Centerfield

Let us remember that our goal is national security, and democratization is a means to achieve that goal, in appropriate situations. There is a window of opportunity in the Middle East with a new Palestinian leader who does not seem dedicated to the use of terrorist means, as Yasir Arafat was. Let's not screw this up by grasping for too much too soon.

I don't think we should define the limits to our policy of democracy promotion to "when it furthers our interests" for two reasons. First, there will always be risks to our interests in advancing democracy in illiberal societies, so that sort of policy could quite easily become a de facto policy of supporting "friendly dictators." Second, and more important, it sends a message abroad that our interests are paramount and nobody needs mind our rhetoric about concern for others.

That said, one can develop principles for restricting democracy promotion aside from narrow self-interest that could develop the force of moral authority. I would propose two: respect for minority rights and nonbelligerence towards neighbors. These two principles would either exclude Islamists from taking power or restrict their actions, but demonstrate restrictions on our willingness to meddle in other's internal affairs.

Such restrictions are not unprecedented. During the American occupation of Japan, there was an instance where MacArthur delayed an election in order to remove candidates sympathetic to war era nationalism.

For more information on the dangers of unbounded democracy, with some mention of constitutional liberalism (derived from liberty, not related to liberal/conservative) as a protection against such excesses, lookup Fareed Zakaria's writings on illiberal democracy.

This just points up the problem with sweeping statements like Bush's. The same problem, of course, exists with respect to Saudi Arabia except that the stakes are even higher.
It's fine to favor democracy when you expect the result to be at least partially favorable to US interests. It's another to favor it when the result could be diametrically opposed. Bush's rhetoric makes it very difficult to do the "triangulation" necessary in the real world-ie, push for democracy some places and go slower in others.

On the other hand, I agree with Scott Smith that you can't simply opposed democratization because a party you don't like is likely to win. It's pretty clear that Mubarak's rule has been pretty much a disaster for Egypt and his continued repression is only making an explosion more likely. We cannot simply support Mubarak unconditionally given how unpopular he is. If we are going to be serious about democracy, then we are going to have to have some faith that it actually works, ie, that a democratically elected government would be forced by popular opinion to be more restrained than their rhetoric would suggest. But, of course, that assumes that, post-election, there would mechansims in place to protect free speech, etc. a less than likely prospect. I don't think this situation is analogous to Japan because we are not occupying Egypt and even if we were, as Iraq shows, there are limits to our ability to dictate the course of events.

I'm glad I don't have to make decisions on things like this.

Egypt has been a very stable society, historically--much more stable than France, for instance. The current regime goes back to Nasser's coup in the 1950's. Before that, King Farouk's dynasty, at times under British protectorate, went back to the Albanian Muhammed Ali taking over in 1805. So repressive regimes can be quite stable. That doesn't mean that a revolution could not occur in Egypt. However, the forces of inertia there are strong.

Well there's something to be said for most strongly supporting genuine democracy. A genuine democracy would lead to goverment that legitimately represented and respected the views and needs of all of the people, and continued doing that as a primary responsibility. Scott S was hinting at this idea.

There's a lot of talk about how, if we support democracy unconditionally, we might not like what we get, because the vote could lead to a theocratic islamic republic. Fine, but what we really want is something more than simply a democratic moment leading to authoritarianism. Politics and democracy are a little bit like chemistry. Not all elements combine, and some combine in a volatile fashion. Only a small subset of elements combine to make stable compounds.

Like Scott suggested, the social compounds which make up a stable democracy definitely include respect for the rights of various minorities, Leave that out, and you have an illiberal and volatile democratic moment that quickly decays into authoritarianism.

Real democracy is more than a moment.

This is what all the dictators want their centrists and us to believe - that there are few centrists in their country, it's just him holding back the jihad, and if he falls from power....

I don't believe for a moment that centrists are rare in Egypt. Either the Brotherhood has a moderate wing, or there's some banned parties that're more significant than "Egyptian scholars" think. We can be sure that the Egyptian media that Egyptian scholars use as their sources have to hew to the party line.

Does this viewpoint also apply to Hugo Chavez in Venezuela? We seemed not like that Democratic outcome.

Yes, it does. Chavez is exactly as bad as a caudillo, and yards better than the combination of a caudillo and a martyred Chavez.

The last thing we want is a martyr. As it is, IMHO Venezuela's people were stabbed in the back by the election monitors who only saw Allende in Chavez, and refused to notice Chavez' serious elections violations.

I don't think you can compare Chavez--as much of a jerk as he might be--to the potential for a radical Islamic regime in terms of the ability to cause trouble. ON the other hand, Islamic regimes don't seem to be too popular once they get in power and they seem to discredit themselves. The problem is maintaining the ability of the people to actually get rid of the regime. A lot of these groups are willing to use democracy to attain power and then forget about it once they get in.

The question is what does it mean to support democracy. Does it mean actively pushing Mubarak to democratize regardless of the consequences or simply refraining from helping him stay in power. Increasingly, I think American rhetoric is having a counterproductive effect in the Middle East and probably elsewhere in terms of encouraging democracy. Whether it's valid or not, it seems that much of the world doesn't believe what we say. So, perhaps, the better policy would be to work quietly, without making grandiose pronouncments. Of course, no politcian can resist making speeches that echo with history (and the populace), but it seems to me that one way Mubarak, for example, has stayed in power is to leverage the anti-Americanism in Egypt into a sort of referendum against democratization (i.e., by refusing to democratize, I'm standing up to the Americans.) It's a sham, but I suspect it has some effect at least in creating ambivalence toward what seems to be an American-inspired concept. There was one example a few years ago where the US spoke out in support of a jailed Egyptian dissident and it seemed to provoke more hostility. So, maybe let our actions speak louder than our words.

The other issue is, is it more important to support rule of the people, what ever they choose, or to support what we generally associate with democracy in the west, rule of law, separation of powers, protection of basic liberties, etc. This is the point of Fareed Zakaria's seminal article The Rise of Illiberal Democracy Some of Zakaria's major points are that majorities can genuinely will illiberal ends.

THE AMERICAN diplomat Richard Holbrooke pondered a problem on the eve of the September 1996 elections in Bosnia, which were meant to restore civic life to that ravaged country. "Suppose the election was declared free and fair," he said, and those elected are "racists, fascists, separatists, who are publicly opposed to [peace and reintegration]. That is the dilemma." Indeed it is, ...

In countries not grounded in constitutional liberalism, the rise of democracy often brings with it hyper-nationalism and war-mongering.

While constitutional liberalism often leads to democratization, the reverse is generally not true.

In contrast to the Western and East Asian paths, during the last two decades in Latin America, Africa, and parts of Asia, dictatorships with little background in constitutional liberalism have given way to democracy. The results are not encouraging. In the western hemisphere, with elections having been held in every country except Cuba, a 1993 study by the scholar Larry Diamond determined that 10 of the 22 principal Latin American countries "have levels of human rights abuse that are incompatible with the consolidation of [liberal] democracy."

Finally, Zakaria advocates establishing the building blocks of constitutional liberalism before pushing elections

While it is easy to impose elections on a country, it is more difficult to push constitutional liberalism on a society. The process of genuine liberalization and democratization is gradual and long-term, in which an election is only one step. Without appropriate preparation, it might even be a false step. ... In an age of images and symbols, elections are easy to capture on film. (How do you televise the rule of law?) But there is life after elections, especially for the people who live there.

Applying all this to the case of Egypt, there have been legitimate uses of Egypt's emergency laws to control the tyrannical impulses of the Muslim Brotherhood. However, these measures have been used equally against liberals as against Islamists, whether in bowing to Islamist pressure or just to remove one more threat to Mubarak's rule. Joseph Braude, author to the article to which Rick Heller linked, echoed Zakaria's ideas in the following lines: "As a result of all this, liberalism is weak in Egypt, and it needs time to strengthen itself." and

In short, the skewed political environment that has been created by Mubarak's long years of anti-liberal manipulations would only be enshrined if free and fair elections took place now. To foster a semblance of political balance in Egyptian society, political and cultural pressure must first be exerted from the top--a twenty-first century Ataturk-style project to undo the country's decades-long tilt toward Islamism is needed. This means opening Egyptian broadcast media to progressive voices, not just religious clerics and the political establishment.

Advocating first for greater freedom of expression also has the benefit that it brings tangible improvements those abroad without risking that less friendly regimes take power. In the meantime, the free exchange of ideas would enable less hostile parties to build support for when free and fair elections do come.