Centerfield

Back to the Future in Tehran?

There are a number of intersting articles on the Iranian situation from a variety of perspectives. In The National Interest, an International Relations journal that bills itself as "conservative realist," Ray Takeyh has a very sobering sketch of Ahmadinejad that doesn't give a lot of hope to pragmatists. Takeyh sees Ahmadinejad (I wish he would change his name so it's easier to spell) as part of a cohort of Iranian revolutionists that came of age during the Iran-Iraq War.

This was a war waged for the triumph of ideas, with Ba'athi secular pan-Arabism contesting Iran's Islamic fundamentalism. As such, for those who went to the front, the war came to embody their revolutionary identity. Themes of solidarity, sacrifice, self-reliance and commitment not only allowed the regime to consolidate its power, they also made the defeat of Saddam the ultimate test of theocratic legitimacy. War and revolution had somehow fused in the clerical cosmology. To wage a determined war was to validate one's revolutionary ardor and spiritual fidelity--the notions of compromise and a "ceasefire" were anathema to this point of view.

What's especially disturbing is that, like German nationalists after WWI, these Iranian revolutionaries view the West as the reason why the war did not turn out satisfactorily for Iran--and they aren't completely incorrect. This has shaped Ahmadinejad's view of relations with the West, especially the United States. Unlike some pragmatists in Iran, he does not particularly care about improving relations with the West and sees things like the nuclear program as a test of nationalist resolve. And he certainly is not interested in copying western political systems. Takeyh claims that these Iranian conservatives see the western stance on Iran's nuke program as being aimed not at the nukes themselves but at the regime itself and that makes them even more determined not to give in.

In a peculiar manner, the nuclear program and Iran's national identity have become fused in the imagination of the hardliners. To stand against an impudent America is to validate one's revolutionary ardor and sense of nationalism. Thus, the notion of compromise and acquiescence has limited utility to Iran's aggrieved nationalists.

Takeyh thinks that American rhetoric, both from the government and from neocons have exacerbated Iran's sense of grievance and validated their sense that the U.S. is opposed not so much to Iran's nukes as to Iran's government. At any rate, it's not a pretty picture.

Takeyh's article calls into serious question the utility of negotiating with Iran. In the New York Times, Jessica Mathews, of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, states, unlike some others, that an Iranian bomb would be a disaster, in large part because of the likelihood that it would cause others in the region to seek the bomb. She believes that it is possible to get Iran to give up its program but that the West must speak with one voice and

[t]he administration must, finally, hold its nose and recognize that the nuclear challenge is the indisputable priority. It must get off the sidelines and into negotiations with Tehran. It must solidify agreement among its fellow permanent council members by working closely with Russia, not least by concluding a long overdue pact on civil nuclear cooperation. Russian participation would make it possible to provide Iran with a credible international guarantee of uranium enrichment and reprocessing services.

Of course, if Takeyh is correct, it's going to take a hell of a lot more than just talking to get Ahmadinejad to even think about making concessions. On the other hand, an earlier article in the New York Times suggests that some in Iran are having second thoughts about confronting the West so directly in the nuke issue. (Unfortunately, this article has been placed in "Times Select" so I guess I cannot link to it.) And, still others believe that we should just let Iran have the bomb and count of deterrence to keep it in check.

What of the fear that Iran might pass a weapon to Hezbollah or to Al Qaeda in Iraq? Those arguing for a containment strategy say Iran knows that the origins of any detonated bomb would be traced sooner or later, so the mullahs would not be foolish enough to trust proxies with such a weapon.

Of course, even if this position is correct (which is, obviously, pretty speculative at best), it entirely ignores the issue of additional proliferation in the region. There seem to be no good options for dealing with Iran. At this point, Iran is simply playing the US and Western Europe off against each other. Clearly, the Europeans have no stomach to confront Iran and don't trust the US enough to follow us. The question is, of course, whether Iran is amenable to compromise at all and that likely depends on how strong Ahmadinejad's position is. The Times article that I can't link to suggested that his confrontational policy was very popular when it appeared to be working, but the more that it seemed to be backfiring, the more questions were being raised. Thus, if the West can forge some kind of united front (along with China and Russia), Ahmadinejad's position may begin to weaken. Big IF, however.