Centerfield

I've argued against direct elections from the beginning, but given the President's rhetoric, we're trapped. I'd rather Iraq not turn into a theocracy, but if that's how the vote goes, that may be the outcome. Given the destruction of their armed forces, it's unlikely they'll be a threat to their neighbors at any time soon, even under a theocracy.

John Marshall was one of those who took an exceedingly dubious position before the war that the Iraqis could hack this democracy stuff; he thought it would take WWII-level destruction. IMHO, since then, he has been unwilling to look at signs that aren't clearly negative. While there are reasons to worry, maybe even including some of the reasons given in the Post article, I think Marshall's Iraq posts are pretty bad these days.

Some of the constructive analysis in this post includes:

The profoundest deception was the claim that the IGC was designed to be a transitional governing authority when in fact, as is now
becoming clear, its true purpose was to provide a sort of dark, Falstaffian comic relief to balance out the ominous backdrop of
postwar Iraq.
(who can believe that the Bush Administration feels this way about its own creation?)

Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani ... He's calling the shots; we're not.
(How? Does Marshall believe in the stereotype where Muslims obey their Ayatollahs unquestioningly?)

We can't even get our puppets in line.
(maybe they aren't puppets?)

The worst problem of Marshall's post is that it treats speculative parts of the Post article as fact. And I'm stopping here on criticising this article - I try not to Fisk.

The Post article is negligent in a different way. It only quotes possibly negative interpretations, without asking anybody who might have a different perspective. It's even worse in that it only consulted one school of foreign policy, the realists. And the analyses totally ignore political differentiations and don't consult ground realities. Bad enough that we had to live with this when Nixon was in.

I can just see their analysis of the US: "Most actors want power for themselves instead of having to live with the Republican hold on the Presidency and the Congress. I believe we will see a coup soon, with the connivance of the Democratic governors, the Democratic minority in Congress, and the Democrat-led CIA."

Some of the basic pieces of the problem are as follows:

1. The Shiites, being a majority, want direct elections.
2. The Sunnis make up about a quarter of the population, but are accustomed to ruling Iraq and have a lot of their identity caught up in that role.
3. The Iraqi Governing Council has little popular support, and therefore little natural interest in nationwide elections.

Look at the news just out today to see how these faultlines are emerging. The Iraqi Governing Council apparently voted today -- unanimously -- to support full national elections for selecting the interim government in June.

Sounds great, right? They're clearly trying to send a positive signal to the Shiite leaders who spoke out against their original plan.

But then look at what else they said. They don't intend to disband in June, and, from their comments, it sounds like they intend to retain national sovereignty in the Council even after the elections. They're using terms like "State Council", "Sovereignty Council", and "Senate" to describe the role they see themselves as having.

It's possible that all this will work out. But the tensions are pretty serious, and the parties harder to influence now that we've signaled our intention to draw down our presence.

Also, take a peek at the survey results just reported today:

* 79% of Iraqis said they have little or no trust in the U.S.-led occupation.
* By contrast, 70% said they have a lot or a great deal of trust in Iraq's religious leaders.

I get the feeling Al Sistani's comments reflect a lot of popular opinion. But of course he's the one calling for democracy, in this instance, not some sort of theocratic rule.

I am partway through the packer piece, which is quite long, but so far seems well worth the trouble. So far what impresses me the most is the degree of difficulty of the task we face in Iraq. Packer is contending that those in charge in the admin for the most part grossly underestimated the difficulties we would face.

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