Centerfield

Absence of Pivot

A certain basic concept seems to have become the key to unlocking the political dimension of the Iraq war.

I think of it as "the pivot".

We discussed it extensively here on Centerfield back during the Democratic primaries, when Howard Dean was surging to a seemingly insurmountable lead based on a largely anti-war platform.

Dean made much of his consistent opposition to the war. He also, once the war started, expressed an understanding that things had changed once we went forward with the war. In those early days, he emphasized our need to see it through to success and our responsibility to establish order and rebuild the country. He posted a plan for doing so on his website.

He seemed to understand initially that Iraq becomes a key front in the war on terror after we invade, even if it wasn't before. By invading, we face the prospect of either building a successful Iraqi government or failing to do so -- and failing gives terrorists a rallying point and new opportunities to find refuge in a conflict-ridden nation in the middle of the Arab world.

This is a separate issue from whether they found refuge in Iraq before the war. There is a distinct before and after, with regards to Iraq policy. A clear pivot.

Dean pivoted nicely in the immediate post-war period. But he had problems sticking with it. He called for more troops in the early days, but called for a drawdown of U.S. troops later. He argued that the international community should replace U.S. troops. But given that the existing U.S. force was not enough, it was never realistic to think we could raise overall troop levels while lowering the U.S. presence.

He lapsed into "withdrawal" type rhetoric, at times.

He publicly opposed the $87 billion reconstruction package, basing his argument on fiscal policy. That reflects a broader misunderstanding of foreign policy -- that the money part of the problem would ever constrain us from taking the proper steps to achieve our fundamental security needs, or to follow through and win a war.

We had some interesting discussions about this here on Centerfield. A certain segment of Dean's supporters felt he was the true centrist candidate in the field -- that he was more of a DLC type Democrat in his record as governor of Vermont, and that independents and moderates were genuinely energized by his candidacy.

A few of us, here, took that on from a foreign policy perspective. A foreign policy centrist would know how to pivot -- to understand the difference between the pre-war question (whether to invade) and the post-war question (what to do once you have). To understand that winning was critical, once you decide to go in, and that there's no rewind button on history that would allow a Howard Dean to go back and "remake" the war decision.

Someone who pivots knows how important it is to provide the reconstruction funds and places that priority ahead of the need to score anti-war political points.

Someone who pivots doesn't say that capturing Saddam didn't make America safer. Because America is at war with an insurgency, and Saddam is a rallying point for part of the insurgency. Having him in custody is a blow to the real forces in Iraq who are opposing us every day.

You can look at it in terms of the broader question -- whether going in to get Saddam was the better choice for American security. But to do so -- to insist on that perspective -- is to fail to pivot. You are looking at it in terms of past decisions rather than actual circumstances we face on the ground today.

No pivot. And you're not a moderate realist on foreign policy. You don't belong in the grownup crowd of centrist foreign policy internationalists that includes Hagel, Lugar, and Biden. They all voted for the funding.

The pivot was clearly central to the foreign policy issues surrounding a surging Dean campaign last year. But it has followed us all the way through, culminating in a headline I read this morning in the Columbus Dispatch.

Before we get there, though, let's consider the intervening period. Kerry and Edwards failed to pivot in opposing the $87 billion reconstruction package. They have paid for it dearly -- with ads running daily here in Ohio highlighting their vote againts funds and equipment for troops in the middle of a war.

I think Cheney was correct a few nights ago in suggesting a motivation. Howard Dean was the hot Democrat at the time of the vote, and Dean publicly opposed the $87 billion and used it to burnish his anti-war credentials.

Kerry and Edwards were 2 of only 11 Democrats to vote against the funding. Voting for it was a strong majority position among Senate Democrats (77%), even those who opposed the war.

The rest of the party could pivot. But the ones running for president could not. Howard Dean cast a fairly long shadow at the time of that particular vote.

The pivot became a key concern in a different way during the first presidential debate last Thursday.

Yes, the president pointed out Kerry's failure to pivot on the $87 billion. But he also essentially denied the right of anyone to pivot. He didn't just say that Kerry didn't pivot, with regards to the $87 billion -- he said you can't ever pivot.

Bush drew the line at a place that makes any sort of opposition to the war at any time a disqualifying factor for becoming commander in chief. Suggesting that the original decision to go to war was wrong means that you cannot now accept the challenge and follow-through with a plan for success.

There is no pivot, the president said. You were either with us from the beginning, or you're unqualified to take over the reigns now and see it through. Either I was right all along, or you're wrong now. Heads I win, tails you lose.

This attitude -- this failure to see any sort of pivot at all -- is what led to a headline in this morning's paper that's likely to strike Ohio voters in an odd sort of way. It says:

Bush Insists WMD Report Still Supports War on Iraq

The administration's position, expressed yesterday, is that the absence of WMDs has nothing to do with whether the original decision to go into Iraq was right. It was their central claim justifying the war, but now it has no relevance to the decision.

The stark illogic is clear to most voters who picked up their papers here in Columbus this morning.

It is, in essence, a refusal to see any sort of pivot. They can't admit we've learned things that would've influenced our decision, had we known them before the war. They can't accept the pivot as a central fact of our war policy -- that the justification for war is fundamentally suspect, but that it doesn't matter now, because we still have to succeed.

Iraq has in fact pivoted. It was not key to the war on terror before we went in, but it is now. This is a fundamental fact that both parties ignore, frequently, to their peril. And to ours.

Bush can't be credible without making ample room for the stark contrast in his war rationales and the facts. Kerry can't prosecute a war without prioritizing the difficult choices over the politics of those choices.

Bush needs to be honest. Kerry needs to be tough.

Posted by William Swann at October 8, 2004 10:58 AM