iraq. My guess is no.

I don't know what you mean when you talk about people that "politicize" the war. I thought war was a matter of politics. Or is only politicizing it when people take a position against the war?

I agree that Rumsfeld has probably done a good job in transforming the military generally. But the problem is that he let his ideology get in the way of the facts on the ground. So he was going to fight this war based on his conception. (And, I'm not military expert so I'm not going to get into the debate about whether we needed or need more troops. Bobby will kill me on that. I'm just saying the controversy is largely over the war rather than his general stewardship of the military.)

Moreover, he is responsible, as head of the military, for things like Abu Gharib. I think its interesting that Jon dismisses Rummy's "disinterest in stopping torture." I think that's a pretty significant issue. He is the one (and the president) that sets the tone for things like that. And he is the one responsible for blunders like not providing adequate security post-invasion, and not taking seriously warnings of problems. Is it all his fault directly? No, but like the president, the buck stops at his desk for a lot of it.

Also, while this isn't specifically Rumsfeld's fault, why has the DOD essentially been given the job both for fighting the war and winning the peace? Where has the State Department been? To me, the entire process has been too militarized. Why is Rummy involved in getting the Iraqis to negoatiat a government rather than Condi Rice? To me, this is another example of where the institutional military has become not just a way of fighting wars, but the primary face of the United States.

I don't know what you mean when you talk about people that "politicize" the war. I thought war was a matter of politics. Or is only politicizing it when people take a position against the war?

Surely, you can see that many Democrats have used the war as a staple for their campaign to unseat George Bush and to discredit him. Here we are three years after the start and we still hear a lot of them still debating the reasons for going to war. Many of these Dems voted to authorize the use of force, but when things didn't go as planned, they took the opportunity to "politicize" it for their own political advantage.

Now, did GWB miscalculate and underestimate the resistance? Yes. Did the military make some major mistakes along the way? Yes. Have we made strategic and tactical errors. along the way? Yes.

But, to keep beating a dead horse over the reasons, to me, is now a moot point. The better question would be how to facilitate the Iraqis' transition to self-government and to self-protection, so we can scale back and maybe even get the hell out. In my judgement, the arguments now, should center on the present, where we are now, not the past. We cannot change the past, we can only learn from it. We can, however, focus on the present, so that we can look toward making better decisions in the future.

I wish a group of Dems would break ranks with the loud left and say:

"You know, we screwed up in a lot areas. Let's stop placing blame, roll up our sleeves, and look at solutions to fix the problem(s)."

Then, if Rummy and others do not listen, then there is a great cause for argument. Then we would have some alternatives. But except for a handful, the majority of the opposition seems focused on making allegations of past mistakes, and creating a great stagnation principle that benefits no one, least of all themselves.

Thank you! Rumsfeld deserves credit for trying to transform the military for 21st Century fighting. We're not going to invade the Soviet Union or China. We're going to be hopping from hotspot to hotspot, and we need a leaner, quicker fighting force.

What's going on in Iraq only proves the point. We're facing a stealthy guerilla/terrorist organization that does not follow the laws of warfare. The same people that said we need 10 times as many troops there are the same ones who say our overwhelming presence there is what's creating the problems in the first place.

The same people that said we need 10 times as many troops there are the same ones who say our overwhelming presence there is what's creating the problems in the first place.

This is an excellent observation and so very true.

To say that only the opponents of the war are using it for political gain is not true. When things were going well (or at least better), the GOP was bashing it over the heads of those that thought the war was a mistake.

Second, I think it's perfectly legitimate to hold the origins of the war against Bush. What you seem to be saying is that Democrats should simply fall into line behind Bush and say, well, it happened, so let's not worry about why he invaded or whatever. That's just giving Bush a pass on the war. I recognize that many people still support the war. But many do not and a lot of us think that the problems weren't just tactical "mistakes" but derived from fundamentally bad policy. You can certainly disagree with that, but it's not fair to say that the origin of the war is not fair game. I agree that the Democrats need to focus on where we go from here, but I disagree that we should simply forget about why and how the war started. I guarantee if the war was going well, the GOP would be "politicizing" the war to Bush's benefit.

When I saw the title of this post, I immediately thought it would be about the retired generals who have come out against Rumsfeld, not the Democrats. Either party will generally politicize any issue they can to gain an advantage over the other, so any mobbing done by the Democrats over real, arguable, perceived or spinnable failures on the part of anyone in the Bush administration comes as no surprise. Sounds to me like you just need more koolaid, Jon.

Second, I think it's perfectly legitimate to hold the origins of the war against Bush.

But not against Clinton? Or Saddam? Or the UN? Or...

What you seem to be saying is that Democrats should simply fall into line behind Bush and say, well, it happened, so let's not worry about why he invaded or whatever. That's just giving Bush a pass on the war.

Bull. Looking forward and dealing with the present is what we should be doing. Unless you have something better up your sleeve, we hold together, keep working on what's going right, and finish the job. Not give up and eat our own. Obsessing over the past and insisting on scapegoating is straight PDS blamestorming, and there's plenty of time afterward. Alert the villagers and pass out the torches!

I think you have to wonder, if the administration knew the level of casualties we would incur, whether it would have still invaded Iraq. My guess is no.

You guess wrong. Casualties for three years of operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan have yet to reach one-quarter the number estimated for the initial invasion of Iraq. Current theater total including deaths by accident and natural causes has yet to reach the amount of American motorcycle traffic deaths in one year, or the number lost in a single battle (Choesen) in Korea, or half those lost in the taking of Iwo Jima. Every one hurts, of course, but casualties are remarkably light.

By that line of thinking, we shoulda impeached FDR and shot Eisenhower after the debacle at Omaha Beach. Admittedly hyperbole, but I trust you get the point.

The armchair quarterbacks don't want to wait for the final score to kill the coach for perceived bad calls. But the game is still going on, and we're leading.

...it's not fair to say that the origin of the war is not fair game.

If a family member were to accidently start a fire in the family home through carelessness, it would be most foolish to argue about the whys and the hows, while the fire is in progress. The wise thing to do, in this case, would be to get out and then get the fire put out. After that, when the trauma wears off, the wise thing to do would be to discuss, reflect, and process what started the fire, and who is responsible for it.

The one thing in all of this that must ring true is this, you cannot change what has already happened. And arguing about it during the time of crisis, is counterproductive. You risk more loss and in this case, do far more damage, than if you manage the things at hand. Then you can take a fresher look at the whole thing, once the situation has improved.

That is not the same as getting a pass.

Marc,

I agree that Rumsfeld has probably done a good job in transforming the military generally. But the problem is that he let his ideology get in the way of the facts on the ground. So he was going to fight this war based on his conception. (And, I'm not military expert so I'm not going to get into the debate about whether we needed or need more troops. Bobby will kill me on that. I'm just saying the controversy is largely over the war rather than his general stewardship of the military.)

No, I think that was-- initially-- a fair criticism of the SECDEF. My point all along has been that most Americans live in some kind of binary-coded political universe: it's either 1 or 0... if something is not 1, then it must be 0. So when they determine that Rumsfeld's conduct of the War in Iraq is a 0, then they conclude that his critics-- not just Generals Shinseki and Zinni, but the larger "mob"-- must be a 1. That is, the General Critics must have gotten it right, because they're against Rumsfeld and Rumsfeld got it wrong. Case closed.

Only life isn't as simple as that. We're far more likely to encounter a thousand different shades of grey than we are a simple black or white.

Yes, Rumsfeld's focus on Transformation, becoming lighter and more rapidly-deployable, and using Joint effects-- synchronizing USAF capabilities to support ground maneuver forces on a tactical, point-to-point level-- to bring overwhelming firepower against enemy forces was not a direction that was well-suited to fighting and winning a counterinsurgency. But neither is the desired direction of the critics. Many of them commanded forces on the ground... and chose the wrong kinds of tactics with which to defeat the insurgency and estalish the conditions for an enduring security in Iraq.

When it comes to viewing the actual strategy needed in the War in Iraq-- or an unconventional war anywhere, as we're most likely to be facing for decades to come-- viewing it through a Rumsfeld v. Army prism isn't very helpful. Both offer competing visions for how to win a linear, maneuver war... something that isn't likely to help too much in Fourth Generation Warfare.

Having said that, I really think people exaggerate the SECDEF's role in the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. He doesn't give to day-to-day orders, doesn't preside over operational decision-making, and doesn't really play that much of a role in shaping our operations and tactics. (Full Disclosure: During my tour in Kabul, I used to sit in on the irregular [no more than monthly] video teleconferences with the SECDEF). He's involved, to be sure, with the strategic direction and he could have shaped the effort by stressing specific training programs before the units deployed (the cultural training and classes on counterinsurgency that they're now getting) in theater, so that the General Caseys and Eikenberrys wouldn't have subordinates with such steep learning curves, but that's water under the bridge now.

Bobby,

You are right; it's not black and white and I didn't want to give that impression. I assume the truth is somewhere in the middle--generals always fight the last war and Defense Secretaries always think they know more than the military professionals. No doubt egos get in the way of sound policy everywhere and, in the Pentagon, you often have a clash of military and political cultures.

My point was that issue of general military transformation is different from the issue of the specific war-fighting in Iraq and that was primarily where Rumsfeld was open to criticism. As I said, I will not tread into venturing an opinion that is, at best, uninformed. I always find your analysis enlightening and well-informed. And you have stated in the past that the issue is more complicated than more or fewer troops. And, as you said, Rummy isn't doing the day-to-day decision-making. But, in any organization, the leader will set the tone for how policy is set. I have no way of knowing whether the criticism from the retired generals is legitimate or whether it is widely shared. It does seem to me that Rumsfeld has been, like most of the Administration, more inclined to hunker down in the face of criticism rather than consider alternatives. But, admittedly, it is difficult to separate criticism of Rumsfeld from feelings about the war generally and that is probably not fair to Rumsfeld--at least in this context.

I can't speak for Democrats nationally, but many here in NYC simply do not agree that pre-emption or removing Saddam was illegal or unjustified. Funny how many Democrats said little while Clinton advocated regime change. One can argue Bush has failed to promote a clear criteria of pre-emption or selected the best how-tos. The majority of Democrats here however, talk about competency, timing, adaptation and the lists of alternative how tos. General Criticism is generally perceived in binary by the public as Bobby points out.. It reduces the discourse in a pointless and partisan fashion. Clinton, Biden, Lieberman and others are well liked in NYC. The salient features of criticism are drowned out by the hammering.

I think Tully is correct here. Just imagine Saddam now with thousands of Russian and French nationals and improved military technology. Russia plots to deliver advanced missiles through its proxy Belarus to Iran (watch). Russia's former proxy, Ukraine gave Iran older Russian cruise missiles to back engineer. Why sell Iran any air defense? And they had planned less support for Saddam? He would have loved the Russian building the Mullahs nuclear power plants. What casualties and international outrage would we create now by removing Saddam as Iraqis danced with their WMD materials in front of the world press?

Mobbing Rumsfeld in fact takes Democrats away from real issues they can criticize like 100,000,000,000 and counting or new nukes

Let's face it, with players like Russia and China and with improving militaries and technology around the world, we need both better conventional forces and better rapid strike forces of the nature Rumsfeld is allegedly building. Deficits and energy costs may be the great limiter.

In addition, Global Strike, nuclear bunker busters, expensive raptors, aging recon aircraft, declining US sub manufacturing, the need for better close in force protection, weapons in space and our intelligence capabilities are substantial policy debates requiring more than binary code to resolve. Mobs are distractions. Rumsfeld is not central to this national security debate, nor is salivating partisanship constructive at all in designing a stronger American internationalist position or the military required to defend it.