Centerfield

I have a lot of respect for Hitchens in many ways, particularly his willingness to bump heads with his colleagues on the left. But much of the article and your post is simply a caricature of realism and just a way for Hitchens to attack those that refuse to accept his all or nothing view of the world. (This is the guy that attacked Mother Teresa, after all.)

Realism is an extremely broad term that encompasses a wide variety of viewpoints. There were realists, like Kissinger, that favored intervening in Viet Nam, and realists like Hans Morganthau that opposed it. And, certainly, some of realism's practitioners, such as Nixon and Kissinger, have given realism a bad name.

But, IMO, properly understand, realism offers an important corrective to the American idea that our power and righteousness allows us to do anything we want. At its essence, the way I look at realism is that it simply teaches a few simple points: (1) the world is not Manichean and no country or system has a monopoly on virtue; (2) there are limits on the ability of any country, no matter how powerful, to impose its will on the world; (3)military action, while essential at times, has limited utility; and (4) we should make sure our commitments and actions are commensurate with our capabilities and interests. Personally, I don't see what's so wrong with that. Today, it's fashionable among the remaining pro-war people, such as Hitchens, to bash realists. But I guarantee a true realist wouldn't have blundered into this war thinking that the Iraqis would be throwing flowers at us and that all we had to do was take out Saddam and everything would be hunky-dory.

And, Jon, I think your summation of realism is a caricature that misstates the nature of the philosophy. There are very few realists today that think the world is ALL about power and coalitions. Most realists realize the world is complicated and that's why they are cautious about going on crusades. Obviously, you don't like that kind of caution. (Although your argument about realism not anticipating the American Revolution is somewhat odd considering that Edmund Burke, a thoroughgoing realist I believe, supported the Revolution.)

I'm not saying realism has all the answers and, like any doctrine, it is subject to misuse; on one end by leading to the support of dictators and on the other by allowing an apathy in the face of injustice. I admit, I am very skeptical about idealism, but certainly, morality should have a place in American foreign policy. And, despite what you seem to think, I believe most realists today would agree. But, in a lot of cases, idealists have ended up doing realist-type things under the guise of idealism. Look, for example, at the CIA interventions--by quite idealistic men--in the 1950s to overthrow elected goverments in the name of saving the world from Communism. These ended up having disastrous consequences, IMO.

Realism was great at explaining international behavior during the post-Westphalian era of the dominant nation-state and throughout the Cold War, which represented a constant (though not universal) competition between the two great superpowers. As a predictive tool, however, it was less successful, though it still did a pretty good job during those centuries.

But even before 9/11, its failure to predict the demise of the Soviet Union and the breakup of the Eastern bloc essentially marked the end of its preeminence as an international relations theory. It fell out of favor in the mid-90's and by 1998, its most prominent advocate-- Harvard professor Stephen Walt-- was forced to defend its existence at every turn against proponents of the new dominant theory, Rational Choice (hence, the publication of the great collection of essays, "Stephen Walt and His Critics").

Now I dislike Rational Choice at least as much as I do Realism, but I have to admit the Realists boxed themselves into oblivion by blindly adhering to their state-centric assumptions and failing to understand the emergence of powerful non-state actors in the 20th and 21st centuries. If they are ever to return to academic respectability, it will be by incorporating their Hobbesian traditions into updated systemic and subsystemic lenses, instead of relying upon the antiquated 17th-century inspired nation-state.

If the Realists are yesterdays news, and the neo-cons delusion of a flowery Baghdad parades was killed by an IED, what's next?

What should be the new policy for America?

Personally I've always had a philosophy of pragmatic opportunism.
AKA: Fight where you can win, contain what you can't, and plan for the worst case scenario.

The Bushies had me convinced back in 2002 that we had to go to war in Iraq. In a post on my personal blog (no longer extant) I blasted Scrowcroft. I don't remember what I said, but I remember the title of the post: "Garbage, Scowcroft"

He was right and I was wrong.

Someone tell me where the neocons are Wilsonian? That would require some kind of cooperation between nations. Certainly not being beligerant like the neocons and disdaining Wilsonian institutions, ie, the UN.

Neocons are really just a higher, more force focused versions of realists. They disdain Wilsonian values.

I don't think realism is that static doctrine that Bobby thinks it is. If one reads The National Interest, which is sort of the realist journal, I think you would understand that realism has advanced past purely state-centric, balance of power explanations. Granted, realism did not predict the fall of the Soviet Union, but i don't think that means there is no value in the approach; if not as a predictive tool, then as a cautionary principle.

I agree with Bob. No doctrine is set in stone and it makes no sense to look at the world through a single prism. I think Bobby is correct that classical or neoclassical realism has been essentially discredited, but as I read the literature, there is a lot of good work being done at essentially integrating a variety of different approaches. For example, I think few modern realists would argue that the type of government has no impact on a country's behavior in the international system. All I'm saying is that realism (at least as I define it) provides an important and valuable perspective on the world.

And the fact is, realism does explain certain behaviors. No one here wants to admit it, but the United States behaves essentially as a hedgemon because we are the most powerful actor in the system. Obviously, not a completely successful hedgemon, but it's naive to think that we don't do things because we can. That's certainly the way much of the world views us. So, while realism's emphasis on the traditional instruments of power might be somewhat exaggerated today, it's still a valuable perspective on the world.

Perhaps what we need are Idealists to set the direction of policy (spread democracy, etc.). But a heavy concentration of Realists to give the implementation a chance of success.

Politicians are the ultimate realists. Just not in public.

Marc,

I think few modern realists would argue that the type of government has no impact on a country's behavior in the international system.

Okay, how about John Mearsheimer and his disciples at the University of Chicago-- perhaps the country's top "Realist" school? That's precisely what they've been arguing all along. To the Realists, a state's behavior can be explained and predicted based almost exclusively upon the notion of the "state interest" and where it fits into the systemic structure. Where that theory breaks down is often (although, not always) because it presupposes a unitary state that clearly understands its interests-- that is not always the case.

And the fact is, realism does explain certain behaviors.

Indeed, it explains some certain behaviors VERY well-- the Rational Choice theorists simply argue that their theory explains those same behaviors and others even BETTER. Their mantra is something like, "Realism gets 90% right-- we get 95%. Why settle for less?" Now I'm neither a Rational Choice theorist nor a Realist (I'm a historian, and so I get to reject political theories), but that essentially is the ongoing debate in political science right now.

No one here wants to admit it, but the United States behaves essentially as a hedgemon [sic] because we are the most powerful actor in the system. Obviously, not a completely successful hedgemon [sic], but it's naive to think that we don't do things because we can. That's certainly the way much of the world views us. So, while realism's emphasis on the traditional instruments of power might be somewhat exaggerated today, it's still a valuable perspective on the world.

I agree it's still very valuable-- that's why it is still being taught in virtually every undergraduate "Theories of International Relations" class in the country. Harvard hired Stephen Walt and gave him tenure-- that says a lot about its endurance within the field. But VALUABLE is not necessarily the same thing as being ALWAYS ACCURATE, ALWAYS TRUE, or even ALWAYS DEPENDABLE. There is a place for Realism in academic studies and in policy-making decisions; however, like ALL theories (including Rational Choice), it has flaws and contradictions and if one simply applies it blindly, without understanding its assumptions and limitations, it will not work.

All I'm saying is that realism (at least as I define it) provides an important and valuable perspective on the world.

That's kind of the problem, Marc. You don't define Realism. Your conception of the theory might be this fluid, changing, and highly accurate tool; but it's guys like Ken Waltz, Stephen Walt, and John Mearsheimer who have more influence over what Realism really is. If we're talking about your brand of Realism, then I take back everything I've said. But I thought we were discussing it as the academic theory.

Jim M,

Someone tell me where the neocons are Wilsonian? That would require some kind of cooperation between nations. Certainly not being beligerant like the neocons and disdaining Wilsonian institutions, ie, the UN.

Neocons are really just a higher, more force focused versions of realists. They disdain Wilsonian values.

Wilsonian is probably not the right term at all. I would venture it came from a common mistake in equating Wilsonian with the Liberal/Idealist tradition, which is not a one-for-one exchange: Wilsonian is Liberal/Idealist, but there are other theories/movements that are Liberal/Idealist, and not Wilsonian.

The "Neocons" (a term which is widely applied inconsistently, and therefore means different things to different people) were originally mostly Jewish intellectual liberals who rejected the New Left agenda and championed foreign and defense policies based on strength-- they became conservatives, hence the term neoconservative. After the fall of the Soviet Union, they became quite active in decrying what they saw as American complacency and our seeming disengagement from the greater world. They also have an almost theological belief that democratization spreads freedom (something that Fareed Zakaria famously rejected in The Future of Freedom), and a similarly emotional hatred for tyranny and totalitarianism (again, very much derived from their original roots that despised Communism).

They don't have an academic theory, per se, but their movement seems to compare somewhat closely to Hegemonic Stability Theory, which is from the Liberal/Idealist tradition.

They do disdain some aspects of Wilsonian thought in that Wilson viewed international organizations and multinational institutions as a means of managing conflict between the greater powers-- a body that could resolve conflicts and, in some cases, settle disputes before they became violent. Neocons reject these institutions, however, because those institutions credit the Soviet Union or the People's Republic of China with the same standing as the United States or Great Britain. That's all good and well for a Wilsonian, where democracy is somethng nice but really not so important (hence Wilson's decision to consign Ho Chi Minh to revolution), but to a Natan Sharansky or an Alexander Solzhenytsin that is abject hypocrisy. Democracies are inherently and irrefutably morally superior to dictatorships, in their world. Thus, their rejection of Wilsonian institutions. Realists, it should be said, do not necessarily reject these institutions-- many like Scowcroft believe they exist largely as a product of balance of power theory, and so have some utility; others like Mearsheimer believe they are mostly irrelevant since states will follow their interests-- if it fits with the organization, great, if not, states won't obey it anyway, so it is irrelevant (here their proof would be in, for example, the EU's failure to control deficit spending in France and Germany). Similarly, since states follow their interests, Realists believe it doesn't matter if you democratize a country or not, because their interests don't change so neither will their behavior-- hence, Scowcroft's opposition to democratizing Afghanistan in 1988 and Iraq in 2003. In fairness, however, I should note that Stephen Walt's excellent Revolution and War argued that dramatic changes in a state's internal characteristics, leads others to view it differently and thereby affects their interests.

Anyways, defining your terms is important when you're discussing established academic theories, which is why I dislike the term "neocon"-- too many have used it to apply to something it is not.

And a really good primer on "neocons" can be found at the Christian Science Monitor.

Signed, A Dumb Infantry Officer Trained Not Just in Breaking Things and Killing People, But in International Relations Theory As Well

Marc, we just crossed in the night there. In fact, most Wilsonians agree with you on all four of your practical points. And there are actions with realist tinges that I reluctantly approve of, like the WWII alliance with Stalin and looking the other way on Pakistani democracy. These both seem to me to be making the best of a bad hand.

> They also have an almost theological belief that democratization spreads freedom

...foolish of them. After all, Europe is hopelessly unfree now; it was clearly a waste of time to spend effort supporting their freedom.

> Someone tell me where the neocons are Wilsonian? That would require
> some kind of cooperation between nations. Certainly not ...
> disdaining Wilsonian institutions ...

> ... Wilson viewed international organizations and multinational
> institutions as a means of managing conflict between the greater
> powers...Neocons reject these institutions,

...like the World Bank. Yes, we can certainly see they just despise these international organizations.

> their movement seems to compare somewhat closely to Hegemonic Stability Theory, which is from the Liberal/Idealist tradition.

...I fail to see the connection between Liberal/Idealism and stability theory. Perhaps you could explain it?

Jon Kay,

> They also have an almost theological belief that democratization spreads freedom

...foolish of them. After all, Europe is hopelessly unfree now; it was clearly a waste of time to spend effort supporting their freedom.

You're missing the point. Fareed Zakaria's The Future of Freedom argues that democracy has no correlation to freedom, and that the Western concepts of freedom were actually spread by our commitment to constitutional liberalism, NOT democracy. He notes that we see freedom and democracy and think that they were linked, but argues that in fact they are not. Zakaria cites a number of rising illiberal democracies that have popular support but nonetheless suppress freedom.

In fairness, I should note that I generally share the neocon belief in democratization, but I believe it important to footnote that-- empirically speaking-- there may not not necessarily be an ironclad relationship between democracy and freedom. Zakaria could very well be right, that it was our traditions of constitutional liberalism that led to Western freedom, and that democracy may have even acted against traditions of freedom at times (a theory advanced by Dye and Zeigler's The Irony of Democracy, more than a decade ago).

...like the World Bank. Yes, we can certainly see they just despise these international organizations.

Okay, that's a fair critique-- neocons generally support the World Bank and the IMF, as well. Change international organizations to mean some international institutions, though, since they're very disdainful of the UN, the ICC, the EU, even NATO, among others. But, you're right, it's not true of ALL institutions and I apologize for the mistake. It is however different from constructivists and neoliberals who believe that international institutions, simply by virtue of their existence, are superior to national institutions.

...I fail to see the connection between Liberal/Idealism and stability theory. Perhaps you could explain it?

Well, it's not "stability theory," it's Hegemonic Stability Theory, a specific academic IR theory that comes from the Liberal/Idealist tradition. HST argues (in the highly-simplified one-sentence version) that if there is a liberal hegemon, it will act to impose a variety of enlightened international standards, such as breaking down trade barriers and combating potential spoilers (such as pirates), defending weaker member-nations, and promoting common practices (such as currency exchange). They do this, says HST, simply because it is the right thing to do (i.e., the hegeomon is "enlightened"-- this is why the theory only works for a liberal hegemon), which is where it differs from Realism that argues that the hegemon only imposes these standards because it is in its own interest; those that are not in the hegemon's interests are not supported. HST compares very closely to the "national greatness" vision endorsed by leading modern neocons like Kristol, Kagan, and Boot.

But if you think about some of the Bush Administration's actions in this light-- i.e, sending Marines to Liberia, supporting regime change in the Ukraine to bring democracy to an authoritarian government that had actually sent troops to support our cause in Iraq (and knowing the new government would probably withdraw them-- and did), protesting the Uzbek human rights violations despite knowing that it would cause Pres. Karimov to force the withdrawal of US air bases (which it has), even Condi Rice embarassing the Egyptians and telling them to open up their political system-- you can see the actions of a President who is not necessarily guided by self-interest, but rather by strong liberal beliefs in right and wrong, and that democratization is purely in the right column and not the wrong. [NOTE: I always use liberal in its classic definition, and not in the modern American tendency].

This, on a sidenote, I believe is one of the main reasons the Clintonites hate the Bush Administration so much-- they are jealous because for all their talk of their belief in Democratic Peace Theory and "enlargement" they never did anything to help re-shape the world to be conducive to those traditions. Now they're guilty and jealous that they missed their opportunity to be the proponents of democracy in the Middle East, and plainly wish they had thought of it first. The sad thing is they had thought of it first; they simply chose not to do anything about it.

Jon Kay,

I missed the critical aspect of HST, which is that these enlightened actions the hegemon carries out bring stability and order to an otherwise anarchic system.

The invasion of Iraq may have marginalized the United Nations and caused upheaval in the Middle East, but some HST theorists and virtually all of the neocons would probably both argue that the erosion of unenlightened institutions (such as a UN that rewards tyranny on an equal footing as democracy, or a concept of state sovereignty that allows Saddam Hussein and a few thousand fellow thugs to impose their will over millions of innocent citizens in Iraq) is a requirement in order to promote the greater good.

Hope that clarifies things a little bit.

Fareed Zakaria's The Future of Freedom argues that democracy has no correlation to freedom, and that the Western concepts of freedom were actually spread by our commitment to constitutional liberalism, NOT democracy.

I reached a similar conclusion twenty years ago or so, after knocking around our neighbors to the south for a while. Democracy is more conducive of individual freedom than dictatorship, but it's constitutional liberalism combined with democratic pluralism that seems to drive our love of individual liberty. More ethnically homogenous societies seem to find democracy much less useful as a means of assuring freedoms. We almost seem to require "the other" in our own society to maintain that individualist approach. "If for me, then for thee as well."

Thanks for the careful explanations, Bobby! Very helpful.

I went and read the FP review of The Future of Freedom on Zakaria's ite. So I haven't actually RTFP.

I'm not totally in disagreement, but mostly. It's true that democracy fails in many developing countries because the idea of a civil society and/or the elites to run are too weak. The less of these two qualities they have, the more luck a democracy needs. And he's right about oil/diamonds being a problem.

But the idea that fostering democracy in developing nations is hopeless is just wrong. First, sometimes it works (hi, Botswana!), and those people are better off.

Even when it fails, it often advances the value citizens place on both liberty and democracy after the inevitable recessions of liberty after it falls. I remember realists laughing about Wilson's insistence on democracy for the people of Europe freed by the Allies after WWI, because so much had been conquered by the Soviets. Well, Wilson had the last laugh. When the Wall fell, and the Soviet tide receded, guess which states immediately went democratic, and are now stable places with rapidly climbing standards of living, NATO membership, and impending EU membership? Exactly the ones Wilson freed. Hmmm.... The others are only now coming to the fold (seeing their neighbors' prosperity?).

One excuse we keep hearing for opposing democracy is that it allows corruption, ala Russia and Indonesia. Well, that's not true. Was Soviet rule really noticeably different from Mafia rule, or any more benevolent? Are Indonesians today really less free than under Suharto, as liberal a dictator as he was? What IS true is that under democracy it becomes possible to talk about corruption, and think a bit about how much better life would be without it.

Let's face it - there are real limits to how much freedom you can have under a dictatorship. In Pakistan, can you hold an anti-honor-killing demonstration? Can you run a big company without major payoffs? Do the successful have a way of landing in trouble?

I agree, and interestingly enough, if they were around today, I suspect that many of our Founding Fathers would have implicitly agreed with aspects of Zakaria's thesis-- with their fears of the "tyranny of the majority" and the crucial importance they placed upon checks and balances, and shared powers, they would likely have said of course a democracy unfettered with constitutional protections could invade freedom and liberty.

On the other hand, anyone making the argument that all we're interested in in Iraq is the installation of a democratic government-- liberal or illiberal-- is really just making a caricature of the political side of our strategy. We have an enormous amount of technocrats [out of the Afghan Reconstruction Group (ARG) and the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO)] who are involved in fostering and building the civil and political institutions needed to support a liberal democracy. I've worked alongside several of the guys from the ARG, and they are among some of the finest individuals I have ever met.

But I guess inconvenient facts don't need to be supported.